Content warning: this article contains graphic descriptions of violence.

In May 2025, Tanzanian security forces stripped Ugandan activist Agather Atuhaire naked, raped her and smeared her with excrement while they filmed her ordeal, seemingly to try to shame her into silence. Her crime: entering the country alongside fellow activist Boniface Mwangi from Kenya to attend the politically motivated trial of opposition leader Tundu Lissu. Mwangi, arrested alongside her, was also subjected to torture. They were eventually dumped near the border.

This brutality should shock the world into recognising the reality of Tanzania under President Samia Suluhu Hassan, who took office in 2021 with eloquent promises of reconciliation and democratic renewal following the death of authoritarian president John Magufuli. Four years later, every democratic gain made since 2021 has been dismantled. As a general election scheduled for October approaches, Hassan is showing herself to be not a reformist alternative to Magufuli’s authoritarianism but a more polished successor: one who uses the language of democracy to legitimise increasingly brutal repression.

Illusion of change

In 2022, Time magazine named Hassan as one of the 100 most influential people of the year. This praise conveniently overlooked the fact she’d been elected and re-elected on the same Party of the Revolution (Chama cha Mapinduzi, CCM) ticket as Magufuli in rigged elections, been a key part of his administration and benefited from the system that had kept the CCM in power for over half a century.

But Hassan’s early presidency seemed to mark a genuine departure from her predecessor’s methods. She championed what she called ‘the four Rs’ – reconciliation, resilience, reform and rebuilding. In January 2023, she lifted a 2016 ban on political rallies, allowed banned media to resume operations, released imprisoned opposition leaders and set up a task force on political reform including civil society, media and political representatives. Hassan sought to improve the business climate, re-engaged with international partners and adopted a more pragmatic approach to COVID-19, in sharp contrast with Magufuli’s refusal to respond to the pandemic.

However, this liberalisation proved superficial and short-lived. By early 2024, reforms had stalled. Many restrictive laws remained in place, and as the country approached crucial local elections, Hassan decisively turned back to repressive tactics from the old CCM playbook.

Single-party hegemony

Tanzania’s democracy has always been constrained, its political system dominated by the CCM since independence in 1961. Its supremacy survived Tanzania’s transition from a one-party state to regular multiparty elections in 1995, as competition remained severely constrained behind a multiparty facade. The opposition has remained weak and fragmented, unable to mount a serious challenge to the CCM’s hegemony.

The CCM’s power derives not just from its organisational strength and resource advantages, but also from its manipulation of electoral processes. This was clear in 2020’s implausible election results, which saw the increasingly unpopular Magufuli re-elected with over 84 per cent of the vote. Tactics included tight control of the election administration body, systematic exclusion of opposition candidates, deployment of security forces against opposition supporters, voter intimidation and ballot stuffing. Opposition parties were constrained by legislation empowering the government to interfere with their registration, funding, internal operations, advocacy and coalition formation.

The state became more authoritarian when Magufuli took the helm in 2015. His administration used increasingly extreme measures to silence critics, including banning political rallies, shutting down media outlets and targeting civil society organisations with restrictive legislation. His crackdown extended beyond traditional opposition figures to encompass activists, journalists and anyone who dared criticise government policies. So when Hassan, who’d been vice president, succeeded Magufuli upon his death, people hoped for change.

Intensifying crackdown

Hassan’s mask slipped ahead of November 2024 local elections. The run-up was marked by a systematic campaign of repression, closing the democratic space that had briefly been allowed to emerge in previous years. The government silenced opposition voices and restricted civic participation through mass arrests, enforced disappearances, media censorship and intimidation tactics.

In August, police detained 375 members and supporters of the main opposition party, the Party for Democracy and Progress (Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo, CHADEMA), including Lissu and party chair Freeman Mbowe. This crackdown was triggered by CHADEMA’s referencing of youth-led protests in neighbouring Kenya, with authorities banning a planned International Youth Day celebration, claiming it would ‘breach the peace’. Systematic targeting extended beyond political figures to include journalists covering events, with authorities arresting five media workers alongside opposition members.

This was followed by a wave of enforced disappearances and targeted killings of opposition activists. In September, senior CHADEMA member Ali Mohamed Kibao was abducted from a bus and found dead the following day with evidence of severe beating and acid burns. Social media commentator Edgar Mwakabela was similarly abducted, tortured, shot in the jaw and dumped in Katavi National Park. Fortunately, he survived. At least three other opposition members went missing.

As voting approached, the state launched a systematic attack on media freedoms through regulatory action and physical intimidation. The government blocked nationwide access to Twitter/X in August, citing concerns over opposition communications, and police physically assaulted journalists covering banned CHADEMA protests in September. In October, authorities suspended three major online news outlets for 30 days after The Citizen published an animated video featuring a character resembling Hassan watching coverage of abductions.

Civil society organisations working on human rights and good governance issues faced growing restrictions, including deregistration, legal harassment and unlawful arrests. This forced many to self-censor or cease operations rather than risk government retaliation for their advocacy work.

People faced prosecution for criticising the government on social media platforms. Portrait artist Shadrack Chaula was convicted and fined for ‘insulting’ Hassan and burning her photo in a TikTok video, then disappeared for a month after his release. Academic freedom was also more tightly constrained, with scholars self-censoring due to laws that criminalise disputing of government statistics and impose vague prohibitions on research that could be deemed politically sensitive.

These actions were effective in creating a climate of fear and intimidation, neutering political opposition. When the local election was held, meaningful competition was impossible, and to nobody’s surprise, the CCM won over 98 per cent of seats.

Democracy denied

With local elections secured, Hassan moved to eliminate any potential challenge in the October general election. In early 2025, the CCM unanimously nominated her for re-election. In April, a court charged CHADEMA leader Lissu with treason – which carries the death penalty – for allegedly inciting rebellion while calling for electoral reforms. After CHADEMA refused to sign an electoral code of conduct without comprehensive reforms, the election body banned it from all elections until 2030, eliminating the only credible challenge to CCM rule.

On the same day they abducted Atuhaire and Mwangi, authorities detained former Kenyan Justice Minister Martha Karua on her arrival at Dar es Salaam airport to attend Lissu’s trial, and then deported her. This targeting of foreign political figures demonstrates the government’s growing confidence that brutal repression carries no consequences.

The international community’s response has been shamefully muted. While international civil society organisations and United Nations human rights experts have condemned violations and called for investigations, governments have done virtually nothing. Their silence can only embolden Hassan and authoritarians around the world.

The upcoming general election isn’t just another vote: it’s a test of whether the international community will stand by as Tanzania becomes a fully authoritarian state.

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