CIVICUS discusses Colombia’s recent wave of political violence with Andrés Preciado, director of Conflict and Security at the Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP). An independent think tank and action centre founded by Colombian business leaders in 1999, FIP is Colombia’s leading peace and security research centre.

Colombia is currently experiencing a surge in political violence, with over a hundred attacks on political leaders reported in 2025, including murders, assaults and threats. At the same time, social unrest has intensified, driven by labour demands, deficiencies in basic services and the state’s absence from large parts of the country. A security and governance crisis threatens to undermine Colombia’s peace agreements and further erode public confidence in democracy ahead of elections in March and May 2026.

What explains Colombia’s current political violence?

The assassination of senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay during a political rally in Bogotá was reminiscent of a form of violence Colombia had seemingly left behind: political assassination. President Gustavo Petro’s government pursued a policy of ‘total peace’ to reduce violence and improve the humanitarian situation, but three years on, the situation has not improved. In much of the country, security has deteriorated and the state has lost control over large territories.

Rather than ending after the 2016 peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), violence has mutated due to circumstantial and structural factors. There are fewer politically motivated armed groups and more criminal organisations with local interests. Previously concentrated at the national level, violence is now mainly felt on the ground, manifesting itself in attacks on social leaders, displacement, clashes between armed groups and restrictions on freedom of movement of communities imposed by armed groups. It is no longer an ideological struggle, but rather a dispute over control of illicit economies such as drug trafficking and mining, which generate enormous profits.

Although insecurity has increased, none of the current armed groups have the military capacity of FARC or the paramilitaries at the height of their criminal activity. The main violent forces are the Clan del Golfo and FARC dissidents, with former FARC forces having grown from 38 scattered structures at the end of the previous administration to four major groupings in the process of unification. The National Liberation Army continues to pose a significant threat, and criminal structures have also grown stronger in cities including Barranquilla, Bogotá, Cali and Medellín.

What risks do social leaders face?

Colombia remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world for environmental and human rights defenders. Since 2016, the number of social leader murders has continued to increase: 173 were recorded in 2024, and 154 have been recorded so far in 2025.

This violence is not random. Criminal groups seeking to control territories view local leaders as a threat. By protecting their communities and denouncing abuses, these leaders become prime targets.

The government’s response has been reactive, addressing specific crises but failing to prevent them. By prioritising negotiations with armed groups, it has neglected to provide military and police protection to communities. In regions such as Catatumbo and Cauca, communities are calling for an immediate reduction in violence, regardless of who is responsible.

Fear of reprisals, coupled with the fragmentation of social movements and a lack of resources, has led to demobilisation and disillusionment. Although there are still some Indigenous, environmental and coca grower marches, the large protests that marked the previous administration are no longer happening. However, mobilisation is expected to regain momentum in 2026, as it will be an election year.

How are the international community and civil society responding?

International cooperation in Colombia has declined significantly, particularly due to reductions in foreign aid from Europe and the USA. This has left many community organisations, particularly those associated with the 2016 peace agreement, with serious financial difficulties, with some at risk of closing down.

Humanitarian work has become much more dangerous. International agencies, including United Nations (UN) organisations, face serious restrictions when operating in territories controlled by armed groups. According to information from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, attacks and incidents affecting medical missions increased by around 400 per cent between January and August of this year.

At the national level, civil society has also had to reconsider its role. Some organisations used to be aligned with Petro’s government, making it difficult to maintain an independent and critical stance. However, social organisations and think tanks agree the security and humanitarian situation has worsened, and they are calling for compliance with the 2016 peace agreement. This agreement remains key to territorial development and the reconstruction of the social fabric. Although Petro’s ‘total peace’ policy has not yielded the expected results, it is important to salvage the elements that proposed a comprehensive solution to the conflicts and learn from the experience.

What are the challenges for elections in 2026?

The main challenge will be to ensure the parliamentary election in March and presidential election in May are conducted freely, transparently and securely. Violence and territorial control by armed groups could hinder the opening of polling stations and limit turnout, particularly in rural areas.

While an increase in election incidents is anticipated, there is consensus among the various political forces on the importance of preserving democratic stability and ensuring peaceful elections, particularly following Miguel Uribe’s assassination. To achieve this, the Colombian state must prioritise guaranteeing security and trust in the electoral process.