CIVICUS speaks about US counterterrorism laws and their impact on civil society with Poorvika Mehra, Howard S. Brembeck Fellow at the Charity & Security Network (C&SN). C&SN seeks to reform these laws and increase the operational space for civil society organisations (CSOs) working on peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance and human rights.

US counterterrorism laws, such as the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, are making it increasingly difficult for CSOs to operate in conflict and disaster-affected areas. Broad definitions of ‘material support’ mean that even humanitarian and peacebuilding work can be treated as illegal if it involves groups on terror lists. Limited exemptions, unclear guidelines and complex licensing processes create legal and practical hurdles, while asset freezes and designations put organisations at serious risk. Grassroots and women-led groups are particularly affected. Without reform and stronger international backing, the ability of CSOs to reach vulnerable communities and do essential work remains under threat.

How do US counterterrorism laws affect the operations of CSOs today?

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the USA has built one of the world’s most extensive counterterrorism systems. It has blurred the line between security and civic life, pulling humanitarian, human rights and peacebuilding work into the same space as armed conflict. What began as an effort to isolate terrorism now isolates those working for peace by criminalising their work, cutting off their access to funds and spreading fear.

At the heart of this framework are two laws: the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which was strengthened by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. Together, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A & B, they created the federal offence of providing ‘material support’ to a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO), a term so broad it can include giving money, services, personnel and training. Violations can lead to up to 20 years in prison, or life if a death results. Prosecutors need prove someone knowingly provided support, not that they intended to break the law. That distinction can make humanitarian work in areas controlled by FTOs legally perilous.

CSOs can face prosecution even when their work saves lives. One example is the Holy Land Foundation, once the largest Muslim-American charity providing food and medicine to Palestinians through local zakat committees. None were listed as terrorist entities, but prosecutors claimed they were controlled by Hamas and the charity’s leaders were convicted. The case had a chilling effect on civil society.

Another key law is the Bank Secrecy Act, which was amended after 9/11 to make banks the first line of defence against terrorism financing. To avoid penalties, banks began cutting ties with civil society as a whole, a process known as de-risking. Because most global transactions use US dollars and pass through the US banking system, these rules reach far beyond US borders and allow US counterterrorism policies to shape how civil society operates and manages its finances worldwide.

What are the main challenges CSOs face under these laws?

US counterterrorism laws make it increasingly difficult for CSOs to fulfil their missions as they must constantly adapt to an unstable legal landscape. What began as temporary post-9/11 measures has turned into a complex web of overlapping rules that keeps expanding. Over 150 executive orders have been issued this year alone. This has happened alongside the creation of Joint Task Force 10/7 and a surge in ‘foreign terrorist organisation’ designations, sometimes applied to loosely defined groups such as cartels or organised crime units. The National Security Presidential Memorandum-7 has also blurred the line between domestic and foreign counterterrorism by introducing vague terms like ‘political violence’ to justify monitoring civil society groups ‘directly or indirectly’ linked to dissent and to direct politically-motivated reviews of nonprofit tax status with little oversight.

This legal uncertainty also fuels a financial chill. Fear of liability makes banks and donors overly cautious, delaying or rejecting transfers, closing accounts and dissolving partnerships. Women-led organisations are often hit hardest, particularly in fragile contexts where they provide essential humanitarian services that hold fragile communities together. The irony is cruel: those most effective at building resilience and preventing violent extremism are the ones most constrained by counterterrorism finance rules.

Over time, this pressure silences civil society from within. Under this climate of constant surveillance, CSOs start to self-censor. They avoid some partners and reword their work to sound less political. This cautious behaviour, often described as ‘pre-compliance’ or the ‘fear of getting it wrong’, undermines civil society’s purpose. Compliance should protect missions, not silence them.

How can civil society mitigate the impacts of these restrictions?

The C&SN was created to defend civil society from the overreach of US counterterrorism laws. In our Nonprofit Compliance Checklist, we’ve put together a list of steps that CSOs can take to reduce risk.

Here are some of the basic ones: safeguard your organisation from financial restrictions. Keep governance documents such as founding papers, bylaws, board minutes and registrations in order and build a culture of due diligence. This means screening donors, running regular risk assessments and checking the Office of Foreign Assets Controls and United Nations (UN) sanctions lists. It also means knowing which general licences and humanitarian exemptions apply to your work.

Relationships are key. Stay in touch with your banks, donors and peers, and make your mission visible online. Many flagged transactions are first reviewed by junior bank staff, so making sure they are well-acquainted with your mission and work can make a difference

Even with these precautions, many CSOs still lose access to banking. This shows how broken the system is and it’s not your fault. When it happens, record each case and share it with us, particularly if it involves one of the 12 Wolfsberg banks, since our partners at the Wolfsberg Group may be able to support you. Gathering this evidence helps strengthen advocacy for change. Real protection comes from combining solid compliance with public pressure.

Are international bodies doing enough to protect civil society and humanitarian work?

Some progress has been made, but not nearly enough. UN Security Council Resolutions 2664 and 2761 exempted humanitarian activities from UN asset freezes. This was the result of a decade of civil society advocacy led by the 1267 Renewal Coalition, coordinated by C&SN. These have made it easier for humanitarian organisations and donors to operate in sanctioned areas.

The Financial Action Task Force has also updated its Recommendation 8 on nonprofit oversight. It’s urged governments to apply proportionate and risk-based measures to CSOs. Some countries are starting to follow, but many still apply a zero-risk approach and restrict civic space.

This has serious consequences. For instance, the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, Ben Saul, has warned that over-compliance and weaponisation of counterterrorism laws has contributed to Gaza’s banking collapse, blocking humanitarian funds. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy faces a similar problem: strong language but limited implementation. States committed to combating discrimination and gender disparity, but Islamophobia and antisemitism keep rising and women continue to suffer the worst effects of both terrorism and counterterrorism.

At this rate, the UN and its member states risk becoming complicit in the harms they were built to prevent. If we really want to ameliorate the terrible harms of the international counterterrorism framework, we don’t need more rules but need to make the existing ones work. This means enforcing Resolutions 2664 and 2761 uniformly, codifying humanitarian exemptions in national laws and embedding accountability within administrative measures. This helps treat financial access as a human rights standard.

Counterterrorism is not just a technical issue; it is political and ethical. International institutions must choose whether they will simply administer legality or act as custodians of humanity. The future of human rights depends on that choice.