Democracy was the winner and Russia the loser in Moldova’s 28 September election. The incumbent pro-Europe Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) took 55 of parliament’s 101 seats on just over half of the vote, while support for the pro-Russia coalition collapsed to a record low. The result came in the face of Russia’s most intense attempt yet to influence an election, with a concerted propaganda and disinformation operation allegedly linked to a Moldovan oligarch who fled to Russia to escape a long jail sentence for his role in a massive fraud operation.

Contested territory

Moldova, a landlocked country with a population of under 2.4 million, rarely commands headlines. But its location, sandwiched between EU member Romania and war-torn Ukraine, makes it prime territory for an ongoing tussle over the future of former communist states.

Independent since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Moldova faced east-west tension from the start, evident in conflict over its disputed Transnistria region, a narrow strip in the country’s east. A 1992 ceasefire left the dispute frozen, and to this day Transnistria remains a breakaway pro-Russia unrecognised republic, where Russia keeps troops on the ground. In 2022, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly designated Transnistria as Russian-occupied territory.

Initially, Moldova’s international relations sought to strike a balance between the EU and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an association of former Soviet states. The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) became the only ex-Soviet communist party to win an electoral majority under democratic conditions. This pro-Russia, anti-Europe, socially conservative party last held power in 2009, when a pro-Europe coalition replaced it, starting a decisive shift. Since then, every prime minister has been committed to European integration.

Moldova and the EU signed an economic and political cooperation agreement in 2014; Russia suspended several provisions of Moldova’s CIS free trade agreement in response. In March 2022, shortly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moldova formally applied to join the EU. It subsequently suspended its CIS participation and announced plans to leave the association.

Russia’s response was to weaponise Moldova’s dependence on imported energy. In October 2022, its state-owned energy company Gazprom cut gas supplies, and from December to March, the height of winter, it only supplied Transnistria. Combined with Russian airstrikes damaging the power grid Moldova shares with Ukraine, this caused soaring prices, prompting protests calling for the government to resign, with some protesters urging a more pro-Russia direction.

This pressure on gas supplies – since alleviated by imports from countries to the west – was one of the tactics set out in an alleged plan by Russia’s secret services, leaked in 2023 and denied by Moscow. This lays out a 10-year strategy to bring Moldova under its control, including by supporting pro-Russia political forces.

But at the ballot box, pro-Russia parties have declined. The PCRM collapsed, and the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) took its place as the main pro-Russia party. Although the PSRM came first in 2014, it lacked coalition partners to form a government with; when it came first in 2019, it briefly served in two short-lived coalition governments until a fresh election in 2021.

Meanwhile, from 2016 to 2020, PSRM leader Igor Dodon held the presidency. Although the prime minister commands most power, the president has some sway over foreign policy and defence, and Dodon predictably steered Moldova in a more pro-Russian direction.

But the tide turned in 2020, when Maia Sandu, founder of the strongly pro-Europe PAS, defeated Dodon to become Moldova’s first female president. In the 2021 parliamentary election, PAS became the first party to win a majority of seats since 2009, while the PSRM, with the PCRM as its junior partner, came a distant second.

Sandu won a second presidential term in a 2024 runoff, taking 55 per of the vote against a PSRM-backed candidate. The government also narrowly won a referendum held at the same time to change the constitution to include a commitment to joining the EU. Both the presidential election and referendum campaigns saw clear attempts to influence the outcomes in Russia’s favour.

In the 28 September election, the vote of the PSRM-led coalition, including the PCRM and other pro-Russia parties, fell further, to a record low of around 24.2 per cent.

Influencing operations

Some Moldovan citizens undoubtedly gravitate towards Russia, particularly in Transnistria and the autonomous region of Gagauzia. The social conservativism of pro-Russia parties appeals to older people in particular, and connects with the enduring influence of the Moldovan branch of the Russian Orthodox Church. But as recent election results show, most Moldovan voters are rejecting pro-Russia parties.

With its popular support declining, Russia has turned to covert influence operations. At the centre is oligarch Ilan Shor, alleged to have been heavily involved in trying to sway recent elections. He’s believed to have been a key figure in Moldova’s biggest scandal: in November 2014, around US$1 billion was fraudulently transferred from three Moldovan banks in loans that would never be repaid. The banks went bankrupt, forcing the government to provide a bailout equivalent to one eighth of GDP.

Shor, board chair of one of the banks, was accused of being among the masterminds. In 2017, he was convicted of money laundering, fraud and breach of trust and sentenced to seven and a half years in jail. But in 2019, while under house arrest pending an appeal, he fled the country, first to Israel and then Russia, where he now has citizenship. His sentence was doubled in his absence. The Constitutional Court banned his Șor Party in 2023 and the EU and UK and US governments have imposed sanctions on him.

Shor’s only hope of a return to Moldova without going to jail is the establishment of a pro-Russia government. He says Moldova should unite with the Russian Federation, and is able to use his stolen riches to promote this cause.

Shor was accused of paying people to take part in the protests triggered by high energy prices. For the 2024 presidential and referendum votes, he promised to pay people to register for his campaign to oppose the referendum or publish anti-EU posts; the government said he’d paid close to US$16 million to 130,000 people to spread his influence, sharing instructions on how disseminate disinformation on the messaging app Telegram. The 2024 campaign was awash with disinformation, including deepfake videos and false claims about Sandu. Fake social media accounts proliferated, opposing the EU and Sandu and promoting pro-Russia views.

Unprecedented interference

The 2025 campaign saw a further intensification of Russia’s influence efforts. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a regional intergovernmental organisation focused on security, observed the election and said Moldova faced ‘unprecedented’ threats in the campaign.

A secret network, again coordinated via Telegram, offered to pay people for posting pro-Russia propaganda and anti-PAS disinformation on Facebook and TikTok, and to help carry out selective polling that would overstate pro-Russia support, potentially as part of a plan to dispute the election results should they be close. A BBC investigation found links between this network, Shor and one of his organisations, Evrazia, with money sent via Promsvyazbank, a Russian state-owned bank used by its defence ministry.

The network ran online training events on how to use ChatGPT to produce social media posts, including those making ludicrous claims that Sandu is involved in child trafficking and the EU would force people to change their sexual orientation. At least 90 TikTok accounts receiving over 23 million views since the start of the year were involved. The investigation found no comparable disinformation campaign in support of PAS.

Russia also evidently tried to target Moldova’s million-strong diaspora, who tend to favour pro-EU parties and provided close to 20 per cent of voters in 2024. People in diaspora communities were offered cash, evidently from Russian sources, to serve as election observers, with large bonuses for providing any evidence of fraud. This seemed to be an attempt to promote doubt about the integrity of the diaspora vote.

The influence campaign extended to the Orthodox Church: last year, Moldovan clergy were treated to an all-expenses-paid trip to holy sites in Russia, then promised money if they took to social media to warn their followers about the dangers of EU integration. They duly established over 90 Telegram channels pushing out almost identical content positioning the EU as a threat to traditional family values.

Attempts to undermine the election didn’t stop there. A few days before the vote, Moldovan authorities detained 74 people suspected of planning post-election violence. Authorities claimed they’d travelled to Serbia, under the guise of a pilgrimage to Orthodox churches, to be trained in how to resist security forces, break through cordons and use weapons. On election day, officials reported attempted cyberattacks and bomb scares at polling stations in Moldova and abroad. Dodon even tried to claim victory and called for protests, although few turned up.

Challenges ahead

Moldova’s democratic institutions have survived a crucial test, repaying efforts to strengthen the country’s defences against Russian interference made since the 2024 votes. But the struggle for Moldova’s future is far from over. As it moves closer to the EU, Russia isn’t simply going to walk away from the fight. Even dirtier tricks may come.

Meanwhile the government has many other problems on its plate. In one of Europe’s poorest countries, people are struggling with the high cost of living. Public services have come under strain as Moldova has accepted proportionately more Ukrainian refugees than any other country. Corruption concerns haven’t been adequately addressed. Many young people are seeking better lives abroad.

In combating future Russian influence attempts, the government faces the challenge of striking the right balance on regulating social media and political financing, strengthening its intelligence services and building stronger social media literacy and awareness of disinformation. It will need help from EU countries, as it will to further modernise its energy infrastructure, including through more investments in renewable energy such as solar and wind, to disarm one of Russia’s most potent tools.

There’s also a sizeable minority who backed pro-Russia parties, particularly in Gagauzia and Transnistria, pointing to a need for efforts, involving civil society, to build bridges and strengthen common ground between polarised voters.

Moldova’s hopes of EU membership will rest on its progress in addressing these challenges. Even then, as the experience of Hungary shows, becoming an EU member doesn’t guarantee protection against the dangers of authoritarianism. But there’s no hope for democracy and human rights if Moldova falls under Russia’s grip. Avoiding that fate should be a concern for anyone who cares about democracy.

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