The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the scene of sickening violence. Rebel M23 forces – short for Mouvement du 23 Mars, a reference to the date of a 2009 peace agreement the group claims the DRC government failed to respect – and the Rwandan soldiers fighting alongside them are gaining ground in a renewed offensive. In January, they captured Goma, a city of two million people and the capital of North Kivu province. The following month they seized Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province, effectively taking control of the region around Lake Kivu on the DRC’s border with Rwanda.

Over 8,500 people have reportedly been killed since January. There’s ample evidence M23 forces have been responsible for summary killings, including of children, sexual violence, ethnically motivated attacks, conscription, forced labour and looting. The onslaught has caused a humanitarian crisis, with food, water and health and sanitation services in short supply. Goma was already under heavy strain, since many fled there to try to escape fighting in the region, and the M23 has worsened the situation by bombing and forcibly emptying camps for displaced people, leaving an estimated 450,000 without shelter. Tens of thousands have fled across the border into Burundi, many by making a dangerous river crossing.

Civil society under attack

Civil society is doing what it can to respond to the crisis. Local groups are working to provide food and other essentials to displaced people, while calling for outside aid and safety for the humanitarian workers trying to help.

But civil society is under attack. This has long been a dangerous region for aid workers, human rights activists and journalists, but as M23 gains territory, violations are on the rise. The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders and international human rights organisations have reported targeting of civil society workers. Civil society faces threats of murder, sexual violence, torture and abduction.

LUCHA (Lutte pour le Changement / Struggle for Change), a major youth-led social movement, reported that M23 forces shot dead one of its members, Byamungu Katema Pierre, along with four members of a local youth council, in Muhongoza village, South Kivu, on 12 February. The next day, outspoken musician Delcat Indengo, who’d criticised M23, was shot dead while filming a music video.

M23 has reportedly ordered civil society to halt all activities in areas under its control and drawn up lists of people to be captured. Activists live in constant fear for their lives and many have either gone into hiding or fled. But some escape routes are dangerous, and people fleeing to other countries risk being returned against their will.

Threats and restrictions on civil society and media are so severe that it’s hard to get accurate information from the conflict zone. The risks for journalists are high. In November 2024, community radio journalist Yoshua Kambere Machoz was found dead, presumably killed by the M23 forces who’d arrested him eight days before.

As well as threats from M23, media face censorship from DRC authorities. In January, the government’s media regulator suspended Al Jazeera for 90 days, accusing it of destabilising state institutions, after it broadcast an interview with an M23 leader. The regulator has threatened to penalise several other media outlets for their coverage of the conflict. In an X/Twitter post in January, Justice Minister Constant Mutamba threatened journalists with the death penalty if they spread information about M23 and Rwandan forces.

Authorities have also shut down internet access and blocked social media in the conflict region, making it harder for people to access potentially life-saving information and document human rights violations. They also appear to have restricted access to the Google Play Store to stop people downloading VPN apps to circumvent social media restrictions.

By making it less likely that abuses will be documented, perpetrators will be held accountable and local people will get the help they need, attacks on civil society and the media are enabling further human rights violations.

Rwanda and the region

Conflict has escalated recently, but it’s been a grim reality in eastern DRC for several decades. Over 100 armed groups are believed to be operating in the area. M23 formed in 2012 and reorganised and went on the offensive in 2021. It claims to exist to defend the rights of the DRC’s Tutsi minority. But a more obvious motivation for M23 and other rebel forces is control of the region’s incredible mineral riches, which include gold, tin, tungsten and coltan – from which tantalum is extracted. Manufacturers of mobile phones and other electronics are hungry for these metals. Tantalum, for example, is used in electronic circuits and a wide range of industrial alloys.

Although Rwanda denies it, UN experts have repeatedly concluded that it is indeed involved in M23. The latest UN Security Council resolution on the conflict, passed on 21 February, was clear on the matter, calling on the Rwanda Defence Forces to leave the DRC and stop supporting M23.

Rwanda’s support has been crucial to the group’s resurgence and its troops have regularly been spotted crossing the border. An estimated 4,000 to 7,000 Rwandan military personnel are currently deployed in eastern DRC, along with Rwandan armoured vehicles, drones, missiles and other advanced equipment. This looks less like a civil war than a foreign invasion, and one with greater territorial ambitions as M23 continues to advance and indicate it plans a long-term occupation of the areas it controls. M23 forces held a press conference to announce they’re ‘here to stay’ in Goma and have set up their own administrative structures, including police forces and a tax administration.

Rwanda’s effective control of the border region makes it easy to smuggle metals across. At least 150 tonnes of coltan were smuggled to Rwanda and mixed with Rwandan supplies in 2024. Minerals constitute around 80 per cent of Rwanda’s exports, much of which is gold that has likely been moved across the border. This wealth gives Rwanda considerable influence. While a small country, it sees itself as a regional power that’s entitled to have a say in the security arrangements of neighbouring countries.

Rwanda is far from the only one involved. Multiple African states have a stake in this conflict. Forces from Burundi are fighting on the DRC’s side, along with a contingent from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), led by South Africa, although these forces have just announced their withdrawal, a move that could potentially fuel insecurity. Then there’s Uganda. Its once friendly relations with Rwanda have soured, and Uganda now seems to be playing both sides, maintaining links with the M23 while striking deals with the DRC government. With so many countries involved, a broader regional conflict could result, while M23’s military successes could embolden other rebel groups.

International action needed

People in the DRC are making clear they want the outside world to stop ignoring the conflict. 2025 has already seen several protests in support of the armed forces and against M23 and Rwanda. During one protest in the capital, Kinshasha, protesters attacked the embassies of Belgium, France, Rwanda and the USA, accusing western powers of doing nothing to stop the violence.

On 7 February, following civil society advocacy, the UN Human Rights Council agreed to create a commission of inquiry and a fact-finding mission on atrocities committed during the conflict. But many such UN initiatives struggle to attract funding and therefore to do their job properly. They must be adequately resourced and enabled to gather the evidence needed to hold perpetrators to account, and states should cooperate with them.

Africa’s intergovernmental institutions must play their part, including by opening up spaces to negotiate de-escalation and demilitarisation agreements. In a potentially promising development, a joint summit was held in February between the East African Community (EAC) and SADC. Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame was present and DRC President Félix Tshisekedi took part via video. The summit called for an immediate ceasefire, direct negotiations among all involved in the conflict, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the opening of humanitarian corridors. Zimbabwe has recently hosted a second joint EAC and SADC meeting, which called for the reopening of airports, a move that would help improve humanitarian access.

Talks between the DRC government and M23 were scheduled, hosted by Angola, but M23 pulled out at the last minute following the imposition of European Union (EU) sanctions. Pressure may however be building to resume some frozen initiatives. The Luanda Process, named after Angola’s capital, has been stalled since December, when Rwanda failed to turn up for planned talks with the DRC. The DRC government also says it wants to resume the Nairobi Process, an EAC initiative, through which it can hold talks with a range of armed groups. But here too, the self-interest of states taking sides in the conflict comes into play: the DRC government is suspicious of Kenya, which it sees as aligned with Rwanda. Given this, the African Union, as the continent-wide body, could perhaps play a bigger part.

The UN’s role has often been controversial. It’s had a presence in the DRC for over two decades, through the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). But many in the DRC have viewed it as ineffectual in the face of rising insecurity, and in 2022 protests were held, at times violent, calling for its withdrawal. Now would clearly be the wrong time for that to happen, and MONUSCO must surely be enabled to play its role in helping to protect civilians.

Pressure on Rwanda

Global north states, including former colonial powers, must show some responsibility. Many significantly finance the Rwandan state, providing over US$1 billion in aid each year

Kagame has long enjoyed international acclaim for his leadership in rebuilding Rwanda after the 1994 geocide and has also been credited with strong economic development, although this is disputed. Global north states have accordingly been slow to criticise Kagame. But his power is underpinned by systematic human rights abuses that have seen independent civil society silenced, government critics jailed and exiled dissidents at risk of forced return or assassination. Recently, Denmark and the UK both looked towards Rwanda as a possible place to send migrants and refugees they didn’t want, providing a further reason for them to rein in criticism.

In light of the recent escalation, there are finally signs attitudes may be changing. In February, the UK government announced it was suspending aid to Rwanda over its role in the conflict, while Germany has cancelled consultations with the Rwandan government. The EU is coming under pressure to suspend the controversial €900 million (approx. US$983 million) deal it struck with Rwanda in 2024 for minerals used in microchips and electric vehicle batteries, since it’s almost certain some come from eastern DRC. The DRC government is also calling for an end to Rwanda’s sportswashing sponsorship of high-profile football clubs including Arsenal, Bayern Munich and Paris St Germain.

More pressure is needed to ensure that hostilities cease and Rwanda and M23 withdraw. But there’s also a need to support Congolese civil society on the ground. Lasting peace will only be achieved if the whole spectrum of civil society, including youth-led social movements, is enabled to play its part.

The DRC is currently on the CIVICUS Monitor Watch List, which tracks countries currently experiencing a serious decline in respect for civic space.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org