When leaders of Oceania’s states gathered in Solomon Islands from 8 to 12 September, it was who was missing that made headlines. The host government of the annual meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum – an 18-member continent-wide intergovernmental organisation – excluded external partners who normally join discussions on issues such as climate change, development and security, including China, Taiwan and the USA.

Tuvalu’s threat to boycott the meeting due to Taiwan’s exclusion pointed to a broader geopolitical tussle between China and western states increasingly being waged across the vast ocean continent.

China’s power moves

Oceania was long a place the world’s powers felt free to neglect. But China has changed the game, stepping up diplomatic efforts and striking bilateral deals with numerous states. As the closest superpower, China sees the region as a legitimate extension of its sphere of influence and doesn’t want its naval reach constrained by Pacific Island chains.

China seeks material as well as strategic advantage. It wants the fish stocks that swim in the large ocean zones even small islands command, and minerals, such as those that could be extracted through deep sea mining. This is an untested and potentially environmentally destructive technology, and civil society is calling for a moratorium on it.

There’s a political prize too. China wants to build political alliances and disrupt established relations with Oceania’s biggest country Australia, the USA and former colonial powers France, New Zealand and the UK. All United Nations (UN) member states, however small, have an equal vote, and allies can help China subdue criticism of its systematic human rights violations.

China particularly wants Pacific Island states to abandon ties with Taiwan. China sees the country as a breakaway province that will ultimately be united with the mainland, if necessary by force. As China’s global influence has grown, it has worked to systematically isolate Taiwan.

The success of its campaign can be seen in the growing derecognition of Taiwan. In 2000, 31 states maintained full diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but now the number’s down to 11. Three Pacific Island states have switched sides recently: Kiribati and Solomon Islands in 2019, followed by Nauru in 2024, making Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu the region’s only outliers.

At more Pacific Island states have come on board, China is trying to make its leverage count. At last year’s meeting, references to Taiwan were removed from the final communique following complaints by Chinese officials. China has also challenged Taiwan’s ‘development partner’ status, which enables it to attend meetings. Tuvalu’s reaction was sparked by suspicions the ban on external observers was designed to exclude Taiwan. Thankfully, new rules agreed at the meeting should ensure all partners, including Taiwan, can attend future gatherings, starting with the one Palau hosts in 2026.

2025 host Solomon Islands followed up its controversial switch of allegiance by becoming the most pro-China Pacific Island state. It has signed a series of deals with China, including a secretive 2023 security cooperation agreement that raised civil society concerns about potential training of local police in the repressive techniques used in China and deployment of Chinese security forces. Solomon Islands has experienced recent ethnic unrest and violent protests by young unemployed men, with some targeting of Chinese-heritage people.

As links have deepened, it’s become harder to criticise China. Solomon Islands delegations have travelled to China for training, and China has given Solomon Islands media funding in return for favourable content. The Solomon Islands government has accused critical media of spreading ‘anti-China sentiments’, and two politicians face trial for taking part in protests about Chinese influence.

Yet China’s Oceania strategy hasn’t always succeeded. Ahead of the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum meeting, it tried to push through a regional economic and security pact with 10 states. The pact would have created a free trade area and enhanced cooperation on disaster resilience and security – including, troublingly, on policing and surveillance. Several governments however resisted what they saw as an attempt to hurry them into a deal, and the proposal was shelved.

Instead, China has continued to strike bilateral deals. A 2022 diplomatic blitz saw it agree support for infrastructure projects in Kiribati, Samoa and Vanuatu, and loans for Tonga.

In February, the Cook Islands agreed a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ with China, sparking protests, including over the deal’s secrecy. It caused alarm in New Zealand: the two countries have an association agreement that grants Cook Islanders New Zealand citizenship and requires consultation on defence and security matters. In a move that hardly seemed likely to improve the situation, New Zealand reacted by pausing some of its development aid. Adding to civil society concerns, the Cook Islands government is taking the lead on licensing deep sea mining and has agreed to collaborate with China on seabed research.

In August, the government of Nauru announced a US$660 million agreement with a little-known Chinese company. The move caused concern in Australia, because the two governments had signed an economic and security treaty just a year before.

In contrast to China’s advances, Australia has struggled to secure new deals despite Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s pledge to renew regional relations after coming to power in 2022. A planned US$330 million deal with Vanuatu covering climate adaptation and economic and security support has stalled as the Vanuatu government is concerned it may limit potential partnerships with other countries, presumably China. Most recently, a defence treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea has been pushed back.

Climate concerns

The climate crisis gives urgency to the diplomatic calculations of Pacific Island states. Oceania is a continent where climate injustice is deeply felt. Its small island nations have contributed a fraction of the greenhouse gases that are causing climate breakdown, but they’re among the most exposed to its impacts, particularly low-lying lands such as Tuvalu that are having to plan for national territory disappearing as sea levels rise.

One reason China’s proposed 2022 regional pact failed was its lack of climate commitments. Australia faces similar scepticism despite improvements under Albanese’s government, compared to the previous government’s climate denial. The Australian government has expanded renewable energy capacities, legislated for cleaner vehicles and provided tax credits for businesses involved in climate transition. It has recently announced an emissions cut target of 62 to 70 per cent by 2035, although climate campaigners criticise this as inadequate. Albanese hopes to host the 2026 COP31 climate summit in partnership with Pacific Island states.

But Australian authorities also criminalise climate protesters and, despite the latest emissions cuts plan, have just agreed to extend the lifespan of one of the country’s biggest fossil fuel projects, the North West Shelf, until 2070. The government of Vanuatu has criticised this extension, saying it potentially breaches the recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that states have a legal obligation to prevent climate harm.

Pacific Islands are showing global climate leadership. Vanuatu secured the ICJ ruling, which originated in a civil society campaign, and is now seeking a UN vote on restricting fossil fuel industry lobbying in climate talks. Fiji, Samoa and Vanuatu are prominent in the campaign for ecocide to be made a crime subject to International Criminal Court jurisdiction.

Pacific Island leaders took another important step forward for climate action at the meeting, launching Oceania’s first climate fund, the Pacific Resilience Facility, aimed at supporting small-scale community climate responses. Globally, there’s a huge gap between the funding needed to cut greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate impacts and the amounts wealthy states are prepared to provide, and this new fund will give states that want to partner with Pacific Islands a chance to show how serious they are. Australia has already announced a contribution of US$66 million.

Balancing act needed

Pacific Island leaders now find themselves with rare geopolitical leverage, but they should use it carefully. After decades of neglect, they’re right to capitalise on the sudden interest of powerful states, particularly to demand climate action and funding. But they should be wary of being dragged into defensive pacts that serve external agendas, and of getting closer to authoritarian partners such as China that systematically repress human rights at home and readily export that model abroad.

Oceania currently enjoys the world’s most open civic space. CIVICUS Monitor ratings show civic space is fully open in seven countries and narrowed in five, indicating mostly favourable conditions. Only two countries, Nauru and Papua New Guinea, have serious civic space restrictions. Governments must ensure any increased foreign partnerships don’t adversely impact on civic space; for example, security and policing deals shouldn’t lead to increased restrictions on protest rights.

Governments should use good civic space conditions to consult extensively on how partner funding can benefit communities, hear civil society’s concerns on contested issues such as deep-sea mining and enable civil society to scrutinise spending as a safeguard against corruption.

At a time when climate breakdown is accelerating and authoritarian power is on the global rise, Oceania has the potential to model a different approach, focused on community needs rather than transactional power politics. Pacific Island leaders shouldn’t just leverage their newfound influence; they should use it to pioneer an Oceanian approach to climate resilience, peacebuilding and sustainable development of global value.

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