‘Each failed attempt at democratic transition reinforces the power of the authoritarian government’
CIVICUS discusses the expectations of Venezuelan civil society following Nicolás Maduro’s inauguration with Carlos Torrealba, a Venezuelan academic and researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico.
In the months leading up to Nicolás Maduro’s inauguration for his third presidential term in January 2025, his government intensified repression, rejecting his defeat in the July election. While some still hoped that the legitimately elected president, Edmundo González Urrutia, could take office, the regime launched a preventive wave of what the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights denounced as state terrorism; the body has documented 25 murders, some 2,000 arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances and torture and cruel treatment of detainees. Between August and December, the authorities arrested at least 56 opposition activists, 10 journalists and one human rights defender, while deploying an unprecedented military and police presence.
What patterns of repression have emerged since the election?
Over the past two decades, the ruling Chavista movement has built an extremely sophisticated and effective repressive apparatus that has caused great suffering to Venezuelan people. Since the election, we have seen an increase in mass arrests, a new practice in relation to the cycles of protests linked to previous electoral conflicts, where mobilisations were violently repressed but more visible. The current mass arrests include the authorities picking people up from their homes and criminalising them through a wider range of criminal charges.
The Penal Forum, a Venezuelan human rights organisation that monitors these rights violations, reported that as of 15 January, 1,687 people were imprisoned for political reasons. According to the United Nations, the cumulative figure since 2014 is 18,000.
From time to time the government releases some prisoners. In the days leading up to Maduro’s inauguration on 10 January, for example, it released some who had been detained since the post-election protests, while arresting others.
What were the expectations of civil society as the inauguration approached?
The opposition, led by María Corina Machado and president-elect González Urrutia, was hoping for change. But the government’s control machinery was in full swing, going so far as to close sections of the motorway linking the airport to the capital, Caracas, to prevent any potential attempt by González to return to the country.
Social media also fuelled unrealistic expectations, fed by international allies such as Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, whose insinuation that he was in Caracas caused confusion. In the end, these expectations collided with the harsh reality: González was unable to return to assume the presidency.
The opposition’s main challenge now is to maintain hope, cohesion and the attention of the international community. Since 28 July, Maduro has shown he is in firm control of the situation. Although the opposition has managed to mobilise the electorate, which in itself is a great success given the lack of adequate conditions for an election, the next steps are unclear. For instance, it was feared that they would do a symbolic proclamation similar to that of Juan Guaidó, who was recognised as ‘interim president’ between 2019 and 2022, which failed miserably.
The opposition has often engaged in ‘adventurism’ without a solid plan and could improve its communication strategy, as demonstrated by the episode of Machado’s kidnapping, which lasted several hours, on the day of protests on the eve of the inauguration. Every failed attempt at democratic transition strengthens the power of the Maduro government.
How has the international community reacted to Maduro’s inauguration?
In the face of the failure of internal efforts to force a democratic transition, the opposition has sought to internationalise the crisis. Since 10 January, the USA has increased the rewards it is offering for the arrest of Maduro, his number two Diosdado Cabello and other senior regime officials, while the European Union has stepped up its pressure with new targeted sanctions. But international pressure has its limits and has ended up exacerbating the crisis.
Trump’s arrival in the US presidency raises the possibility of tougher sanctions against Venezuela’s oil industry. But this tactic was already tried and failed in 2019, when it failed to remove Maduro from power and instead worsened the economic crisis.
But there are also countries in the region with left-wing governments, such as Colombia and Mexico, which this time have not adopted a position of automatic solidarity with Maduro. Although they have not agreed on a way forward, it is significant that their presidents did not recognise Maduro’s victory or attend his inauguration.
What factors can help or hinder a democratic transition?
The key to an effective transition is to build from the bottom up. That’s why what’s happening at the civil society level is encouraging.
In an unfavourable environment, many organisations continue to work to rebuild the social fabric, addressing health and food issues and promoting democratic relations at the community level. New groups have also emerged that express discontent but do not align with the traditional political opposition, such as Surgentes, a human rights research, education and advocacy group, and Mothers in Defence of the Truth, formed by women whose teenage children were arrested in the post-election protests and are groundlessly accused of terrorism in flagrant violation of all due process guarantees.
Although the actions of these organisations are modest, they are important as forms of resistance against the Maduro regime. They are still able to take advantage of the fact that the autocratic regime tolerates their protests: on 21 January, for example, they held a sit-in at the Public Prosecutor’s Office. But this could change at any moment, and they too could become victims of repression. But here lies the opportunity to make progress in the formation of new coalitions like the Popular Democratic Front, which brings together left-wing political and social organisations and includes dissident Chavistas.
Maduro has already shown that he can govern without being recognised as legitimate. Any attempt at political transition in Venezuela must take this reality into account. Although the atmosphere is pessimistic, hope lies in the new human rights movement, the rapprochement between parts of the traditional opposition and these groups and their openness to attempting negotiation.