Ecuador’s runoff presidential election saw centre-right candidate Daniel Noboa, leader of the National Democratic Action coalition (Acción Democrática Nacional, ADN), defeat left-winger Luisa González, former president Rafael Correa’s handpicked candidate for the Citizen Revolution Movement (Movimiento Revolución Ciudadana).

In becoming Ecuador’s youngest-ever president, the 35-year-old Harvard Kennedy School graduate handed his family – the owner of a vast business empire that includes one of the world’s best-known banana brands – the one thing it never had. And it wasn’t for lack of trying: his father Álvaro Noboa, Ecuador’s richest person, unsuccessfully ran for president three times. In 2006 he won the first round only to be defeated in the runoff by Correa.

Daniel Noboa won by offering renewal and promising to overcome polarisation around Correa’s legacy. But under his administration, meant to last only 18 months, the legislative balance of forces won’t be much different from that which doomed his predecessor. Progress will require serious coalition-building efforts, negotiation skills and willingness to compromise.

Change, but what kind?

Noboa’s second place in August came as a surprise. His strong debating performance was a factor in his growing popularity. But crucially, the political newcomer had found a niche when the candidate who most clearly embodied change, Fernando Villavicencio, was assassinated only 10 days before the election.

The change proposed by Noboa, however, was quite different from that promised by Villavicencio, a former investigative journalist and trade union activist. Villavicencio was one of the journalists who uncovered the bribery scandal that resulted in Correa’s in absentia conviction in 2020, and he’d chaired the congressional Commission for Oversight and Political Control, daring to name those responsible for crime and drug trafficking in Ecuador. On the campaign trail, he’d promised to take on government corruption and fight collusion with organised crime. At the time of his murder he was under police protection after receiving serious threats, including from people linked to Mexico’s Sinaloa drug cartel.

Noboa promoted himself as a new young face untainted by the vices of politics, intent on overcoming the polarisation around the controversial Correa, whose authoritarian leanings and corrupt legacy were now increasingly rejected.

Noboa’s style, more moderate and less divisive than his runoff rival’s, suited him well. His message was that energies should focus on tackling Ecuador’s serious economic and security problems rather than be wasted on political squabbles and power struggles. He effectively conveyed his messaging through social media, particularly TikTok, and gained traction among young voters who’d mostly been disengaged from politics.

By comparison, his left-wing competitor looked like a typical representative of the political establishment. González had held various government roles under Correa, and her campaign hailed her mentor’s government record, promising to restore social spending to tackle the unsatisfied demands of the mass protests that have erupted in recent years.

While González’s emphasis was on social spending, Noboa stayed true to his business background, proposing to tackle economic woes by focusing on productivity – through the promotion of education, employment and investment, including by lowering taxes. Unlike González, he emphasised fiscal discipline and supported the continued use of the US dollar as the official currency.

But there wasn’t much ideology in the election campaign, and there arguably wasn’t much enthusiasm either: Noboa’s victory probably owed as much to rejection of Correa’s legacy as it did to his campaign pledges.

Ultimately, Noboa was able to convince young voters to follow him into a promised brighter future, while González continued to appeal to older voters’ nostalgia for a more secure past. In doing so, González relied more heavily on party structures on the ground, which gave her a higher threshold of support, as attested by the August results. Correa’s backing and continuing high profile, even though he lives in exile in Belgium, were initially a blessing, as they helped her become known to the public. But they later became a curse, as they limited the amount of additional votes González could gather between the first and the second rounds, ultimately sealing her defeat.

Insecurity to the fore

Violence was at the forefront of voters’ minds even before the assassination of Villavicencio – which wasn’t the only killing of a politician during election season.

The problem is major. A bloody turf war between rival criminal organisations fighting for control of drug trafficking routes has plunged Ecuador into unprecedented violence, with violent deaths quadrupling since 2019, up to 4,603 in 2022 – a rate of 25 per 100,000 people, compared to 13.7 in 2021. This makes Ecuador the Latin American country with the highest growth in rates of criminal violence. 2023 could end with a rate of 39 per 100,000, making it one of the most violent countries in the region.

According to official sources, some 90 per cent of violent deaths are the result of crime, and most of these are linked to drug trafficking. Eighty-three per cent of violent deaths have happened in five of Ecuador’s 24 provinces – those on the ‘drug route’.

About a week before the runoff, seven Colombian nationals who were being prosecuted for their role in Villavicencio’s death were found dead in the Ecuadorian prisons where they’d been detained.

Safety was the overwhelming public demand expressed during the campaign, and it was at the centre of the candidates’ pre-election debate, in which both emphasised the need to provide more funding for police, militarise ports and regain control of prisons overtaken by gangs. But it was hard for people to tell the two candidates’ proposals apart, so what ultimately mattered the most was the candidates’ personality and the trust they managed to inspire in their ability to make the right calls when the time came.

The end of instability?

But there are reasons to doubt that Noboa will be able to make and implement such decisions. He will only serve a year and a half. His job – and that of the 137 National Assembly members elected in August – is to complete the current presidential and legislative terms cut short by the activation of the ‘cross-death’ mechanism by President Guillermo Lasso in May – a constitutional manoeuvre under which he dissolved the National Assembly to stop it impeaching him. This allowed Lasso a couple of months when he could rule by decree but also ended his term early.

Noboa will also likely face a hostile National Assembly. The August vote produced a legislative body in which ADN will have only 14 seats, compared to 52 for Citizen Revolution. The distribution of seats closely replicates that of the previous legislature, in which President Lasso’s party had only 12 seats, while the Correa-led coalition had the largest share. In two and a half years, Lasso – a former banker with a pro-business agenda – could barely pass three laws.

To tackle Ecuador’s growing social, economic, environmental and security problems, the new president will need to seek broad agreements – and need to do so in a transparent way instead of going behind the public’s back, to avoid feeding suspicion that policies serve elite or personal interests rather than the general good.

Noboa should reach out to civil society, which will for the most part give him the benefit of the doubt. Under the decade-long government led by Correa, a populist who tended to view himself as the sole legitimate representative of the people and to deny the legitimacy of dissenting voices, civil society faced serious restrictions and numerous activists and journalists were vilified and criminalised. Noboa’s pledge to turn the page contains an implicit promise to civil society.

That promise should now be made explicit and translate into action. To meet the challenge of combating organised crime and standing up to impunity while respecting rights, the president will have to enable and work with civil society. That would be a vital step in arresting the downward spiral of instability and violence.