Milei managed to capture social unrest and channel it through a disruptive political proposal. His messaging against what he calls the political caste, his confrontational style and his constant presence on digital platforms and social media allowed him to build himself up as a leader outside traditional parties. The clarity of his narrative, combined with an anti-establishment aesthetic and Trump’s explicit support, reinforced his identity as a disruptor. In addition, the perception of initially effective economic management strengthened his electoral performance.

The opposition, in contrast, was fragmented and lacked clear leadership. It failed to articulate a convincing message to an electorate that demanded profound change. Many of its leaders carry negative evaluations from their previous time in government, and internal disputes further exposed its lack of cohesion. Peronism is going through a particularly critical moment, without a common project, with tensions between figures such as Cristina Fernández de Kirchner – who is serving a prison sentence for corruption and faces several additional legal proceedings – and the governor of Buenos Aires province, Axel Kicillof, and with divided legislative blocs. Following poor performances in the 2021, 2023 and 2025 elections, Peronism has its lowest share of deputies, senators and governors since democracy was restored in 1983.

It’s hard to say. Financial support from the US Treasury prevented what would probably have been a collapse of the peso in the days before the election, which would surely have hurt the performance of Milei’s party, La Libertad Avanza (Freedom advances). Faced with a currency run that threatened to destabilise the country before the vote, the US Treasury granted a US$20 billion bailout, which made it possible to contain the dollar, reduce inflationary pressure and improve public perception of the government. This support was linked to the ideological affinity between Milei and Trump, but also to US strategic interest in Argentina’s geopolitical position and natural resources.

However, Argentine public opinion has historically been reserved about the USA, and certainly does not sympathise with Trump. I believe the first factor was more influential than the second, and that US support largely explains the results Milei’s government obtained.

Milei’s victory deepens a structural change in Argentine politics. He came to the presidency without a developed party structure. La Libertad Avanza was essentially a brand sustained by digital activism. One of the government’s priorities is to build a real party, present in all 23 provinces and with organisational capacity of its own.

At the programmatic level, the election result consolidates Milei’s project: adjustment of government structures, reduction of public spending and alignment with a conservative international agenda. The greater legislative support he will have as a result of the election will allow him to move forward more quickly with these changes, although he will still depend on the support of like-minded parties such as Propuesta Republicana (Republican Proposal) or whatever he may received from negotiations with small parties and governors, who often control the legislators elected by their party and province.

Milei’s success, then, will depend on his ability to gain allies and maintain cohesion within his coalition in a historically unstable country. Ultimately, his room for manoeuvre will be conditioned by the depth of the economic crisis and the level of social support he can maintain as he implements his programme.

In terms of human rights, no structural setbacks are to be expected. Argentina has not seen systematic violations for decades and there are no signs this will change. Isolated incidents of police abuse persist, but they are not part of a deliberate policy of repression. What is cause for concern is the government’s hostile treatment of the independent press, with disparagement and attempts to exert pressure. Although worrying, this does not imply a profound deterioration of rights, but it does require vigilance.

With regard to international cooperation, the change is clear: Argentina has distanced itself from multilateral agendas related to climate, Indigenous peoples’ rights, the Sustainable Development Goals and women’s rights. The government now aligns itself with a group of right-wing governments that question multilateralism, which is also reflected in regional policy, with less involvement in the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and forums such as the G20 and an almost exclusive focus on the USA and, secondarily, Israel.

As far as civil society is concerned, the outlook is less worrying. Argentina has a strong civic fabric, with organisations active in democracy, human rights and transparency. So far, there have been no attempts to co-opt or demobilise these organisations. The government is primarily focused on the economy and building its own party, not on directly antagonising civil society.