Nicaragua’s authoritarian regime finds itself in an increasingly precarious position on the international stage. Its recent legal manoeuvres at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) may have inadvertently strengthened the case for action against its own human rights violations. By filing a case at the ICJ in early 2024 against Germany regarding military assistance to Israel, the government led by President Daniel Ortega effectively acknowledged the court’s universal jurisdiction. United Nations (UN) human rights experts are now urging states to use the same principle against Nicaragua for its systematic repressive campaign that has rendered hundreds of Nicaraguans stateless.

This development comes as the regime faces mounting international scrutiny over its practice of making critics and political opponents stateless, which reached new depths in September 2024 with the expulsion of 135 political prisoners to Guatemala. Those deported immediately had their nationality revoked and their assets confiscated, following a pattern established in February 2023 when the regime put 222 political prisoners on a plane to the USA and declared them stateless on arrival. As well as punishing current opponents, the tactic appears designed to deter the emergence of new opposition by demonstrating the severe consequences of dissent.

Nicaragua’s totalitarian path

The Ortega regime has moved towards total control through increasingly insidious repressive mechanisms. Clear early signs of democratic backsliding came with elections in 2011 and 2016, which were marred by fraud accusations and growing repression of Indigenous, Afro-descendant and peasant movements opposed to government projects. Steady restriction of democratic participation at the local level set the stage for more comprehensive authoritarian control.

The turning point came in April 2018, when changes to the social security system triggered widespread protests. The government’s response was brutal, resulting in 355 deaths and injuring thousands of people. The regime committed systematic human rights violations in an attempt to suppress dissent, jailing hundreds of protesters on serious unfounded charges, including terrorism and organised crime. This marked a decisive shift from selective repression to the wholesale elimination of civic space.

Following the protests, the regime engineered a comprehensive legal framework for repression that cleared the path to the November 2021 election, which saw Ortega re-elected through blatant fraud. The government passed, in quick succession, a Special Law on Cybercrime, which made the online publication of content deemed false by the government punishable with up to 10 years in jail, a Law to Regulate Foreign Agents, which blocked international funding of civil society organisations (CSOs), journalists and political opponents, a ‘Law for the Defence of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty and Self-determination for Peace’, barring so-called ‘traitors to the homeland’ from running for office, and a constitutional amendment to allow life sentences for broadly defined ‘hate crimes’.

In 2022 the regime passed amendments to the General Law on Regulation and Control of Non-profit Organisations to strengthen its control of CSOs and force their alignment with state policy. In August 2024, it pushed through changes to the Criminal Code to enable the prosecution of Nicaraguans and foreigners outside the country, with penalties ranging from confiscation of assets to life imprisonment for crimes such as money laundering, terrorism and its financing, cybercrimes and broadly and vaguely defined crimes against ‘public administration’ and ‘state institutions’. The regime has effectively armed itself with a weapon of transnational repression to wield against those in exile or already stripped of their nationality.

In November 2024, a constitutional overhaul formalised the concentration of political power in the hands of the ruling family, establishing an apparent system of dynastic rule. The changes included the introduction of a ‘co-presidency’ system, officially making vice-president Rosario Murillo, Ortega’s wife, his co-president, with the surviving partner retaining power if one dies. The couple’s son, Laureano Ortega Murillo, appears to be being positioned as their successor.

The constitutional changes also extended Ortega and Murillo’s current presidential term by an additional year until 2027 and granted them indefinite re-election rights and immunity from prosecution. The changes effectively eliminated the separation of powers, giving the co-presidents complete control over the legislative, judicial and electoral bodies, and the authority to appoint and dismiss ministers and other officials. They also established a ‘voluntary police force’ to support the national police, allowed military intervention in domestic affairs and elevated the red and black flag of the Sandinista Front, the ruling party, to the status of a national symbol.

Also in November, the Sandinista-controlled Nicaraguan National Assembly passed the ‘Law for the protection of Nicaraguans against external sanctions and aggressions’, in response to sanctions on Nicaraguan officials and institutions, including Murillo and three of her children, imposed by Canada, the European Union, Switzerland and the USA. The new law declares all sanctions imposed by foreign states, governments or organisations as void and legally invalid in Nicaragua and requires entities such as banks to continue providing services to those sanctioned. It empowers regulators to impose fines and other penalties on those who comply with foreign sanctions, including temporary or permanent suspension of operations. Those found in violation could also face criminal charges for ‘treason against the homeland’.

In December, Nicaragua’s parliament passed the Law on the Administration of the Monetary and Financial System, granting the government unprecedented powers over private banking. It authorises the government to appoint and remove bank directors, supervise all financial operations and abolish banking secrecy. It also grants the government power to request economic and financial information from banking institutions regarding any legal entity, including CSOs.

These measures have been accompanied by increasingly sophisticated surveillance and control mechanisms. The regime relies on a complex system of informants and party loyalists at the neighbourhood level, while also deploying digital surveillance technologies to monitor communications and social media activity, making it increasingly difficult for opposition groups to organise or communicate effectively.

Civil society dismantled

Over the course of 17 years, the government has dissolved over 5,500 CSOs — almost 80 per cent of all Nicaragua’s organisations. The closures began in 2007, targeting eight media outlets. The biggest wave of shutdowns came in 2022 and 2023, affecting over 3,000 organisations. The new mass wave currently underway, including the closure of 1,500 CSOs on a single day in August 2024, has affected organisations of all kinds  – leisure and cultural associations, media outlets, trade unions, universities, women’s groups and, most significantly, religious organisations.

The targeting of religious institutions represents a significant escalation, as the Catholic Church had historically been one of the few institutions capable of maintaining some degree of independence from state control. Alongside the cancellation of religious organisations, the repression has included bans on religious processions and the arrest and expulsion of clergy members.

The regime has also dismantled independent journalism, with the climate of fear forcing at least 263 journalists into exile between 2018 and 2023 and an a further 26 in the first half of 2024 alone. This has resulted in what civil society calls ‘zones of silence’ where access to information is severely restricted, now covering over half of Nicaragua’s territory.

The government has expanded its use of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances, with at least 427 cases documented since 2021, Those detained are often arrested without warrants and held incommunicado, with families denied information about their whereabouts. In facilities such as La Modelo prison, detainees face severe conditions including torture, sexual violence, denial of medical care and prolonged solitary confinement. The practice is particularly cruel as authorities deliberately provide conflicting information to families about detainees’ locations, with guards sometimes claiming transfers have occurred or denying that people were ever detained, effectively placing victims outside the protection of the law. Even after release, former detainees often remain subject to strict control, required to report to police stations daily or twice daily.

Civil society’s response

An estimated 800,000 Nicaraguans fled the country between 2018 and 2024, with around 100,000 leaving in 2024 alone, a substantial exodus for a nation of 6.9 million. Despite this mass displacement, civil society has shown remarkable resilience, with exiled activists and journalists establishing new platforms to document abuses and maintain pressure on the regime.

The international legal response has grown increasingly robust. A significant development is an ongoing criminal trial in Argentina, initiated in October 2022, where Ortega, Murillo and a dozen senior officials face prosecution for systematic human rights violations. In December 2024, an Argentinian judge issued an arrest order against Ortega and Murillo, applying the principle of universal jurisdiction.

Diaspora networks have been particularly effective in keeping international attention on Nicaragua’s crisis. They have worked closely with the inter-American human rights system, recently submitting 97 cases of persecution and exile to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The international community has moved beyond expressions of concern to action, with several states offering citizenship to exiled Nicaraguans stripped of their nationality, and the UN Human Rights Expert Group on Nicaragua calling on states to take legal action against Nicaragua at the ICJ for violating the human rights treaties it has ratified.

Prospects for change

Looking ahead, the prospects for democratic change in Nicaragua are limited but not non-existent. The international community’s response will be crucial, particularly regarding the potential for legal action at the ICJ. While the court could potentially rule on the Nicaraguan state’s responsibility for human rights violations, personal criminal accountability for Ortega, Murillo and other officials would require either universal jurisdiction in another country or referral to the International Criminal Court by the UN Security Council – an unlikely scenario given China’s and Russia’s veto power.

The path forward requires a multi-faceted approach. Democratic states, particularly in Latin America, must unambiguously recognise the authoritarian character of the Nicaraguan regime and deny it any claim to legitimacy. This should include diplomatic isolation, targeted sanctions against regime officials and measures to prevent the laundering of assets seized from political prisoners and CSOs.

Regional and global human rights institutions should increase pressure on the Nicaraguan government to restore civic space and democratic institutions. This should include continued documentation of human rights violations, support for accountability mechanisms, assistance to victims of state repression and support for civil society, in Nicaragua and in exile, to maintain its crucial role in documenting abuses and advocating for change. The international community must also work to prevent Nicaragua exploiting international institutions to legitimise its authoritarian practices.

While the immediate prospects for change are limited, the regime’s increasing isolation and reliance on force rather than legitimate authority puts it on an ultimately unsustainable path. The restoration of democracy in Nicaragua will ultimately depend on sustained international pressure, combined with the resilience and determination of Nicaraguan civil society.

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