Venezuela: the democratic transition that wasn’t
Venezuela is at a critical juncture as Nicolás Maduro begins his third term as president, despite losing the July 2024 presidential election to opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia. His inauguration, attended only by the authoritarian presidents of Cuba and Nicaragua, took place amid heightened security measures, widespread protests and a crackdown on civil society and the political opposition. It represents a significant setback for democratic aspirations in Venezuela and has implications far beyond its borders, as it can only exacerbate the ongoing crisis that has seen around eight million Venezuelans flee the country.
Venezuela stands at a critical juncture as Nicolás Maduro begins a controversial third term as president, deepening a political crisis that continues to reach new depths. His 10 January inauguration, following a post-election period marked by widespread protests against election fraud and heightened repression, represents a significant setback for democratic aspirations in a country devastated by years of economic collapse and political oppression. Maduro’s confirmation at the helm is the latest chapter in a decades-long process that has transformed Venezuela from a beacon of leftist democratic aspirations into a full-blown authoritarian regime, where institutional checks and balances have been systematically dismantled and the last shred of legitimacy – popular election – has now vanished.
The implications of Venezuela’s crisis extend far beyond its borders, generating the largest refugee exodus in the Americas and creating significant challenges for neighbouring countries. Almost eight million Venezuelans already live abroad, with projections suggesting another two or three million might leave in the coming years.
This crisis comes at a moment when, unlike in the past, two key factors potentially leading to a democratic transition are present in Venezuela: unprecedented opposition unity capable of sustaining a protest movement and growing international support, with progressive Latin American governments increasingly distancing themselves from the Maduro regime. However, Maduro’s willingness to use violent repression and his ability to maintain military loyalty suggest a difficult path ahead for democratic restoration.
The 28 July election
The 2024 presidential election initially sparked hopes for democratic change. These hopes were crushed when Maduro declared himself the winner despite clear evidence that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia had secured a significant victory.
The election campaign unfolded against a backdrop of intensifying civic space restrictions as the government pushed through two significant pieces of legislation: an ‘anti-NGO law’ restricting civic participation and human rights advocacy and a ‘law against fascism’ that criminalises a broad range of activities deemed fascist, based on deliberately vague definitions and aimed at suppressing dissent.
The election was far from free and fair. The government disqualified popular opposition leader María Corina Machado and blocked her proposed replacement, forcing the opposition to field González Urrutia as its candidate. Additional irregularities included systematic persecution of opposition leaders, abuse of public resources, media manipulation and voter suppression tactics, particularly targeting the estimated four million Venezuelan voters abroad.
Despite these challenges, the opposition demonstrated unprecedented unity and organisation. Through its Plan 600K initiative, it mobilised around 600,000 volunteers to monitor polling stations, collect the vote tallies produced by voting machines and independently calculate results. Their parallel vote count revealed that González won around 67 per cent of votes compared to Maduro’s 29 per cent, figures supported by independent exit polls. However, the National Electoral Council (CNE) stopped publishing results after counting 40 per cent of votes, eventually declaring an implausible victory for Maduro without providing any supporting data. The Carter Center, the only independent observer permitted, declared the results unverifiable and the election undemocratic. The United Nations panel of experts on Venezuela similarly concluded that the CNE had failed to comply with basic measures of transparency and integrity essential for credible elections.
Post-election repression
Fraud sparked widespread civil unrest, with 915 spontaneous protests erupting across Venezuelan cities in the two days following the election. The regime’s response was swift and severe. The government labelled the protests a ‘fascist outbreak’ and charged many protesters with terrorism and incitement to hatred. Security forces used deadly force, resulting in at least 25 deaths, while pro-government paramilitaries engaged in intimidation and violence.
According to official figures from the Public Ministry, 2,400 people were detained in the immediate aftermath. Foro Penal, Venezuela’s leading human rights monitoring group, documented over 1,800 political prisoners by September, with widespread reports of torture and violations of fundamental rights. Repression intensified in the lead-up to Maduro’s inauguration, with 75 new political detentions in the first 11 days of January 2025 alone.
The crackdown extended beyond street protesters to target opposition and civil society leaders. Several prominent figures were forced into hiding or exile, while others faced arbitrary detention. Among them was Carlos Correa, director of Espacio Público, a prominent organisation defending freedom of expression, who was kidnapped by hooded officials on 7 January in the capital, Caracas. His family searched for him in multiple detention centres, but authorities refused to provide any information about his whereabouts. He was freed eight days later following an intense international civil society campaign.
#Venezuela: #CIDH y su @RELE_CIDH condenan la detención arbitraria y desaparición forzada de Carlos Correa, Director Ejecutivo de @EspacioPublico. Las autoridades no han brindado información a familiares que han acudido insistentemente a varios centros de reclusión en su… pic.twitter.com/bG8qq2pZOh
— CIDH - IACHR (@CIDH) January 8, 2025
El Secretario General de la ONU @antonioguterres está profundamente preocupado por los informes de nuevas detenciones arbitrarias y persecuciones contra miembros de la oposición y sus familiares en #Venezuela pic.twitter.com/GhqOzV5jKA
— Noticias ONU (@NoticiasONU) January 8, 2025
On 29 November, the government published the ‘Liberator Simon Bolivar Organic Law Against Imperialist Blockade and in Defence of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’, the Simon Bolivar Law for short, significantly expanding state powers to punish perceived dissent. Punishable offences include both direct and indirect support for international sanctions, including questioning electoral results and merely sharing information about sanctions. The law imposes severe penalties, with prison sentences of up to 30 years, political disqualification for up to 60 years, civil liability, asset seizure and the comprehensive deprivation of civil rights. It establishes a national registry of suspects who can face immediate penalties without due process, imposes heavy fines on media outlets that discuss sanctions and allows trials in absentia.
Inauguration day
Maduro’s inauguration reflected both the regime’s isolation and its increasingly authoritarian character. Only two presidents – those of Cuba and Nicaragua – attended the ceremony, while other governments sent lower-level representatives. The swearing-in ceremony took place 90 minutes earlier than scheduled, out of fear that the opposition’s president-elect, in exile in Spain, could somehow materialise its declared intention to enter Venezuela and hold a parallel counter-inauguration.
The government implemented extraordinary security measures to make sure this wouldn’t happen, closing land borders with Brazil and Colombia, shutting down Venezuelan airspace and deploying an unprecedented number of security forces throughout Caracas. The militarisation extended to the closure of opposition-controlled neighbourhoods and the pre-emptive detention of dozens of opposition figures.
Maduro’s inaugural address and subsequent appearances were particularly confrontational. He announced plans for constitutional changes to further consolidate power and declared the start of a new phase of governance based on a strong alliance between civilian authorities, military forces, the police and the intelligence apparatus. In his speech at the ‘Great Anti-Fascist World Festival’ following the inauguration, he openly discussed Venezuela’s readiness to take up arms against intervention alongside Cuba and Nicaragua, framing political opposition as a threat to national sovereignty.
International responses and regional implications
In the Americas, only Bolivia, Cuba, Honduras and Nicaragua recognise Maduro as the legitimately elected president, with only an additional handful worldwide, including China, Iran and Russia, maintaining their support.
The USA responded to Maduro’s inauguration by increasing the reward it offers for information leading to Maduro’s arrest to US$25 million, while also targeting his inner circle with new sanctions. The European Union also imposed new sanctions targeting the president of the Supreme Court of Justice and 14 other high-ranking officials. The foreign ministers of the G7 – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the USA – along with the High Representative of the European Union, issued a joint statement condemning Maduro’s ‘lack of democratic legitimacy’ and the ongoing repression of civil society and the political opposition.
Most significantly, the positions of Latin American states appear to be slowly shifting, with some left-wing leaders, notably those of Brazil and Colombia, not automatically siding with the Maduro regime for the first time. However, Colombia’s pragmatic approach under President Gustavo Petro reveals the complexities faced by Venezuela’s neighbours: while not accepting the official election results at face value, Colombia has stopped short of condemnation and has been careful to maintain its diplomatic relations, citing the need to manage border issues and the refugee situation.
Brazilian President Lula da Silva has taken a relatively ambiguous line, and an unconditional commitment to democracy has regrettably also been lacking from another important left-led country, Mexico. Chilean President Gabriel Boric, a member of a younger generation with a very different relationship to the traditional left, remains largely alone in his unconditional anti-authoritarian stance. Hopefully others will soon join him.
Venezuela’s political crisis continues to fuel a humanitarian emergency. Economic collapse has driven the largest movement of refugees in the Western Hemisphere’s history. Experts have warned that many more people could leave over the next year or two if current conditions persist, further straining resources and social services in host countries, particularly Brazil and Colombia.
Voices from the frontline
Carlos Torrealba is a Venezuelan academic and researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico.
The opposition was hoping for change. But the government’s control machinery was in full swing, going so far as to close sections of the motorway linking the airport to the capital, Caracas, to prevent any potential attempt by González to return to the country.
Social media also fuelled unrealistic expectations, fed by international allies such as Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, whose insinuation that he was in Caracas caused confusion. In the end, these expectations collided with the harsh reality: González was unable to return to assume the presidency.
The opposition’s main challenge now is to maintain hope, cohesion and the attention of the international community. Since 28 July, Maduro has shown he is in firm control of the situation. Although the opposition has managed to mobilise the electorate, which in itself is a great success given the lack of adequate conditions for an election, the next steps are unclear. For instance, it was feared that they would do a symbolic proclamation similar to that of Juan Guaidó, who was recognised as ‘interim president’ between 2019 and 2022, which failed miserably.
The opposition has often engaged in ‘adventurism’ without a solid plan and could improve its communication strategy, as demonstrated by the episode of Machado’s kidnapping, which lasted several hours, on the day of protests on the eve of the inauguration. Every failed attempt at democratic transition strengthens the power of the Maduro government.
This is an edited extract of our conversation with Carlos. Read the full interview here.
Prospects for democratic change
The path to democratic transition faces significant obstacles, with military support remaining crucial to Maduro’s hold on power. The regime has secured military loyalty through a combination of institutional integration, coercion and economic privilege, with high-ranking military officers reaping generous benefits from the state’s economic apparatus. The regime has found additional layers of protection in security structures including the National Bolivarian Guard, special police units and pro-government militias, and the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, strongly backed by G2, Cuba’s secret service.
But the authoritarian regime also has vulnerabilities. Growing international isolation, combined with continued economic deterioration, may eventually strain the system of patronage that maintains elite loyalty, including among the military. The opposition’s commitment to peaceful resistance, while seemingly ineffective in the short term, continues to earn it moral authority and international support.
While the combination of peaceful resistance, international pressure and potential internal divisions within the regime may eventually create conditions for change, the immediate future suggests a continuing struggle between an entrenched authoritarian system and a resilient democratic movement. The outcome will have profound implications for Venezuela and for all of Latin America.
OUR CALLS FOR ACTION
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The government must immediately release people arbitrarily detained for expressing dissent and restore fundamental freedoms.
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The international community should continue to isolate the authoritarian regime to increase its costs of holding on to power.
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Progressive Latin American governments should use their leverage with President Maduro to initiate a transition.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
Cover photo by Juan Barreto/AFP via Getty Images