Millions of people have taken to the streets across Turkey in recent weeks, and they show no sign of stopping. What began as a response to the detention of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu has rapidly evolved into a nationwide movement challenging President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule. With each passing day, the protests have grown in size and intensity, raising questions about Turkey’s political future. These demonstrations could mark a turning point in the country’s long slide towards authoritarianism.

Birth of a movement

Protests erupted on 19 March following İmamoğlu’s detention and subsequent arrest on corruption and terrorism charges. The timing of his arrest – just a couple of weeks after he announced his presidential candidacy – immediately aroused suspicion about its political motivations. Authorities also invalidated İmamoğlu’s university degree, a move widely perceived as an attempt to disqualify him from political office.

Student protests began at Istanbul University and quickly spread to campuses across major cities such as Ankara and Izmir, accompanied by widespread class boycotts. Simultaneously, people gathered outside city hall, initially led by İmamoğlu’s Republican People’s Party (CHP) but rapidly evolving into a broader grassroots movement.

One of the most notable aspects of these protests has been their demographic composition. Previous opposition rallies were typically attended by middle-aged supporters, but today’s movement is largely led by people from Generation Z, with many young people protesting for the first time. These young protesters, while united in their anti-government stance, remain critical of both the ruling and opposition parties, suggesting a desire for systemic change rather than just a change at the top. Their defiant rallying cries have included ‘This is just the beginning, the struggle continues!’ and ‘No salvation alone, either all together or none of us!’.

The government has reacted swiftly. Governors have imposed unconstitutional bans on public gatherings in Istanbul and other major cities. Authorities have used facial recognition to identify protesters and restricted movement in and out of Istanbul. They’ve throttled bandwidth, slowing social media access and limiting information flow. Many digital platforms became inaccessible in the early days of protests, including Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Twitter/X. Hundreds of Twitter/X accounts have been blocked, including those of journalists, media outlets, civil society organisations and student groups. The government instructed media outlets to halt live broadcasts of legal proceedings related to İmamoğlu’s case, and then made sure protests weren’t broadcast on major mainstream media channels.

At least 2,000 people have been detained during protests, including at least 10 journalists, with 316 protesters jailed pending trial. Police have repeatedly used teargas and rubber bullets against protesters. But despite all attempts to stop the protests, close to a million people gathered at city hall on 23 March, and over two million rallied in a spot far from Istanbul city centre a week later.

The protest movement has diversified its tactics, embracing shopping boycotts as a strategic form of civil disobedience. Protesters have called on people to withhold spending and urged businesses to close their doors in solidarity. The government’s response has been severe, with authorities detaining multiple people merely for supporting the boycott on social media, including prominent figures such as actor Cem Yigit Uzumoglu. Turkish prosecutors have intensified their crackdown by initiating criminal investigations against boycott organisers, specifically targeting the CHP for identifying and boycotting companies that allegedly support the government.

Turkey’s autocratic trajectory

Turkey’s gradual decline under Erdoğan’s leadership is a textbook case of democratic backsliding. When Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, it initially promised a new era characterised by the combination of democratic principles and Islamic values. The early years saw reforms that aligned with European Union (EU) accession requirements, such as expanded civic freedoms and reduced military influence in politics.

But this promising start gradually gave way to the dismantling of democratic institutions. Early warning signals came after the AKP’s third election victory in 2011. The Gezi Park protests of 2013, which began as an environmental movement against the loss of green space for construction amid rapid urban development, expanded into broader anti-government protests and marked a turning point. The government’s harsh response showed an increasingly intolerant approach to dissent. The same year, a major corruption investigation implicating Erdoğan’s inner circle was shut down through purges of police and judicial officials.

The autocratisation process accelerated dramatically after a failed coup attempt in July 2016, by which time Erdoğan had switched from being prime minister to president. The attempted coup enabled Erdoğan to declare a state of emergency and purge perceived opponents across state institutions. This resulted in the suspension or dismissal of over 150,000 civil servants, academics, judges and military personnel, replaced with loyalists. More than 50,000 people were arrested on terrorism charges, often with minimal evidence. The state of emergency lasted two years, during which Erdoğan ruled by decree, bypassing parliamentary oversight.

A constitutional referendum in 2017 changed the political system from parliamentary to presidential. Under the new constitution there was no longer a prime minister, parliament’s oversight functions were weakened and the president received unprecedented powers to appoint judges, issue decrees with force of law and dissolve parliament. The referendum passed by a narrow margin under emergency conditions that international observers criticised as falling short of democratic standards.

Along the way, Turkey became one of the world’s leading jailers of journalists. Over 90 per cent of national media came under government control through regulatory pressures, economic sanctions and takeovers by pro-government business figures. Independent newspapers faced criminal investigations while dozens of television and radio stations were shut down through emergency decrees. The few remaining independent voices operate under constant threat, forcing self-censorship. Blocks on websites and social media platforms are commonplace.

The judiciary, once viewed as a potential check on executive power, has been put at its service through constitutional changes and personnel replacements. High-profile political trials, particularly against opposition figures, politicians from Turkey’s Kurdish minority and civil society leaders, have frequently violated basic due process rights. The European Court of Human Rights has issued multiple rulings against Turkey for these violations, which the government increasingly ignores.

The government targets civil society. It has shut down thousands of organisations over the years. Prominent organisations such as the Turkish Medical Association have faced government takeovers and activists and opposition politicians have spent years in prison despite European Court rulings ordering their release. Organisations focusing on Kurdish rights, LGBTQI+ rights and government accountability are being particularly targeted.

Elections have still been held but under increasingly unfair conditions, with Erdoğan predictably winning every time. The AKP has leveraged state resources for campaigning, controlled media coverage and frequently changed electoral laws for its benefit. The Supreme Electoral Council, ostensibly an independent body, has often made decisions that favour the ruling party, such as accepting unstamped ballots in the 2017 constitutional referendum and ordering a rerun of the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election after İmamoğlu’s victory. But this rerun, which İmamoğlu won by an even bigger margin, revealed the limits of electoral manipulation.

The cumulative effect of these changes transformed a once-promising democracy into an authoritarian system with a democratic facade. The fact that each step was typically undertaken through legal mechanisms allowed the government to maintain a veneer of legitimacy. Initially, legitimacy was also derived from strong economic performance but, as challenges mounted and corruption allegations emerged, Erdoğan increasingly fell back on nationalist and polarising rhetoric to maintain support.

Democratic states turn a blind eye

Democratic states’ response to Turkey’s democratic backsliding has been muted. Turkey occupies a strongly strategic position as a physical and cultural bridge between Europe and Asia. A NATO member since 1952, it provides the military alliance’s second-largest armed contingent, guarding its southeastern flank. Its control of access to the Black Sea, particularly important for Russian naval access to the Mediterranean and Ukrainian grain shipments, became even more significant following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It has positioned itself as a key broker between the two warring countries.

Turkey is also a vital transit hub for oil and natural gas flowing from Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia to European markets. Major pipeline projects have made it increasingly vital for European energy security.

The country borders several conflict zones, including Syria and Iraq, which makes it a buffer between Europe and potential sources of instability in the Middle East. During the Syrian civil war, it hosted almost four million refugees as part of its migration deal with the EU, under which the EU agreed to pay Turkey around €6 billion (approx. US$6.6 billion) in return for stemming a much larger migration flow towards the continent.

Turkey’s influence extends beyond its immediate surroundings into the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. It has strong cultural, linguistic and historical ties to many surrounding regions, giving it considerable soft power. Its regional and global influence has recently increased with its decisive intervention in Syria, at the expense of Iranian and Russian power, and the victory of its ally Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia, which it fought with Turkish weapons.

As Turkey has drifted toward increasingly authoritarian rule under Erdoğan while maintaining its formal democratic institutions, democratic states have tended to temper their criticism to preserve relations with this indispensable regional partner. They’ve feared that internal instability in Turkey could trigger cascading security challenges, including renewed Kurdish separatism that might spread across borders, increased refugee flows, disrupted energy supplies and power vacuums that could be exploited by regional rivals or extremist organisations.

Prospects for democratic transition

The ongoing protests represent the most significant challenge to Erdoğan’s authority in years. As millions keep taking to the streets, they’ve already achieved something remarkable: they’ve shattered the atmosphere of fear and inevitability that had descended on Turkey. But whether the protests lead to meaningful democratic change remains to be seen.

The sustained nature of the protests, the leadership of young people and their broad demographic appeal suggest a deeper societal discontent than previous opposition movements, and ongoing economic challenges such as high inflation and currency devaluation may amplify momentum.

İmamoğlu is a formidable opponent. As reflected in his 2019 victory in Istanbul – a city Erdoğan once declared was key to winning Turkey – he knows how to build broad coalitions across a polarised electorate. His election win represented an unprecedented blow to Erdoğan. His actions as mayor, which included stopping the transfer of funds to pro-Erdoğan foundations and developing social programmes, enhanced his standing as a credible alternative.

The opposition however still struggles with internal divisions and has yet to present a coherent alternative vision for Turkey’s future. And Erdoğan controls key levers of power, including the judiciary, security apparatus and much of the media, and retains a solid base of support among the more conservative and religiously observant parts of Turkish society. His nationalist rhetoric and framing of opposition movements as foreign-backed conspiracies resonates among these groups.

Democratic states now face a critical choice. For too long, strategic interests have trumped democratic principles in their engagement with Turkey. This calculated indifference can no longer be justified when millions of Turkish people are putting themselves on the line to defend the same values democratic states claim to champion.

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