Moldovan President Maia Sandu secured a second term in office in a runoff election on 3 November, taking around 55 per cent of the vote. But both presidential election rounds and a referendum on the European Union (EU), held at the same time as the first round, were marred by widespread Russian interference.

Russia looms large

Moldova applied to join the EU in March 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The EU granted it official candidate status in June 2022, and the government has set a goal of joining by 2030. The referendum sought approval to write the objective of joining the EU into Moldova’s constitution.

Sandu, meanwhile, sought re-election. Moldova’s first female president, she came to power with a convincing runoff victory in December 2020. Her party, the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), was then handed a commanding majority in the July 2021 parliamentary election. This was key for Sandu’s pro-EU reform agenda, because while the presidency has some sway in areas such as national security and foreign policy, parliament holds most of the day-to-day power. Civil society saw the double election win, a break from the political dominance of pro-Russia parties, as an opportunity to tackle corruption and bring the country closer to other democracies.

But the government ran into strong headwinds. Moldova’s central political question of how to balance between east and west has never gone away since it achieved independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Moldova contains two areas where most people speak Russian and many identify strongly with Russia: the autonomous region of Gagauzia in the southwest and the breakaway strip of Transnistria on its border with Ukraine in the east, which has been under Russian occupation since a 1990-1992 war. By contrast, most Moldovans are ethnically Romanian and speak Romanian. Romania, which borders Moldova to its west, joined the EU in 2007.

Things have come to a head with Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine, with the Moldovan government strongly backing Ukraine. The country is home to around 100,000 Ukrainian refugees, and the war doesn’t feel far away, with Russian missiles occasionally landing in Moldova.

In October 2022, Russia moved to punish Moldova and disrupt its government. Its state-owned energy giant Gazprom announced a 30 per cent cut in gas supplies to Moldova. Russian airstrikes on Ukraine’s power grid also disrupted electricity supplies in Moldova, as the countries rely on shared Soviet-era infrastructure. In December, Gazprom switched to supplying only Transnistria, with gas to the rest of Moldova not resuming until the following March, when the worst of the winter had passed.

While other countries stepped up and supplied gas, the consequence was soaring energy prices that fuelled high inflation, leaving many struggling in one of Europe’s poorest countries. This led to mass protests calling for the government’s resignation. Some protesters demanded a reorientation towards Russia, motivated in part by the hope of a new gas deal.

Moldova wasn’t the only place where this happened: in the Czech Republic, too, masses of people protested against high prices and demanded the resignation of the pro-European government and a friendlier policy towards Russia to secure gas supplies. In both cases, protests stemmed from a mix of economic grassroots anger and opportunism by pro-Russia groups and politicians, with pro-Russia media taking every opportunity to use the protests for propaganda purposes.

These issues were at play in Moldova’s recent votes. Sandu’s opponent in the presidential race, Alexandr Stoianoglo – a former prosecutor general accused of corruption and fired by Sandu in 2023 – was undoubtedly the pro-Russia candidate. Backed by the Party of Socialists, an anti-EU and pro-Russia party, Stoianoglo promised to pursue a deal to restore Russian gas supplies. Meanwhile, while Sandu sought a yes vote in the EU referendum, pro-Russia parties campaigned for either a no vote or a boycott.

These east-west tensions are by no means unique to Moldova. Similar pressures have been seen in elections in several countries that were once part of the Eastern Bloc. They were the central issue in Georgia’s October election, which saw the pro-Russia ruling party retain power. In Georgia, the opposition and the president alleged Russian interference. In Moldova, this was blatant.

Manipulation campaign

Moldova’s government accuses Russia of waging a ‘hybrid war’ against it, and the election and referendum campaign provided ample evidence of a concerted attempt to influence the outcome. A rogue Moldovan tycoon, Ilan Shor, was allegedly heavily involved.

Shor, a pro-Russia oligarch and former politician who now lives in Russia, was convicted in absentia for his role in a spectacular 2014 bank fraud in which around US$1 billion – 12 per cent of Moldova’s GDP – was stolen and spirited out of the country. He currently faces a 15-year prison sentence should he ever return to Moldova, but continues to invest heavily in Moldova’s predominantly pro-Russia regions. Last year Shor was accused of paying people to take part in the anti-government protests.

The government accuses Shor of paying close to US$16 million to 130,000 people to influence votes in the referendum and first-round of the presidential election, with instructions on how to vote and spread disinformation shared on Telegram. With a turnout of just over 1.5 million, this was a potentially pivotal number of voters. Shor, who promised to pay people to publish anti-EU posts and register for his campaign to vote no or abstain in the referendum, insists any payments he made were legal.

The meddling didn’t stop there. Police said they had evidence of people travelling to Moldova to vote illegally, and customs officers intercepted numerous people arriving on flights from Moscow with large sums of money. On a single day they seized US$1.5 million in suspicious cash. Further payments were reportedly channelled via the Russian banking system. There was also evidence of people from Transnistria being paid to vote.

The campaign was awash with disinformation, including deepfake videos and false claims about Sandu. Fake social media accounts proliferated, opposing the EU and Sandu and promoting pro-Russia views. Narratives circulated claiming that a vote for the EU or Sandu could drag Moldova into conflict; as in Georgia, the idea of appeasing Russia to avoid being dragged into the war resonated with some voters.

In the run-up to the 20 October vote, the EU deployed a cyber rapid response team to help prevent cyberattacks. But on the day of the runoff, Sandu’s national security adviser said coordinated cyberattacks were targeting the system that records votes, potentially affecting international voting. Bomb threats were made against international polling stations, including in Germany and the UK, likely in an attempt to deter those most inclined to support Sandu.

There was also a risk of violence. Authorities said they’d thwarted a plan by a group of people trained in Moscow by private military companies to create unrest, including by using weapons.

Challenges ahead

Both the EU referendum and presidential election were closer than opinion polls suggested, with the implication that Russia’s multiple attempts at influence had some kind of impact. But Russia wasn’t the only issue. As in elections around the world, many voters were concerned about the high cost of living – partly fuelled by the war in Ukraine – which led to a drop in support for the incumbent. Sandu has also been accused of not doing enough to deliver on her promise to tackle corruption.

Sandu faced criticism for holding a largely symbolic referendum and was accused of scheduling it to try to improve her chances in the first round. But if that was the plan, it clearly backfired, while the near deadlock in the referendum has done little to strengthen the government’s hand.

Ultimately, Sandu only made it over the line thanks to Moldovan voters living abroad. Around a million Moldovans live in EU countries, and 83 per cent of those living abroad backed Sandu. It was the same story with the referendum. Stoianoglo narrowly beat Sandu among voters living in Moldova, with her vote concentrated in the capital, Chisinau. The pro-Russia opposition is already characterising her as the president of foreigners and the metropolitan class.

One big positive is that Moldova’s democracy has survived a crucial stress test, and many people have made clear they won’t be influenced by Russia, try as it might. But the challenges aren’t over yet. A parliamentary election is due next year and the same kind of influence operation can be expected, leading to the same kind of polarisation. The authorities must strengthen their systems to guard against disinformation and manipulation. It’s also clear Moldova’s political and social divisions are real, if exacerbated by disinformation, and the government must try to heal them, including by engaging better with Russian-speaking Moldovans.

Civil society must be part of the response. Moldova’s civil society must be empowered to play its role in defending democracy, nurturing civic freedoms, building social bridges, exposing corruption and combating disinformation. Sandu and the government must intensify their dialogue with civil society, and Moldova’s democratic partners, particularly the EU, must help nurture it. This is the only way to heal divisions and deepen democracy.

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