CIVICUS discusses the far right’s rise in Germany with Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, a veteran US journalist and host of Common Ground Berlin, a non-profit English-language podcast that promotes public debate and transatlantic dialogue on divisive issues.

Germany’s far right could soon govern a state for the first time since the Second World War. On 6 September, Alternative for Germany (AfD), which a domestic intelligence agency classifies as ‘confirmed right-wing extremist’, won around 44 per cent of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt, which translated into 39 of the state parliament’s 83 seats, three short of a majority. The AfD could take power when the state parliament elects a new minister-president in mid-December. On 20 September, the AfD also came first in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania’s state election, although it isn’t expected to take charge there because other parties won enough seats to form a governing coalition.

What explains the AfD’s rise?

The AfD’s success in Saxony-Anhalt is its latest milestone. Since it was founded as a Eurosceptic party 13 years ago, Germany has gone through one economic, political or security crisis after another. These crises have provided fertile soil for any party calling itself the alternative to the mainstream. Two years after the AfD launched, Germany welcomed over a million migrants, largely from Syria. Their arrival sparked mass anti-immigration protests by grassroots groups whose members were prime recruits for the AfD.

The party remained on the fringe until centre-right Chancellor Angela Merkel left office in 2021. Her departure ushered in an unpopular mainstream coalition led by the centre-left Social Democrats. That coalition, along with a persistent economic downturn, helped the AfD become the country’s second-most popular party in the 2025 federal election. But the centre-right Christian Democratic bloc won and cobbled together a mainstream coalition under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, a multimillionaire who quickly became post-war Germany’s least popular leader.

Meanwhile, a financially struggling Germany became the biggest contributor to Ukraine in the war Russia started. All of this left a third or more of the electorate receptive to the AfD’s claim that it can fix the economy by redirecting the billions of euros now spent on Ukraine, along with money it falsely claims is lavished on immigrants. The party points to benefits such as housing that immigrants receive while many Germans struggle to keep their homes and jobs. And so Europe’s economic powerhouse went from being one of the world’s healthiest liberal democracies to flirting with the prospect of a government led by a party that federal investigators consider a danger to the constitution.

How likely is the AfD to take power in Saxony-Anhalt, and what would change as a result?

It’s likely. The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a small left-wing nationalist party, has broken ranks with parties that pledged not to cooperate with the far right. Its founder, Sahra Wagenknecht, used to co-lead the Left Party’s parliamentary group, and the BSW shares the AfD’s aims of repairing relations with Russia and restricting immigration. The AfD and BSW have already elected the state parliament speaker and seated themselves in the centre of the chamber. They are likely to cooperate again in December to elect the minister-president, the state’s chief executive.

A state government has little control over federal policies such as support for Ukraine or immigration restrictions. But an AfD government would have a chance to show whether it can deliver for everyday Germans, for instance by providing additional benefits to people who volunteer for emergency services. Its plans to exclude immigrant children from mainstream schools or segregate classrooms would likely run into legal trouble. One of its most troubling proposals is to set up voluntary citizen patrols to assist the police. It doesn’t take much imagination to see how xenophobia could turn these patrols into brownshirt-style vigilante groups targeting people who might appear to have a migrant background.

What impact has the extremist label had on the AfD?

It has more or less backfired. One of the AfD’s talking points is that the German establishment is trying to suppress what is now the country’s most popular party. Germany has refrained from banning parties that share many characteristics with the Nazis, such as the National Democratic Party, because they were too small to be a threat. Now many see the AfD as too popular to ban. How can one justify denying nearly a third of the electorate its choice? Voters, particularly younger ones, are finding an answer to that question cleverly packaged in vertical videos on TikTok and other popular platforms.

Even the mainstream media have helped. Before the election, the news magazine Der Spiegel ran a cover featuring the AfD’s lead candidate, Ulrich Siegmund, and calling him ‘Germany’s most dangerous man’. Siegmund made a point of autographing copies at a campaign rally, and they are now selling for €300 (approx. US$334) on eBay. Efforts to ban the party seem to be bolstering its claim to be the alternative to a failing mainstream leadership.

Has the firewall against the AfD worked?

No, the firewall has failed to curb the far right’s rise. If anything, it has won the AfD even more sympathy and protest votes. It also lets the AfD off the hook for its claims and actions while weakening the political centre. As mainstream parties lose support, they try to keep the AfD out of power by forming so-called Frankenstein coalitions that are shaky at best. These are likely to get little done because their members cannot agree on key policies beyond their opposition to the AfD.

Other fringe parties, and sometimes mainstream ones, particularly the Christian Democratic Union, occasionally find ways around the firewall, weakening it further. Saxony-Anhalt, where the BSW is expected to side with the AfD to block any Frankenstein coalition, is the latest example. Such a manoeuvre is unlikely in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, where the Social Democrats, Greens and Left Party have a firm majority and have reached an agreement. Nor is it likely in Berlin, where the Left Party won the most votes in the September election. It still hopes to form a coalition with the Social Democrats and Greens, but allegations of antisemitism against it stalled coalition talks in October.

What would it take to slow the AfD’s momentum before the next federal election in 2029?

Mainstream parties and politicians need to rebuild trust with voters, particularly young ones, and convince them they have answers to their problems. A growing chorus in Germany argues for working with the AfD, but I do not see that as the way to restore trust, given the risk of normalising fascism and racism. Mainstream parties and politicians also need to make better use of social media and alternative or innovative news outlets to reach the growing number of Germans who no longer rely on newspapers, radio and television for information. State governments and officials should make more aggressive use of venues like the Federal Constitutional Court to rein in AfD officials, their activities and their financing where legally warranted.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.