Romania’s latest presidential election offered a nail-biting democratic drama with far-reaching implications. It began in late 2024 with the extraordinary annulment of a presidential election due to evidence that Russian interference favoured a far-right rising star. It culminated in May 2025 with the runoff victory of a centrist, pro-European Union (EU) candidate over the replacement Eurosceptic ultranationalist who won the first round. This electoral saga unfolded in a context of rampant disinformation, street protests and institutional challenges, against the backdrop of rising populism in many European countries. Its likely legacy will be lingering distrust in democracy among a sizeable section of voters.

The election turned into a referendum on Romania’s future, on whether the country would continue its European orientation or pivot towards the regressive, Moscow-friendly stance taken by leaders of countries such as Hungary and Slovakia. The final result was a fragile victory for democratic forces, but it may not be over yet: the defeated candidate unsuccessfully sought to overturn the result at the Constitutional Court and then called his defeat a coup.

Political earthquakes

The November 2024 presidential election came amid deep discontent. Romania has been grappling with severe economic challenges, including over 22 per cent youth unemployment, average wages among the EU’s lowest and a healthcare system with some of the region’s lowest budgets. Widespread corruption has shrunk trust in political institutions to historic lows, creating fertile ground for anti-establishment appeals.

With voters seeking alternatives to the traditional dominance of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and National Liberal Party (PNL), support for far-right and nationalist parties such as the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR) and SOS Romania, which have questioned Romania’s EU and NATO membership and support for Ukraine, had been on the rise for years.

Still, the results of the 24 November vote shocked the political establishment. Călin Georgescu, a far-right nationalist, NATO-sceptic and Russia sympathiser who ran as an independent and had been polling in single figures, came first with almost 23 per cent of the vote. Second was a reformist, pro-EU Elena Lasconi of the Save Romania Union (USR), with over 19 per cent, narrowly beating PSD Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu.

It was the first time in Romania’s 35-year post-communist history that a PSD candidate didn’t make the second round of a presidential race – and the first time a far-right populist did. Overall, around 40 per cent backed far-right politicians, as there was a second far-right candidate, AUR’s George Simion, who got close to 14 per cent of the vote.

Parliamentary elections held on 1 December further confirmed a far-right surge, with AUR coming second on 18 per cent and another new party, the Party of Young People, which supported Georgescu, winning 6.5 per cent.

But then a second political earthquake came: on 6 December, two days before the runoff was due, the Constitutional Court annulled the first-round vote after declassified intelligence documents revealed a massive campaign on TikTok, including AI manipulation and bot-driven activity, likely orchestrated by a ‘state actor’ implied to be Russia to tilt the election in Georgescu’s favour.

A disinformation battlefield

The Constitutional Court cited illegal use of digital technologies, undeclared funding and foreign interference via social media platforms. It was the first time an EU state has annulled an election due to foreign interference and social media disinformation. The European Commission subsequently launched proceedings against TikTok for failing to properly assess and mitigate risks to election integrity.

Controversy involving Russia had already erupted ahead of the November vote, when the Constitutional Court ruled that another pro-Russia, anti-EU candidate, Diana Șoșoacă, was ineligible to run because her views contradicted the presidential oath to protect democracy. This decision drew criticism from political parties across the spectrum and from civil rights groups concerned about judicial overreach.

Ahead of the election, Russia activated a meticulously constructed disinformation ecosystem that had been years in the making, designed to exploit social divisions and anti-establishment sentiment at the most politically opportune moment. These efforts included seeding narratives, including elaborate conspiracy theories, that portrayed Romania as a victim of the EU, NATO and western elites.

The use of disinformation followed a pattern tested in votes across the world, from the UK’s Brexit referendum and the 2016 US election to recent elections in nearby Georgia and Romania’s neighbour Moldova. What distinguished Romania’s election was that interference was identified and acknowledged while the election process was still live and immediate action was taken.

Both the first round results and the cancellation triggered widespread protests that reflected deep divisions in Romanian society over democratic values and foreign interference. Immediately after the first-round results, over a thousand students and young people gathered in Bucharest’s University Square for four consecutive days of protests against Georgescu, with slogans such as ‘No fascism, no war, no Georgescu in the second round!’. Similar protests took place in other major cities, and on 5 December thousands again took to the streets of central Bucharest in support of Romanian democratic institutions and EU values.

The situation escalated on 8 December, the day the runoff had been due, when Georgescu and over a hundred supporters protested outside a closed Bucharest polling station, chanting slogans such as ‘Down with dictatorship’ and ‘We want to vote’. Georgescu claimed authorities had cancelled the election to prevent his victory.

That same day, authorities arrested several armed men heading to Bucharest to participate in protests. Police found axes, guns, knives and machetes in their vehicles. The group was led by Horaţiu Potra, a former French Foreign Legion fighter previously photographed with Russia’s ambassador to Romania. Threats against journalists rose, including those from the investigative outlet snoop.ro, which had reported on Russian influence and disinformation linked to Georgescu’s campaign.

Russia’s disinformation campaign didn’t stop with the election annulment. Instead, it redoubled efforts to sow distrust and further polarise voters with fraud allegations. And it continued using AI-generated smear campaigns, particularly against Nicușor Dan, former civic activist, Bucharest mayor and the centrist candidate who became the main obstacle to the far right reaching power.

Election drama

On 31 December, an appeals court rejected Georgescu’s challenge to the Constitutional Court’s ruling, and the next day Romania – an EU member since 2007 – officially joined the Schengen zone, marking a significant expansion of the world’s largest free travel area.

But the first round of the rescheduled election, held on 4 May, again delivered a dramatic upset. In Georgescu’s absence and on a 53.2 per cent turnout, Simion emerged as the frontrunner with close to 41 per cent of the vote. Dan trailed him on 21 per cent. The establishment candidate, Crin Antonescu, backed by an alliance including the PNL and PSD, again narrowly missed the runoff.

The runoff campaign was intensely polarised. Although Simion initially led the polls, the political landscape shifted rapidly. The PNL and USR both endorsed Dan, consolidating the pro-European camp. A key moment came in a TV debate between the two candidates, when Dan’s calm and pragmatic performance was widely seen as pivotal in swaying undecided voters.

With high stakes reflected in an increased turnout of 64.7 per cent, Dan won the 18 May runoff with almost 54 per cent of the vote against Simion’s 46 per cent. After prematurely declaring himself the winner earlier in the day, Simion ultimately conceded but vowed to continue his political struggle ‘along with other patriots, sovereignists and conservatives all over the world’.

Two days later, Simion announced he’d ask the Constitutional Court to annul the vote on the same grounds as in 2024, baselessly alleging electoral fraud and claiming ‘foreign interference’ by France, Moldova and ‘other actors’. Central to Simion’s claims was a suggestion by Telegram founder Pavel Durov that an unnamed western government had asked the messaging platform to ‘silence conservative voices’ in Romania. The court quickly threw the case out, but Simion’s unwillingness to accept defeat seems sure to continue.

High stakes

Romania’s electoral saga underscores both the resilience and fragility of democracy in the digital era. While Dan’s pro-Europe victory provides reassurance to Romania’s western partners, the unprecedented success of far-right forces has exposed deep-seated public disillusionment with mainstream parties and institutions, echoing broader trends across Europe and beyond. The sophisticated disinformation tactics deployed first against the 2024 election and then during the 2025 campaign represent an evolved form of electoral interference that’s likely to become increasingly common. The responses seen in Romania, from institutional interventions to civil society mobilisation, may offer valuable insights about democratic resilience in the face of foreign manipulation and domestic polarisation.

Despite Dan’s win, formidable challenges lie ahead that threaten to prolong political unrest. Following the December parliamentary election, the mainstream coalition’s majority remains fragile, so early elections are a distinct possibility. Simion’s evident determination not to accept the result can only help fuel continued and widespread distrust towards democratic institutions. Many people will still feel cheated and denied their say, and that will provide fertile ground for divisive narratives to take deeper root. The economy also remains fragile, as evidenced by the fact that Romania’s currency hit a historic low during the campaign.

Romania’s experience offers a warning but also some hope for embattled democracies throughout the world: democracy can withstand sophisticated attacks, but its defence requires vigilance, institutional strength and engaged citizens committed to upholding democratic values. If it is to lead towards democratic consolidation rather than erosion, the road ahead demands action to strengthen institutional safeguards against disinformation, rebuilt public trust in democratic processes and address the economic and social grievances that continue to fuel populist sentiment.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org