Sudan is the scene of unimaginable suffering. As the war between the army and the militia continues, civilians are paying the highest price. In this largely overlooked conflict, both sides are killing non-combatants and committing crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Sudan is home to the world’s largest displacement crisis, and now it stands on the brink of famine. It’s already experiencing its worst recorded levels of food insecurity, with over half its population facing an acute food crisis. More than 750,000 are at risk of starvation.

Around 11 million people have been forced to flee their homes, armed forces have stolen and destroyed food supplies, crops and livestock, and many people are no longer able to earn a living or farm. United Nations (UN) human rights experts accuse both sides of using denial of food as a weapon of war, including by blocking humanitarian deliveries and looting depots.

Many of the worst-affected areas are in the Darfur region, where the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia has gained territory and is currently besieging El Fasher. If the city falls, a massacre will follow. The RSF grew out of the militias that committed genocide in Darfur two decades ago, and they’re once again accused of genocide, carrying out ethnically motivated mass killings and numerous other atrocities. Meanwhile, the army it’s fighting against, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), has blocked the main humanitarian access point on the border with Chad.

Proxy war

The conflict broke out in April 2023, sparked by a power struggle between two men: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, SAF commander-in-chief and head of the ruling junta, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti, leader of the RSF. The two worked together in the October 2021 coup that ousted a civilian government. A plan to incorporate the RSF into the SAF was the flashpoint of their battle for leadership and, crucially, control of resources.

But beyond the two warring egos, there are bigger forces at work. Several other states are taking sides in the conflict, enabling it to continue. Their broader campaigns for regional and global positioning – and sometimes their calculation that an enemy’s enemy must be a friend – are at play.

Much of the foreign involvement is, of course, opaque and subject to official denials. Egypt and Iran are among the states providing military support to the SAF. Egyptian fighter jets and Iranian drones have reportedly been used against the RSF. Meanwhile, forces from the eastern part of divided Libya have allegedly helped supply the RSF, and the government of Chad has been accused of cooperating with it.

Another distant war is echoing in Sudan. Russia, which has extensive goldmining interests in the country, initially seemed to be siding with the RSF, particularly through its mercenary forces, now under the Russian state’s control. In response, Ukrainian troops reportedly carried out attacks on Russian mercenaries and RSF forces. More recently, however, Russia may be tilting towards the SAF, possibly eyeing the development of a Red Sea naval base as the prize. Russia recently abstained on a UN Security Council resolution calling on the RSF to end its siege of El Fasher, which it could have vetoed.

But the biggest player on this crowded stage is undoubtedly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Gulf petrostate that’s increasingly asserting itself in many African countries, offering an alternative economic and security ally to China. In countries undergoing conflict, it takes sides. In Ethiopia, when federal troops fought separatist groups from the Tigray region, the UAE supported the government, reportedly supplying drones. In Libya, it’s backed the eastern forces fighting those in the west.

In Sudan, it’s firmly on the RSF’s side. It’s supplying weapons to the RSF, including reportedly through shipments disguised as humanitarian aid and supplies routed through other African counties where it has a presence, such as the Central African Republic, in collaboration with Russian mercenaries. Key RSF backroom operations are being run from locations in the UAE. Wounded RSF fighters are reportedly being treated in Abu Dhabi. Without the UAE’s support, it’s highly unlikely the RSF would be able to sustain its war effort on the scale it’s doing. The UAE denies all this, but a UN expert panel found the allegations to be credible.

The UAE has extensive economic interests at stake. It receives more Sudanese gold than any other country, some of which then makes its way to Russia. The UAE has large agricultural investments and a major Red Sea port plan, as part of its development of a string of ports around Africa’s coast.

There are political interests too. The UAE really doesn’t want countries it has a stake in to democratise. It supports several anti-democratic African governments, including in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia. It likely sees backing the RSF as the best way to ensure the democratic transition once promised by the 2019 revolution remains thwarted.

As with the Russia-Ukraine war, a regional power struggle is playing out in Sudan. The UAE has long taken a similar stance to Saudi Arabia’s, but is increasingly showing its independence and its willingness to contest Saudi supremacy. The two ended up diverging over the conflict in Yemen, where they have both played an active role. Its Sudan policy is another way for the UAE to demonstrate its independence.

The UAE’s role also accounts for Iran’s pro-SAF position, while Saudi Arabia is trying to distinguish itself from both by seeking to broker peace talks, known as the Jeddah process, which so far have come to little.

The UAE also has some powerful friends in the west, not least the UK and the USA, and it’s using them to limit international scrutiny. The British government, which currently leads on Sudan at the UN Security Council, was reported to have pressured African states not to criticise the UAE over its support for the RSF.

Time for action

The people of Sudan deserve better than to be pawns in a proxy war waged by distant states.

But people in the UAE have no way to pressure their government if they’re upset about the blood on its hands. Civic space in the UAE is closed and those who speak out against the government are routinely criminalised.

This means it falls on others to mobilise. It’s time for states that are helping to perpetuate the conflict to come under greater pressure from other states, the international community and international civil society.

The first and most urgent demand must be for unfettered humanitarian access to stop people starving. Even then, an immediate ceasefire on all sides is needed. This must be followed by a process of genuine dialogue to build peace and plan for transition, which must involve Sudanese civil society in its diverse forms. The neighbourhood-level resistance committees that are offering a vital humanitarian response, have long demanded democracy and are being targeted for their work, must be involved.

The international community must step up its efforts. The UN’s fact-finding mission, established last October following civil society advocacy, has been severely hampered by a lack of funding, as has the humanitarian response plan, which has received only 18 per cent of the money needed. States that aren’t involved in the conflict must stop ignoring it and adequately resource the UN response.

States, the international community and civil society must also throw the spotlight on the UAE, including by stopping the state laundering its reputation through hosting prestigious international events, such as the recent COP28 climate summit. There must be consequences. When the RSF eventually faces international justice, those who enabled it must also be held to account – and the UAE’s rulers should be first in line.

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