On 1 June Mexico held judicial elections, becoming the only country in the world to elect all of its judges, from the local to the federal levels, by popular vote. The unprecedented process saw Mexican voters fill 881 federal judicial positions, including all nine Supreme Court justices, plus many more at the local level in 19 of the country’s 32 states.

The judicial election was the culmination of a controversial constitutional reengineering pushed through by former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and embraced by his successor, President Claudia Sheinbaum. According to its proponents, this made Mexico ‘the most democratic country in the world’. But many in civil society see this as a dangerous assault on judicial independence that threatens Mexico’s democratic institutions.

Although initially the majority of Mexicans approved of the judicial overhaul that triggered the election, the 13 per cent voter turnout ultimately undermined its legitimacy.

The political context

Mexico’s ruling coalition, led by the National Regeneration Movement (Morena) party, promoted the election of judges as a bold democratic reform aimed at eliminating entrenched corruption, increasing transparency and enhancing judicial accountability. López Obrador had long accused judges of protecting organised crime and white-collar criminals and blocking government efforts to fight criminal cartels. He insisted that popular election at all levels, from local courts to the Supreme Court, would make judges and magistrates accountable to the people rather than political or economic elites, helping break the cycle of political patronage and increasing legitimacy.

But the judicial overhaul should be seen in the context of a systematic assault on institutions that checked executive power during López Obrador’s presidency. Between 2018 and 2024, the National Electoral Institute, responsible for overseeing federal elections, faced repeated budget cuts and legislative attacks. The National Institute for Access to Public Information and Personal Data similarly encountered executive hostility, with López Obrador proposing its elimination. This was achieved in late 2024, with constitutional changes leaving oversight of access to public information and the protection of personal data in the hands of a secretariat dependent on the executive branch.

López Obrador also manipulated direct democracy mechanisms. His 2022 recall referendum weaponised a tool ostensibly designed to allow citizens to remove underperforming presidents to mobilise his base of supporters for a show of popularity. López Obrador won 90 per cent of votes cast, but turnout was only 17.7 per cent, well below the 40 per cent threshold required for binding results. The move demonstrated López Obrador’s view of himself as the sole legitimate representative of the Mexican people and his hostility toward any intermediary institutions, including civil society organisations that he routinely stigmatised as ‘coup plotters’, particularly if they received foreign funding.

The judiciary became a prime target after the Supreme Court struck down several of López Obrador’s key legislative proposals as unconstitutional. The president responded with aggressive public criticism during his daily press conferences, accusing judges of corruption and dramatically cutting the judiciary’s budget.

Out of this confrontation grew López Obrador’s judicial restructuring plans. When the Supreme Court invalidated López Obrador’s attempt to place the civilian National Guard under military command, the president declared that the judiciary needed to be made more democratic.

Following the June 2024 general election, in which Sheinbaum won a landslide victory with close to 60 per cent of the vote and Morena secured a supermajority in Congress, the outgoing government introduced a package of constitutional amendments as part of its ‘Plan C’ – its third attempt to pass changes sent to Congress years earlier, with judicial elections the centrepiece.

Mechanics and implications

Despite protests by judicial workers, students and members of the opposition, the bill passed in September. It replaced the traditional appointment system with one in which candidates are pre-screened by Evaluation Committees set up by the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government before facing election by popular vote.

Even before she was inaugurated on 1 October, Sheinbaum dispelled speculation by embracing the changes: she appointed former Supreme Court Chief Justice Arturo Zaldívar, one of the main architects of the judicial overhaul, as Coordinator of Politics and Government for the Presidency, in charge of overseeing its implementation.

Under the new procedures, the traditional merit-based appointment system, in which judges underwent evaluation by the Judicial Council, has been replaced by a process in which candidates pre-selected by the three branches of government must campaign to win the popular vote. Judicial terms have been shortened and aligned more closely with political cycles. Judicial salaries have been tied to the president’s, effectively giving the executive branch control over judicial remuneration, violating international standards that say judicial funding must be stable and independent from political interference.

Additionally, a new Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal has been established, with its five members also elected by popular vote. This body has broad powers to investigate and sanction judicial personnel, and its decisions are final and unappealable. The potential for this tribunal to become a tool of political intimidation against judges who rule against government interests is a fundamental threat to judicial independence.

The international experience

Democratic election of judges is rare, with most countries appointing judges through processes involving government officials, parliaments or specialised judicial councils. Bolivia offers a unique precedent of popular elections of judges at the national level, while some US states have experimented with state-level judicial elections. Their experiences offer sobering lessons about the risks involved.

Bolivia became the first country in the modern era to directly elect national judges in 2011, bringing repeated criticism from the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Margaret Satterthwaite, for allowing political rather than merit-based considerations to dominate candidate selection. This problem was intensified by the fact that Bolivia’s legislative assembly effectively controls the pre-selection process, ensuring only politically acceptable candidates reach the ballot. Instead of increasing, public confidence in the judiciary has decreased as a result. Null and blank votes stood at 57 per cent in 2011 and 65 per cent in 2017; electoral authorities announced the figure had dropped to around 35 per cent in 2024.

In the USA, while federal judges are appointed for life terms, 39 states have elections of at least some judges for state courts. This experience reveals the corrosive effects of money and politics on judicial independence. Some states that nominally elect judges in practice leave their selection to the state governor, as state supreme court justices routinely step down midterm to allow the governor to appoint a successor instead of holding an election.

As documented by the Brennan Center for Justice, in 2021-2022 special interest spending on judicial campaigns reached record levels. In April 2025, Elon Musk spent US$21 million trying and failing to flip the Wisconsin Supreme Court to conservative control. Other studies show that popular election affects decision-making in concerning ways. For instance, judges are much less likely to overturn death sentences in states where they face elections.

With elections often turning into popularity contests influenced by campaign spending, most countries have opted for appointed judges to maintain judicial independence. The aim is to insulate judges from party politics, prevent conflicts of interest by not putting judges in the position of having to raise funds from people who might later appear before them and ensure professional qualifications through rigorous vetting and input from legal professionals.

Current and future challenges

Mexico’s experience highlights the tension between populism and constitutional democracy. While its proponents framed the judicial overhaul as democratising justice, evidence suggests it constitutes a serious threat to democratic institutions and the rule of law. As such, it has faced overwhelming international condemnation. The Rule of Law Impact Lab at Stanford Law School joined the Mexican Bar Association in filing an amicus curiae – friend of the court – brief before the Mexican Supreme Court challenging its constitutionality. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights expressed ‘grave concern’ about judicial independence, access to justice and the rule of law. These concerns were echoed by Special Rapporteur Satterthwaite and the International Bar Association.

Mexico’s comprehensive approach represents a radical experiment with potentially severe consequences, particularly in a context where political violence has reached unprecedented levels – at least 32 candidates and 24 public officials were murdered during the 2024 campaign – and where criminal organisations are the de facto government in many territories. Vulnerability to criminal infiltration was a serious concern during the judicial elections, when civil society groups identified dozens of candidates with potential ties to drug cartels, including the former defence lawyer for notorious drug lord Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán, elected in Chihuahua state.

The judicial elections are likely to have multiple corrosive effects on democracy and human rights. By making judges accountable to popular majorities rather than constitutional principles, the new system will weaken protection for excluded groups including women, migrants and Indigenous communities who depend on judicial intervention for protection against discrimination.

The low turnout, light years away from the 61 per cent recorded at the last general election, suggested widespread public disconnection from the process, calling into question the democratic legitimacy its proponents claimed to seek. The complexity of choosing between so many candidates, mostly unknown to voters, appears to have put many people off.

But from the government’s perspective, the elections appear to have achieved their underlying political objective: consolidating Morena’s control across all branches of government. Early analysis suggests that judges aligned with the ruling party performed well, potentially giving Morena unprecedented influence over judicial decision-making.

This concentration of power eliminates the accountability mechanisms needed to prevent authoritarian drift. With fewer institutional barriers remaining to prevent further concentration of power, Mexico’s institutions now face a big test. For the rest of the world, Mexico may offer a cautionary tale about how populist claims to democratic legitimacy can be used to undermine the institutional foundations democracy depends on.

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