Four years after leading a coup, Guinea’s military leader Mamady Doumbouya maintained his power in the 28 December presidential election. The election followed a constitutional referendum that removed restrictions on junta members running for office and extended presidential terms. Major opposition figures were excluded, exiled or imprisoned, while independent media were systematically silenced through closures and suspensions. A climate of fear created by enforced disappearances, torture and violent crackdowns on protests ensured no credible opposition could emerge. The international community has failed to do enough to support Guinean civil society.

On 28 December, Guinea’s military leader Mamady Doumbouya secured victory in the country’s first presidential election since the coup he led in 2021. Provisional results showed him winning around 87 per cent of the vote. The poll was the culmination of a tightly controlled process that saw the junta systematically exclude opposition challengers, silence critical voices and manipulate the constitution to enable Doumbouya’s continuing power.

Major opposition figures, including former prime minister Lansana Kouyaté and ex-minister Ousmane Kaba, were excluded from the race on technical grounds, while another former prime minister Cellou Dalein Diallo and the president Doumbouya ousted in 2021, Alpha Condé, remain in exile. Civil society leaders and journalists who might have scrutinised the process had been intimidated, detained, abducted or forced into hiding.

Under conditions that didn’t give them a chance, major opposition groups called for a boycott, meaning there was no strong challenger among the eight candidates who ran against Doumbouya. According to civil society sources, turnout was low, although official data placed it at over 80 per cent.

With results swiftly confirmed by the Supreme Court, Doumbouya successfully turned four years of military rule into electoral authoritarianism.

The path to electoral autocracy

Doumbouya systematically laid the foundations for this outcome. In April 2025 he announced a constitutional referendum to be held on 21 September. In June, he further centralised control by creating a new General Directorate of Elections under the authority of the minister responsible for territorial administration, departing from previous initiatives to establish an independent electoral institution.

The constitutional process was designed to consolidate his power. The junta’s acting legislative body, the National Council of the Transition, drafted the new constitution through an opaque process. Citing its lack of legitimacy, the main opposition groups refused to participate in consultations. While early drafts contained provisions barring lifetime presidencies and limiting constitutional revisions, these were removed before the final text was presented to voters.

The referendum rubber-stamped a new constitution with a reported 89 per cent support and 86 per cent turnout, figures disputed by opposition groups that boycotted the vote. It removed a prior ban on junta members running for office, extended presidential terms from five to seven years, renewable twice, and created a Senate with a third of its members appointed by the president.

A climate of fear

The junta’s consolidation of power built on civic space restrictions imposed since the coup. In May 2022, authorities slapped a blanket ban on protests and political gatherings, citing security concerns and claiming demonstrations would prevent implementation of the transition timetable. Security forces used violence to suppress protests, including those on the junta’s failure to initiate a democratic transition and over housing and power cuts.

When the junta missed a December 2024 deadline for democratic transition agreed with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the opposition coalition Forces Vives de Guinée called for protests that were met with security force violence. According to the coalition, at least three people were killed, including two children, when security forces fired live ammunition at protesters on 6 January 2025.

In October 2024, the government dissolved over 50 political parties and announced investigations into dozens more. In March 2025, it suspended two major political parties, the Rally of the People of Guinea (RPG) and the Union of Republican Forces, for three months and disbanded 27 other groups. The next month, a court sentenced opposition leader Aliou Bah to five years in prison for allegedly insulting Doumbouya.

In August 2025, a month before the constitutional referendum, authorities suspended three major opposition parties, including the RPG and the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea, for another three months. On 29 August, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights urged Guinean authorities to lift restrictions on civic space and uphold rights guaranteed under the African Charter, a plea the junta refused to hear.

Authorities unleashed violence against activists, journalists and opposition figures. Abductions and torture intensified in the run-up to the referendum, and again before the presidential election. The United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, pointed out the aim of these tactics: to intimidate opposition, disrupt campaigning and deter voters from mobilising. Among the many victims was Mohamed Traoré, former president of the Guinean Bar Association, abducted by armed men in June and found hours later with evident marks of torture. Despite the prosecutor general’s promise to investigate, no information has been made public about progress in any case of enforced disappearance.

By the time of the presidential election there was virtually no independent media operating in Guinea. The country plummeted 25 places in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index, the largest drop of the year, ranking 103rd out of 180. Most independent outlets were shuttered in 2024 through licence revocations. The January 2025 indefinite suspension of Dépêche Guinée for publishing an opinion piece the authorities claimed incited insurrection, following previous suspensions in 2023 and 2024, eliminated one of the last remaining critical voices.

The pervasive climate of fear meant that even the handful of journalists still working practised strict self-censorship to avoid becoming the next target. As voters went to the polls, there was nobody to provide diverse perspectives, scrutinise the process, investigate irregularities or hold authorities accountable.

Democracy denied

Doumbouya initially enjoyed some popularity due to widespread public frustration with Condé, who’d controversially amended the constitution to secure a third term amid violent protests and corruption and fraud allegations. Many Guineans hoped the coup would be a corrective to authoritarianism, corruption and economic mismanagement. Doumbouya’s junta promised a return to civilian rule and released political prisoners, further boosting initial public support. However, Doumbouya’s actions in power mirrored those of Condé, as he changed the constitution to enable his extended rule while eliminating opposition.

Guinea is part of a broader pattern. Since 2020, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger and Sudan have also experienced military takeovers. In country after country, promises to restore civilian rule have been broken and military rulers have instead increasingly consolidated their power through constitutional manipulation and the repression of dissent.

Guinea is the third to transition from military dictatorship to electoral autocracy. Chad was the first, with Mahamat Idriss Déby carrying the May 2024 presidential election, having seized power through a coup when his father was killed by rebels in 2021. The campaign was marred by violence, including the killing of opposition leader Yaya Dillo just days before Déby announced his candidacy. Gabon followed in 2025: General Brice Oligui Nguema, who overthrew dictator Ali Bongo in August 2023, won the April presidential election with over 90 per cent of the vote. In both cases, subsequent parliamentary elections further concentrated power in presidential hands.

Having negotiated the October 2022 transition agreement that Doumbouya subsequently ignored, ECOWAS has proven unable to pressure Guinea to return to civilian rule. The body’s sanctions and deadlines have been systematically flouted without consequence. The African Union and the wider international community have been just as ineffective, offering rhetorical concern while maintaining normal diplomatic and economic relations with the junta. UN warnings about the election’s lack of credibility weren’t accompanied by any tangible consequences.

The prospects for democracy in Guinea are now remote. Doumbouya has secured a seven-year mandate through an election that eliminated the essential infrastructure needed for democracy. In the absence of stronger international pressure and tangible support for Guinean civil society, Guinea faces prolonged authoritarian rule behind a democratic facade, with dismal human rights prospects.

OUR CALLS FOR ACTION

  • Guinean authorities must immediately investigate enforced disappearances and torture and prosecute those responsible.
  • Guinean authorities must release all political prisoners, lift suspensions of media outlets and political parties and end the blanket ban on protests.
  • The Economic Community of West African States, the African Union and the wider international community must hold authorities accountable for human rights violations, including through targeted sanctions against those responsible for repression.

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Cover photo by Luc Gnago/Reuters via Gallo Images