The changes have included the dismissal of all judges and magistrates, with the intention of filling the resulting vacancies with people elected by popular vote. They also provided for the abolition of the Federal Judiciary Council, whose powers will now be exercised by two new institutions: the Judicial Administration Body, responsible for management and governance, including budget management, identification of service needs and training, and the Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal, with broad powers to investigate and punish judicial officials involved in corruption or administrative misconduct.

The changes have also reduced the number of Supreme Court justices from 11 to nine and shortened their terms in office: they will now serve 12 years instead of 15. The Supreme Court’s powers are impacted on as it loses control over its budget, which is transferred to the Judicial Administration Body. The Supreme Court will also no longer be able to intervene in disciplinary proceedings, which will be the responsibility of the Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal.

Regarding elections, the renewal of the judiciary will occur in two stages: the special elections held on 1 June 2025 and regular elections in 2027. Federal bodies have until 2027 to implement the changes.

At the federal level, the first judicial elections in Mexico’s history saw citizens vote for nine Supreme Court justices, five Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal magistrates, 17 Electoral Tribunal magistrates, 464 circuit magistrates and 386 district judges. At the subnational level, elections were held in 19 states, which elected a total of 1,711 judges and 468 local magistrates.

These unprecedented and complex elections were held with insufficient resources and very short deadlines. Consequently, it was impossible to set up the required number of polling stations, collect votes from Mexicans abroad or from people in preventive detention, design simple ballot papers, give citizens enough time to get to know the candidates or clarify campaign financing.

Additionally, the distribution of electoral districts departed from a key principle of political representation. For example, people living in Mexico City elected judges who will decide cases at the national level. In the most populous cities, residents voted for specialised judges. However, if they require judicial services, they will not necessarily be served by the people they elected, as cases are randomly assigned among more than 20 specialised courts.

Further, in the weeks leading up to the election, leaflets were distributed containing lists of candidates affiliated with the ruling party, Morena, using a font similar to that Morena uses. It was not clear who produced and distributed them, but candidates who appeared in the pamphlets went on to win. Problems such as these erode confidence in electoral institutions.

In terms of transparency, there was no clear information on the criteria and procedures for selecting candidates. The selection criteria for the five members of each evaluation committee remain unknown, as does the question of whether they were paid or provided with support staff, or what criteria they used to select candidates for judicial positions.

Since March, voters faced the difficult task of learning about over 3,000 candidates, understanding the functions of each position and distinguishing between federal and state positions. They also had to familiarise themselves with complicated ballot papers. Although the National Electoral Institute published microsites containing candidates’ resumes, these were only accessible to people with internet access and prior knowledge of judicial functions. As a judiciary expert, it took me two weeks to decide who to vote for; in many cases, I decided not to cast a vote due to a lack of reliable information. Campaigns focused on social media and leafleting in public squares, but this was insufficient to enable people to vote with knowledge and understanding. Ultimately, transparency issues meant people voted based on hearsay or direct recommendations.

Morena presented the selection of judges by popular vote as a means of strengthening democracy by giving citizens responsibility for electing officials who have historically been shielded from public scrutiny. Unfortunately, people tend to not recognise the importance of other fundamental democratic principles, such as the separation of powers, checks and balances between political authorities and transparency and accountability.

In this regard, we have observed the return of problematic practices, such as a lack of deliberation and in-depth technical discussion in Congress when approving structural reforms. The approval of the judicial changes was characterised by the absence of pluralistic discussion guided by technical arguments.

The judicial changes enabled direct intervention by the executive and legislative branches in the selection of judicial candidates via evaluation committees. Further, the possibility of re-election means there is a risk judges will favour political interests to guarantee their continuity. Judicial terms will coincide with other political terms, meaning judicial elections will be held alongside other elections. This increases the likelihood of people voting based on party affiliation rather than evaluating the candidates’ suitability.

In these first elections, most of those elected to the highest courts had links to Morena. Moreover, the transfer of budgetary management powers from the Supreme Court to the Administrative Body, whose members will mainly be proposed by the executive branch, implies a de facto subjugation of the judiciary.

The reform also impacts on internal independence, which seeks to ensure judges make decisions without pressure from their superiors. The creation of Disciplinary Tribunals with the power to sanction judges for the content of their decisions and the evaluation of evidence, as well as the power to initiate investigations into decisions deemed to be contrary to the public interest, turns this body into an instrument for controlling judicial behaviour and punishing those who do not conform to political interests.

Turnout was around 13 per cent. In my opinion, this was due to three factors.

First, it was an unprecedented election. Voting is a practice that takes many years to develop, as people gradually become aware of the impact of their participation. In this case, there was no time for this learning process to take place.

Secondly, the short deadlines, regulatory gaps, lack of budget and large number of positions resulted in an extremely complex process. Those interested in casting an informed vote had to invest considerable time in understanding the ballots and getting to know the candidates; in general, they lacked sufficient information.

Finally, some people decided not to vote because they disagreed with the changes. It is impossible to know what proportion of abstentions were due to ideological reasons, ignorance or apathy. We will have to wait and see what happens in 2027, when over 1,500 judicial positions at the state level, as well as half of federal judges and magistrates, will be up for election.

The response mainly focused on the Supreme Court. Organisations such as Equis Justicia para las Mujeres held debates with candidates, and law faculties and bar associations held similar exercises.

Universities and civil society organisations also established election observatories to document the process and compile results data. I have followed the work of the Monterrey Autonomous Technological Institute and the Ibero-American University observatories in particular.

Several civil society organisations filed a series of joint complaints with the National Electoral Institute over irregularities in the design and execution of the electoral process. They criticised a state-orchestrated operation to appoint Morena affiliates to the highest judicial positions of the Supreme Court, the Disciplinary Tribunal and the Electoral Tribunal.

While the efforts of civil society groups were valuable, they were insufficient to influence the electoral process. They continue to generate information on the election results, but their actions remain focused on the higher courts. More comprehensive documentation of the impacts of the changes are needed, particularly at the local level. We must ask ourselves how we can influence public decisions and contribute to improving the justice system now.

The first thing is resolving the challenges filed by civil society organisations and candidates. Electoral authorities face the difficult task of resolving disputes relating to elected officials who do not meet constitutional requirements or who are facing criminal charges.

These decisions of the National Electoral Institute and the Electoral Tribunal will be crucial in building trust. If they make decisions that undermine democratic principles or favour the government based on insufficient or technically flawed arguments, they will fuel concerns they are subservient to the ruling party. And if they maintain their independence, they risk confrontation with the federal executive and legislative branches.

The elected officials will take office on 1 September. There is enormous uncertainty, but we must pay close attention to the consequences on timelines of such significant changes in leadership of judicial bodies. There will most likely be delays due to new judges needing to familiarise themselves with processes, organise their staff and learn about cases. This will undoubtedly have a direct impact on judicial decisions in the short term; what we don’t know is whether the final outcome will represent progress or a setback for the judicial system.

The institutional profile of the Supreme Court, its stance on human rights and its relationship with political authorities will also need monitoring, as will the establishment of the Disciplinary Tribunal and the Judicial Administration Body — two new institutions with extensive governance and judicial disciplinary responsibilities.

This is the largest experiment in justice systems ever undertaken by any country and offers important lessons for others. One key lesson is about the judiciary’s vulnerability to political forces. We have learned that judicial independence is a weak argument in the face of accusations of illegitimacy and corruption. Judicial branches in other countries in the region should consider ways to build closer relationships with citizens and earn their trust, in order to reduce the risks associated with a reform like Mexico’s.

Once the new judges have taken office, Mexico will be able to provide evidence to help assess the pros and cons of electing judges by popular vote. Whatever the outcome, other countries will have the necessary data and experience to inform their decision on the most suitable system for them.