South Africa’s coalition experiment
A big loss of support for the long-dominant African National Congress in South Africa’s general election has led to a 10-party governing coalition. The election results and a huge drop in turnout indicate widespread disaffection with the ruling party’s corruption, factionalism and ineffectiveness in tackling deep inequality, unemployment and long-running economic problems. The new administration, arguably an ideologically incoherent marriage of convenience which huge potential for infighting, will need to make progress on these issues to reverse declining trust in democracy and its institutions. To do so, it must put an end to hostility towards civil society and work with it as a partner.
South Africa is entering uncharted territory with the formation of a coalition government. In every election since 1994 – the first under universal suffrage following the fall of apartheid – the African National Congress (ANC) won a clear majority. But on 29 May, the ANC took just 40.2 per cent of the national vote, way down on its 57.5 per cent total in 2019. After 30 years, many voters have made clear their unhappiness with the ANC and showed an appetite for something different – but they may not be happy with the complex and potentially fractious government that’s resulted.
Display of disaffection
For many years voters rewarded the ANC, the party of Nelson Mandela and a liberation movement that forged a transition that once seemed unlikely without a sustained conflict: replacing a system where the white minority held power with one where every citizen has a vote.
But the legacy of apartheid remains, with the country often said to be the most unequal in the world. While key political figures now overwhelmingly come from the Black majority and some Black people have grown very wealthy, economic status and race remain strongly linked. For most South Africans, democracy hasn’t brought enough change and, while a few live in luxury, many struggle. Unemployment is high, the economy is stagnant and many people don’t have access to decent basic services. The ANC has become plagued by factionalism and corruption allegations.
Disaffection wasn’t only communicated through votes for parties other than the ANC. It was also signalled by staying at home. Turnout stood at just 58.6 per cent, the lowest-ever under democracy and a long way from the heady days of the 1994 election, when it neared 87 per cent as people queued for hours to exercise their hard-won democratic freedoms. This time, only 16.2 million of 27.7 million registered voters cast a ballot, while a further 11 million-plus eligible people didn’t even register.
Disengagement is a symptom of disappointment in the ANC, and also of doubt that elections can change things. During the campaign, doubts about democracy were both exacerbated by and reflected in the circulation of disinformation that sought to undermine the credibility of the electoral commission. The end result could be a loss of public faith in democratic institutions and the value and legitimacy of elections.
Voices from the frontline
Tessa Dooms is Programmes Director at Rivonia Circle, a think tank that seeks to create spaces for political engagement and the development of political agency beyond political parties and elections.
We’re facing a multidimensional crisis – an economic, social and human rights crisis – so when it comes to election issues everything seems a big deal because there’s so much to be done. Even infrastructure and service delivery are under scrutiny. There are many pressing issues that people feel are critical.
People want to see that the democratic process can truly steer South Africa in new directions. Many, particularly young people, have become disillusioned with democracy. They feel it isn’t functioning as promised and elections are meaningless.
Parties focus on mobilising their core supporters, often overlooking the millions of undecided voters who will have a significant impact on the outcome of the election. These undecided voters represent the majority and can make the election unpredictable for those who think they have it all figured out.
For instance, in the 2019 election, about 10 million eligible voters didn’t show up to register. Imagine if those who didn’t register had participated; the result might have been different. That’s why it’s so important for undecided voters and those who don’t belong to a political party to talk to each other and encourage each other to vote. We need to encourage voter conversations to motivate people to turn out and vote, regardless of their choice.
Politicians aren’t the only key players in an election; it’s ultimately up to voters, citizens and communities to bring about change. That’s the key message.
The role of civil society isn’t to dictate voting preferences, but to encourage and enable voters to make informed choices. This approach is becoming more common in civil society.
This is an edited extract of our conversation with Tessa. Read the full interview here.
A fork in the road
The results presented incumbent president Cyril Ramaphosa with a dilemma. To forge a coalition, he had to choose between the main opposition party to the ANC’s right, the Democratic Alliance (DA), whose vote share held steady, and parties to its left formed after splits from the ANC. These include the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a far-left populist Black nationalist party and, most troublingly for Ramaphosa, a new force, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), named after the ANC’s apartheid-era armed wing and headed by the infamous Jacob Zuma.
Few figures have loomed as large over the contemporary South African political landscape as Zuma. A former ANC political prisoner, he served as the country’s third democratically elected president from 2009 to 2018. His time in office was characterised by multiple scandals, the most damning of which involved allegations of close and corrupt links with the wealthy Gupta family that amounted to state capture. Zuma was finally forced out and replaced by Ramaphosa in February 2018. In 2021 he was jailed for contempt of court for refusing to comply with a court order to provide evidence to an official inquiry into state capture, corruption and fraud. His corruption trial is due to resume next year.
When his leadership ambitions were thwarted in the 1990s, Zuma’s arch-rival Ramaphosa took time out of politics to make a fortune as a business leader. He’s also allegedly been implicated in corrupt practices and was a director of the Lonmin mining company when police killed 34 people by opening fire on the company’s striking mineworkers in 2012, in what became known as the Marikana Massacre. Since his ousting, Zuma has hurled criticism at Ramaphosa, evidently intent on revenge.
Just ahead of the election, the Constitutional Court ruled that Zuma’s conviction meant he couldn’t stand for parliament. But his role was pivotal in MK gaining support in his heartland, KwaZulu-Natal province, which has a majority Zulu population. And while EFF’s support unexpectedly fell, MK came third, holding a potentially pivotal 58 of the fragmented parliament’s 400 seats. The MK made clear the price of any cooperation would be Ramaphosa’s resignation.
Personalities have therefore been a key issue in the government that’s resulted, but the ANC has also been forced to make some ideological choices. It positions itself as a big-tent centre-left party, trying to reconcile economic neoliberalism with state interventionism. The DA is pro-business, while the EFF and MK support stronger state ownership and redistribution from the white minority to the Black majority, including transfer of land without compensation. The MK also wants constitutional changes to give more powers to traditional leaders and supports the repeal of same-sex marriage.
There are foreign policy differences too. Internationally, the ANC positions itself as a champion of the global south – most strongly by bringing the International Court of Justice case alleging genocide against Israel – but has refused to condemn Russia’s all-out war on Ukraine. The EFF and MK take a broadly similar foreign policy line, while the DA doesn’t: it’s pro-west and opposes Russia’s war.
Forced to choose between two ideologically distinct alternatives, Ramaphosa has picked the one that keeps him in office. This leaves him open to accusations of opportunism and likely disappoints ANC supporters who want more action on economic inequality. An alliance with the DA can’t be anything but controversial, since the DA is the successor of a party that took part in apartheid era elections, albeit in opposition to the then ruling National Party. It’s still seen by many as standing for the interests of the white minority.
Eight smaller parties have joined the coalition, an ideologically diverse mix ranging from the left-wing Pan Africanist Congress of Azania to the conservative KwaZulu-Natal-centred Inkatha Freedom Party and the right-wing pro-Afrikaner Freedom Front Plus. These parties aren’t needed to achieve a majority: put together, the ANC and DA have 246 seats, more than enough. It may be the case that they’ve been brought in, in exchange for government jobs, to make the coalition look less like an uncomfortable two-party alliance.
It hasn’t taken long for the supposed unity to come under strain. The coalition agreement seemed close to collapse, with the ANC and DA at loggerheads and accusations flying over cabinet posts. The compromise has been to split some portfolios and create more positions, resulting in an inflated cabinet, with 32 ministers, up from 30 before the election, and 43 deputy ministers, up from 36. If voters wanted a more efficient government, it’s probably not what they’ll get. Meanwhile at least one prominent DA politician has been exposed for past acts of racism, bringing renewed accusations that the party is inherently racist.
Need for civil society
In many democratic countries, coalition governments are the norm because elections rarely produce single party majorities. This can offer positives for civil society, as coalition government can check the excesses of individual parties, reduce the potential for parties to govern solely in the interests of their supporters and provide more entry points for engagement and advocacy. But at the same time, if coalition-making is characterised by backroom deals, patronage and jostling for position, coalition government can accelerate distrust in politicians and drive support for populist alternatives.
Coalition government isn’t entirely new in South Africa: as a condition of its interim constitution, the country had a government of national unity following the 1994 election, while ministers from other parties had minor representation in ANC cabinets formed after the 1999 and 2019 elections. But this will be a step change, and Ramaphosa will continue to have to strike delicate balances, with ongoing potential for infighting and defections.
The true test for this new government will not be whether it survives, but whether it can deliver on basic economic and social needs while restoring trust in democratic politics. Opposition parties, including the DA, have also hammered the ANC on corruption. Now they must make good on the talk by working together to clean up governance. These are hard tasks.
The new government can make a difficult agenda easier by working with civil society. Around the election, South Africa’s civil society once again proved its worth. Its many roles included voter education, particularly needed given a change in the voting system, and campaigns for people to register to vote and inform themselves ahead of casting their ballot. Civil society groups also monitored the election over the whole cycle, including scrutinising voter registration processes, flagging irregularities in voters’ lists and alerting authorities to glitches and logistical problems on voting day. They analysed party commitments and called out instances of hate speech. Without all this work, public disaffection and distrust in the election would have been higher.
But civil society isn’t always popular with the government, particularly when it challenges economic interests. In recent years several community leaders who’ve led resistance to extractive projects or demanded adequate services have been killed. In just one example, in August 2023, land rights activist Jomo Keromeng was killed, shot 16 times at home in front of his family.
There have also been several incidents of violence against journalists and protesters by security force officers and unidentified others, with widespread impunity. Women activists are at particular risk.
Violence has been accompanied by increasingly common vilification of civil society by government figures. Last year minister Gwede Mantashe – who has retained his position – used his speech at an oil and gas conference to accuse civil society organisations of being foreign agents working to block development.
This must end. Civil society has a vital role to play in holding the coalition government to account, promoting inclusive policies and strengthening democratic governance. It’s a source of good ideas the new government can draw on as it gets to grips with new ways of working and a challenging agenda. If the government is really to be one of national unity, it must reach out and work with civil society.
OUR CALLS FOR ACTION
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The new government should commit to respecting and expanding civic space and partnering with a wide range of civil society.
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Civil society should work to hold the government to account and demand high standards of accountability and transparency, including tangible progress on corruption.
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South Africa’s government and civil society should promote civic education initiatives so that people, particularly excluded groups, better understand their rights, including around elections.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
Cover photo by Kim Ludbrook/POOL/AFP via Getty Images