Long an exception to the European trend of political fragmentation and far-right influence, Portugal has joined the club.

A snap parliamentary election held on 18 May brought an end to five decades of a stable two-party system, in place since the 1974 Carnation Revolution made Portugal a democracy. The results were seismic: the far-right Chega party, formed just six years ago, took 22.8 per cent of the vote. With 60 parliamentary seats, it displaced the Socialist Party (PS) as Portugal’s second-biggest party, becoming the main opposition. PS leader Pedro Nuno Santos announced his resignation on election night.

The centre-right Democratic Alliance (AD) led by Prime Minister Luís Montenegro’s Social Democratic Party (PSD) came first with 31.8 per cent of the vote. That gave it 91 parliamentary seats, far short of the 116 seats needed for a majority. On 29 May, Montenegro was reappointed prime minister, but political instability is unlikely to be over, as he’ll need to form an alliance or lead another potentially short-lived minority government.

The roots of the crisis

The sources of this electoral upheaval lie in a web of institutional failures, economic pressures and recurring corruption scandals that have systematically undermined public confidence in the political establishment. The election was Portugal’s third in under four years, a reflection of the once-rare instability that has now come to define Portuguese politics.

The immediate trigger was the collapse of the centre-right government following a confidence vote. Opposition parties argued that Montenegro had failed to adequately address potential conflicts of interest arising from contracts between his family business and companies that benefited from government decisions. The PS and Chega voted 142 to 88 against Montenegro’s confidence motion, forcing yet another electoral contest.

The previous PS government of António Costa had similarly fallen in November 2023 following corruption investigations, leading to the March 2024 election that handed Montenegro power through a narrow victory. The recurring cycle of scandal, political crisis and electoral upheaval has contributed to widespread voter disillusionment with traditional parties, creating fertile ground for anti-establishment politicians.

But the causes of disappointment aren’t purely political: government instability has unfolded against a backdrop of mounting social and economic challenges that many feel mainstream politicians aren’t getting to grips with. Despite its economy growing by 1.9 per cent in 2024, well above the 0.8 per cent European Union average, Portugal is experiencing a severe housing crisis that has become a defining issue for voters, particularly younger people.

In many advanced economies, soaring housing prices and the resulting lack of affordable housing have long reached crisis point, with growing political impacts. The situation is particularly serious in Portugal, which now has the worst housing access rates of all 38 countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – the club of wealthy economies.

House prices have more than doubled over the past decade compared to average income growth of 33 per cent. In Lisbon, the capital, rents have jumped by 65 per cent since 2015 and sale prices are now 137 per cent higher, driven by tourism, foreign investment and short-term rentals that have pushed property prices beyond most people’s reach. This has made Lisbon the world’s third least financially viable city, thanks to its punishing combination of soaring housing costs and traditionally low wages.

Immigration has also become a flashpoint issue. In 2018, less than half a million immigrants had legal residency in Portugal; by 2025, there were more than 1.5 million. Rapid demographic change has provided fertile ground for populist narratives about uncontrolled immigration and its alleged negative impacts on housing and job markets.

The 2025 campaign

The election campaign revealed the sharp ideological divisions and strategic calculations that led to the reshaping of the political landscape. AD adopted a defensive approach, focusing on promises of stability and continuity while trying to deflect corruption allegations. Montenegro consistently argued that the opposition’s actions had created unnecessary political instability and presented himself as the leader capable of providing Portugal with a four-year mandate after several years of short-lived governments.

The PS positioned itself as the defender of democratic institutions and sought to capitalise on the corruption allegations against Montenegro. It demanded comprehensive parliamentary inquiries into Montenegro’s business dealings, presenting itself as the party of clean governance and social progress. However, it struggled to overcome voter fatigue with traditional politics and the perception that its role in bringing down governments had contributed to instability. It found itself in an uncomfortable position as it defended its decision to vote against Montenegro, effectively toppling his government, while trying to present itself as a source of stability.

It wasn’t the left but the far right that capitalised most effectively on public frustration with governmental corruption and ineffectiveness. As an outsider party untainted by association with the cycle of scandals and collapses, Chega channelled anti-establishment anger into electoral success.

The Chega phenomenon

Founded in 2019 by André Ventura, a former TV commentator and law professor, Chega portrays itself as a defender of ‘western civilisation’. It campaigns on promises to combat corruption, limit immigration and restore what it characterises as traditional Portuguese values, embracing extreme criminal justice policies such as chemical castration for repeat sexual offenders.

Ventura insists Chega simply advocates for equal treatment for all, with no ‘special privileges’ for any group. But the party’s ranks include white supremacists and admirers of former dictator António Salazar. It’s openly racist in its approach to immigration and is hostile towards women, LGBTQI+ people, Muslims and Roma people.

Chega has particularly strong appeal among young men, economically excluded groups and voters in rural and inland regions who feel neglected by the political mainstream. Montenegro’s refusal to work with Chega, a party he has publicly characterised as demagogic, racist and xenophobic, may have inadvertently strengthened its anti-establishment credentials and deepened its connection with voters who also feel rejected by the political elite.

Ironically, strongly nationalistic far-right parties have formed their own international mutual support group. As part of this network, Chega has cultivated significant connections with other far-right parties, including Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, Germany’s Alternative for Germany and Spain’s Vox party. Ventura was among the European far-right leaders invited to attend Donald Trump’s inauguration, highlighting the party’s growing international profile in the right-wing populist movement. Chega has also received the backing of former far-right Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro.

In line with the trend that has seen far-right parties gain significant ground in countries including France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, Chega’s messaging resonated beyond traditional right-wing voters, accounting for the 236,000 additional votes it received compared to 2024.

Chega’s rise has been meteoric: in 2019 it took just 1.3 per cent of the vote and won only one seat. In 2025, it hit a new high. It had long been thought that Portugal’s extensive pre-revolution experience of repressive right-wing rule had effectively inoculated it against far-right politics. But that seems over now, and the country, long known for its democratic stability with no significant far-right presence, is entering uncharted territory.

Democratic governance in a fractured landscape

Portugal no longer has a centrist majority. Montenegro will likely form a minority government, but the arithmetic suggests any significant policy initiatives will require either PS abstention or, more controversially, Chega support, creating opportunities for far-right influence, particularly on criminal justice and immigration policies.

Chega’s rise has forced established parties to confront issues they previously sidelined, such as immigration and national identity. Ahead of the election, the government announced plans to expel some 18,000 undocumented foreigners. This typified a tactic seen across Europe, where mainstream parties adapt more right-wing positions to try to prevent voters defecting to far-right parties. These choices often backfire, legitimising far-right politicians without bringing sustainable gains for established parties, as voters tend to prefer the original to the copy.

Its transition from protest movement to major parliamentary force however brings challenges for Chega. Once-fringe parties can get exposed by success. Chega’s concentration of power around Ventura and its relatively thin policy platform beyond core populist themes may limit its effectiveness when it comes to lawmaking. Its credibility may suffer if scandals involving its members continue to erupt.

But for the time being, it appears Chega is here to stay. Portugal’s experience offers further evidence that the rise of far-right parties shouldn’t be seen as a temporary glitch but increasingly as an established feature of politics, requiring new strategies for democratic governance.

Political institutions, instead of simply shifting rightward in response to populist pressure, should instead focus on addressing the legitimate grievances that fuel far-right support. This means genuinely tackling economic inequality, improving government transparency and accountability and ensuring that political processes reflect citizens’ concerns rather than elite interests. Instead of adopting watered-down versions of far-right rhetoric, mainstream parties need to offer substantive alternatives that address issues of social exclusion and economic insecurity while upholding democratic values and human rights.

Civil society and media organisations can play a vital role in strengthening democratic resilience against far-right influence. Media institutions must maintain rigorous journalistic standards, providing balanced coverage that neither sensationalises populist messaging nor dismisses legitimate voter concerns. Civil society can promote civic education programmes that help people critically evaluate political rhetoric, support community initiatives that bridge social divides and create inclusive spaces for political dialogue. If Portugal can meet the far-right challenge through institutional reform and civic engagement, it can help lead the way in Europe.

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