CIVICUS discusses international water governance and the political implications of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam with Khaled AbuZeid, Executive Director of the Arab Water Council, a Cairo-based regional organisation that works to promote integrated water management, cooperation and sustainable development across Arab countries.

Ethiopia’s inauguration of Africa’s largest hydroelectric facility in September marked a turning point in regional politics. While Ethiopia celebrated it as a development milestone, downstream countries Egypt and Sudan face mounting uncertainty. Disputes over water management, exemplified by recent flooding and conflicting explanations, reveal a system where climate pressures, development ambitions and national sovereignty collide without binding agreements to guide them.

What led to the dam’s construction and what does Ethiopia hope to achieve?

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was first announced in 2011, during a period of political instability in Egypt. Built on the Blue Nile, which provides around two-thirds of the water reaching Egypt and Sudan, its timing and scale came as a shock to both countries. Earlier studies had proposed a much smaller structure of around 14 billion cubic metres, but Ethiopia unilaterally expanded it to a massive 74 billion cubic metres, equal to the combined annual water shares of Egypt and Sudan.

For Ethiopia, the dam is a symbol of national pride and development. The Ethiopian government claims it will generate enough electricity for its people and export surplus power to neighbouring countries. In reality, large portions of the Ethiopian population will still lack access to electricity because the national grid remains incomplete and exporting electricity will still deprive Ethiopians.

Beyond its stated development goals, the project’s scale and unilateral implementation have caused tensions in relations across that part of the Nile Basin.

What impacts is the dam having on Egypt and Sudan?

The consequences are already visible. Soon after the dam’s inauguration, Sudan experienced severe flooding when Ethiopia released excess water without coordination. The impact of these uncoordinated releases also affected Egypt. As a result, entire communities, farms and homes were flooded.

Looking ahead, the greatest danger is posed by drought and extended drought years. When rainfall decreases, Ethiopia is likely to retain more water to sustain power generation, cutting the flow to Egypt and Sudan precisely when they need it most. Egypt depends almost entirely on the Nile, so even a small reduction could devastate its agriculture, drinking-water supplies and food security.

Compounding these climate-dependent risks are chronic water losses due to evaporation and seepage. The Ethiopian Dam reservoir covers about 1,800 square kilometres, leading to an estimated annual loss of around five billion cubic metres of water, roughly 50 billion over a decade, that once reached downstream users.

In short, the risks are structural and continuous: floods in wet years, shortages in dry ones and steady annual depletion. Without a binding filling and refilling operational agreement, each decision upstream carries the potential to become a crisis downstream.

Why have Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan failed to reach a binding agreement on the dam?

It comes down primarily to political will. For over a decade, Egypt and Sudan have pushed for a binding agreement on how the dam should be filled and operated, while Ethiopia has preferred to act unilaterally. Ethiopia wants full control over the dam, which contradicts the principles of equitable and reasonable use, no significant harm and regional cooperation in international water law.

There have been countless rounds of negotiations and talks since 2011, some led by the African Union, others mediated by the USA and the World Bank. In 2020, the three countries were invited to Washington to finalise an agreement. Egypt and Sudan attended but Ethiopia did not, showing that while technical negotiations were progressing, political commitment was not.

Instability in Sudan has further complicated matters. Different governments have taken different positions, some sympathetic to Ethiopia, others closer to Egypt’s views, and this inconsistency has weakened the collective negotiating stance of the downstream countries. All we’re left with is the 2015 Declaration of Principles, which outlines good intentions but no enforceable rules. Unless Ethiopia signs a binding legal document, the region will remain one major drought or flood away from another crisis.

Beyond the political stalemate, what are the environmental and scientific concerns?

The main concern is the absence of a thorough environmental and hydrological impact assessment. Ethiopia has not shared independent studies on how such a massive structure affects the Nile’s flow, sediment movement or downstream ecosystems. An international panel of experts flagged these gaps years ago, but most of its recommendations were never implemented. Building a dam of this scale without full studies or coordination amounts to experimenting with the entire Eastern Nile Basin.

The dam also disrupts the Nile’s natural rhythm. Seasonal floods that once brought nutrient-rich sediment to farmlands in Egypt and Sudan are now trapped behind its walls. This means soil degradation downstream and a shorter lifespan for the dam as sediment accumulates in the reservoir.

There are climatic and geological risks as well. The Blue Nile Basin’s steep terrain, fractured geological structures, massive water storage body and high rainfall create pressure on the ground beneath the reservoir, raising questions about long-term stability in a seismically active area. Rising temperatures will also increase evaporation, causing continuous water loss, particularly from such a huge reservoir. Finally, concentrating so much investment in a single hydropower project is scientifically risky in a region already facing erratic rainfall and extreme weather. A diversified energy mix – including solar, wind and smaller-scale projects – would have achieved resilience without such environmental costs.

What needs to happen for cooperation to prevail?

The first step is to rebuild trust through transparency. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan must share real-time data on rainfall, storage levels and water releases. Without this, no technical coordination is possible.

Next, the three countries need a binding legal agreement on how the dam will be filled, refilled and operated. It should define clear procedures for managing water during normal years, droughts and floods, allowing Ethiopia to generate hydropower while safeguarding Egypt and Sudan’s water security and ecosystems.

Beyond water management, the region should shift from competition to shared benefits. There is huge potential for joint power grids, food and virtual water trade, shared research and renewable energy investments that ease pressure on the Nile. Collective management of rainfall, groundwater and agriculture would turn scarcity into opportunity.

The Nile could become a model of regional cooperation, but only if the Nile waters are treated as a common lifeline rather than a national weapon.