Political tensions in Togo have increased following recent constitutional changes. Under a newly established parliamentary system, a President of the Council of Ministers will be elected by parliament rather than popular vote. The changes will enable Faure Gnassingbé to stay in power. He’s ruled Togo as president since 2005, when he took over from his father, who’d seized control in a 1967 coup. The government has banned protests against the constitutional changes, disrupted civil society gatherings, arbitrarily arrested and detained protesters and criminalised journalists for covering the dissent. Regional and international institutions must stop looking the other way.

Thanks to his latest constitutional manoeuvre, Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé can stay in power as long as he wants. To do so, he only needs the international community to keep looking the other way as he continues to repress domestic demands for democracy. He’s already been in charge for 20 years, having inherited the presidency from his father, who seized it in a military coup in 1967. The dynasty is now almost 60 years old.

On 25 March, Togo’s National Assembly adopted a new constitution that establishes a parliamentary system, replacing the role of a directly elected president subject to term limits with a powerful prime minister appointed by parliament for six years, extendable as long as they retain majority support. The amendments were passed by a body packed with Gnassingbé supporters and weren’t put to a referendum. They came in an already tense political climate, with parliamentary and regional elections repeatedly postponed while the Assembly debated the constitutional changes.

Civil society and opposition parties saw this as a constitutional coup and took to the streets in protest. The usual heavy-handed response wasn’t long in coming.

Authoritarianism and elections

Togo has held multiparty elections since 1992, but they’ve always been marred by systematic fraud. Opposition parties are allowed to form and operate, but they can’t compete fairly. They’re prevented from campaigning, their protests are met with violence and arrests, and their leaders are criminalised. Many have fled into exile. Genuine opposition parties have no parliamentary presence.

If democracy is a system in which governments can lose elections, Togo doesn’t come anywhere close. The Union for the Republic (UNIR) is firmly in control. It uses the security forces to intimidate the opposition and silence dissent, and relies on patronage to buy loyalty and gather votes. It holds regular elections, but the body responsible for organising and overseeing them, the Independent National Electoral Commission, is anything but independent. Half of its members are supposed to be nominated by the opposition, but in 2020 only two of its 19 members weren’t from UNIR. The Constitutional Court, responsible for verifying election results, is packed with Gnassingbé allies.

The opposition stands no chance.

A half century of dynastic rule

After the 1967 military coup brought him to power, Gnassingbé Eyadéma established a one-party state, with his Rally of the Togolese People the only legal political party. In 1986, the last one-party election, he was re-elected with 100 per cent of the vote – on an implausible turnout of 99 per cent.

In 1992, Togo became a multi-party democracy on paper. In reality, it remained an autocracy – but now with a thin democratic veneer, punctuated by the periodic celebration of fraudulent elections, surrounded by constitutional manipulation and bouts of violent repression.

Over the next two decades, elections were rigged so no opposition candidate ever stood a chance. In 1993, the first multi-party election, the results weren’t much different from previous ones. The government was clearly testing the waters and letting go only a little. Reported results were inconsistent and didn’t add up, and the president was said to have won 96 per cent of the vote.

The next election, in 1998, gave the newly formed opposition more room to manoeuvre, and the incumbent won a comparatively low 52 per cent. In 2003, now facing a more consolidated opposition, the Union of Forces for Change, he claimed 58 per cent. The opposition did its own count and said the real figures were very different, with the president getting as little as 10 per cent.

Eyadéma died three years before he could be re-elected again in 2008. Enter Faure, via a highly irregular succession. The military appointed him president in February 2005, ostensibly because the National Assembly elected him president, although he didn’t hold the post at the time of his father’s death. Parliament then amended the constitutional provision requiring elections within two months to allow Faure to serve out the rest of his father’s term. But international outcry against this constitutional coup led him to resign and stand for election in April.

The campaign leading up to Faure’s first election foreshadowed all the elections that followed, characterised by the exclusion of candidates, obstacles to opposition campaigning and voter registration, electoral violence, massive fraud and the repression of post-election protests. Official results gave Gnassingbé 60 per cent of the vote. He was re-elected in 2010 with 61 per cent, in 2015 with 59 per cent and in 2020 with 71 per cent. Time and again, only friendly countries were allowed to observe elections, and as expected, their reports were largely uncritical.

The 2020 runner-up, former Prime Minister Agbéyomé Kodjo, accused the government of massive fraud and was arrested for declaring himself the legitimate president-elect; he was later released and lived in exile until his death in 2024.

In November 2023, the government postponed legislative and regional elections until early 2024. It eventually scheduled them for 13 April, but Gnassingbé then moved them to 20 April before postponing them indefinitely, ostensibly to hold consultations around constitutional change. In response, civil society and opposition parties called for protests to be held from 11 to 13 April, prompting the president to announce a new date – 29 April – along with a ban on protests. Foreign journalists were banned from covering the voting and requests for independent observation were denied. Unsurprisingly, on 29 April UNIR claimed 108 of 113 seats.

Constitutional rigging

Until recently, Togo had a semi-presidential system, with a powerful president serving up to two consecutive five-year terms as head of state and a prime minister appointed by the president as head of government. Gnassingbé Eyadéma abolished presidential term limits in 2002, and civil society long pressed for their return. In 2019, in his third term, Faure amended the constitution to reinstate it. As always, the process was opaque, lacked consultation and was completely dominated by the ruling party.

The reinstated term limits didn’t apply retroactively, allowing Gnassingbé to have two more terms. He duly got the first in 2020, meaning the one he was sure to get in sham elections scheduled for 2025 would have been his last. This made further changes inevitable.

The new constitution creates a new powerful executive position, the President of the Council of Ministers, to be elected by the National Assembly. This person will come from the party or coalition with the most seats and will effectively act as prime minister, overseeing the day-to-day running of the government. The role can be extended indefinitely as long as the ruling party or coalition retains a majority. The new constitution retains a figurehead president with a four-year, once-renewable mandate – but the most powerful position will no longer have the term limits established in the 2019 constitution. No one will be surprised if Gnassingbé takes on the new role.

Voices from the frontline

CIVICUS discussed the situation with a Togolese human rights defender who asked to stay anonymous for security reasons.

 

it’s crucial to restore direct presidential elections based on universal suffrage, because the electoral system should truly reflect the will of the people. But a president shouldn’t be allowed to rule indefinitely, so it’s also crucial to reintroduce term limits for the president and other key officials to prevent the concentration of power and promote accountability.

In addition, an independent electoral commission should be established to restore public confidence in a system that’s now perceived to be biased in favour of the ruling party. This commission should oversee all electoral processes and ensure they are free, fair and transparent.

It is also key to ensure equal access to campaign resources for all political parties. Fair media coverage and campaign financing would contribute to a more competitive and representative electoral process. It is equally important to strengthen legal safeguards. All parties should be allowed to operate freely without interference or fear of persecution and violence from state authorities.

We need to increase civic participation. Reforms should facilitate platforms for civil society organisations (CSOs) to engage in political debate. We must support grassroots movements with resources and training to help them mobilise people and educate them about democratic principles and their rights.

The international community can play a key role by applying diplomatic pressure and supporting democratic reforms. Public condemnations and resolutions by international bodies such as the United Nations and the African Union can help highlight these issues and push for necessary changes. International bodies and representatives should engage directly with Togolese officials to address concerns.

They should also support local civil society by providing funding, resources and training. This support is essential to strengthen CSOs’ capacity to advocate for democracy and human rights, and to mobilise and empower people.

Independent monitoring and reporting mechanisms are essential to assess the political situation, ensure transparency in the upcoming elections and document human rights violations. If violations continue, the international community should consider sanctioning key officials and making development aid and assistance conditional on respect for democratic principles and human rights. This can serve as an incentive for the government to undertake meaningful reforms.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is also in a position to mediate between the government, the opposition and local civil society to promote a more inclusive and democratic environment.

 

This is an edited extract of our conversation. Read the full interview here.

A sustained crackdown

Mass protests that erupted in 2017 and 2018 against the constitutional amendments finalised in 2019 were followed by a sustained crackdown. Protests were met with live ammunition, resulting in several killings, along with numerous arrests, protest bans and media and internet restrictions.

Further restrictions on freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly have been introduced since. These include the use of spyware and the criminalisation of journalists, with Loïc Lawson and Anani Sossou among the notable cases. They were arrested in November 2023 and charged with defamation, insulting the honour of a government minister and inciting revolt – all in retaliation for some tweets.

Repression intensified in response to protests against the postponement of elections and the latest constitutional changes. Another journalist was arrested and charged with serious offences in March and the media outlet he worked for was suspended in retaliation. The authorities banned several opposition and civil society meetings and dispersed participants when they attempted to gather.

In February and again in March, the government banned a ‘Citizens’ Café’ organised by the Movement for the rebuilding of Togo, on the grounds that it had ‘no legal basis’. Ahead of a press conference held on 27 March in the capital, Lomé, by several CSOs and opposition parties to announce the creation of a coalition, ‘Don’t touch my constitution’, security forces members reportedly intimidated staff, forcing the press conference to be moved to another location. During the event, security forces ordered participants to leave, claiming the meeting wasn’t authorised, and used teargas to disperse them. Journalists were reportedly threatened not to film the events.

The authorities also banned, prevented and dissolved civil society workshops, such as one on the protection of freedoms of association and peaceful assembly on 27 March in Tsévié, 30 kilometres from Lomé. While the workshop was underway, a dozen gendarmes entered the venue and ordered the participants to leave, claiming the meeting wasn’t authorised, and forced organisers to give them a list of participants.

On 3 April, nine members of the opposition party Dynamique Mgr Kpodzro were arrested in Lomé while raising awareness of the constitutional changes, which they described as illegal. Three were released two days later, while the others were placed under judicial investigation for ‘seriously disturbing public order’. They were eventually released on 9 April.

On 8 April, the government banned a protest against the constitutional changes planned by a group of political parties for 12 and 13 April 2024. It claimed the protest risked disturbing public order and organisers had failed to obtain authorisation on time. On the day before, police were stationed at the Bè-Gakpoto roundabout, where the protest was to take place.

International pressure needed

Togolese civil society continues to resist constitutional power grabs and demand genuine democracy through awareness-raising activities and protests. It has formed a united front alongside democratic political parties to speak with a stronger voice. However, given its limited capacity to influence a government that remains insensitive to its demands, it places its hopes on international pressure. It has already lodged complaints with regional bodies such as ECOWAS.

In 2022, Togo joined the Commonwealth, whose charter sets demanding eligibility criteria that Togo clearly didn’t meet, including a demonstrated ‘commitment to democracy and democratic processes, including free and fair elections and representative legislatures; the rule of law and independence of the judiciary… and protection of human rights, freedom of expression, and equality of opportunity’.

The Commonwealth, ECOWAS and other regional and international institutions must now take their stated values seriously, scrutinise the democratic and human rights records of their members and press for improvements where they’re found wanting. They must take a firm stand against power grabs, including in Togo, and stand up for democracy in West Africa, a region currently experiencing alarming levels of democratic backsliding.

OUR CALLS FOR ACTION

  • The government of Togo must commit to holding free and fair elections with independent observers.
  • ECOWAS should urge the government of Togo to respect fundamental civic freedoms, including the right to protest.
  • The Commonwealth should take active measures to support civil society and civic space in Togo.

Cover photo by Emile Kouton/AFP via Getty Images