It’s very worrying. Authoritarianism and militarism in the region have been on the rise since the COVID-19 pandemic, which enabled the introduction of restrictive laws and practices under the pretext of maintaining public health and order, security and unity. Regional stability has also been tested by the human rights and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar following the military coup in 2021.

The chairing of ASEAN by a country like Laos, with a history of human rights abuses, has stalled progress on human rights. Despite this year’s theme of ‘enhancing connectivity and resilience’, ASEAN members have once again failed to prioritise regional cooperation on human rights. On the contrary, they have intensified transnational repression. In February, for example, Cambodian activists and refugees Kung Raiya, Lem Sokha and Phan Phana were arrested ahead of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet’s official visit to Thailand. Y Quynh Bdap, a Vietnamese Indigenous and religious rights defender, is also currently facing extradition despite being a refugee in Thailand. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights has remained silent in both cases.

Civil society has also been affected. The ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN Peoples’ Forum (ACSC/APF), the largest annual civil society conference in ASEAN, which is usually hosted by the chair state, had to be relocated from Laos to Timor-Leste due to limited civic space and security concerns.

China has been a strategic partner of ASEAN since the signing of the Joint Declaration by ASEAN Leaders on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in 2003. Since that year, ASEAN has held an annual meeting with China.

China’s influence in the region has grown significantly through investments and infrastructure projects. Many of these projects have been linked to human rights abuses and environmental degradation, as human rights due diligence and environmental impact assessments are often neglected. Now China is looking to expand its influence in Southeast Asia through new development cooperation and infrastructure investment projects.

Laos’s close relationship with China raises concerns it may prioritise Chinese interests over regional human rights considerations. For example, in 2023 Laos arrested and deported Chinese human rights defenders Lu Siwei and Qiao Xinxin to China, despite the risk of persecution they faced there.

Given these two issues, we might expect the summit’s outcomes to ultimately prioritise economic investment and security interests over the protection of human rights.

ASEAN’s approach has been guided by the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), agreed upon with the Myanmar military junta in April 2021, two months after the military seized power. The five points were an immediate end to violence, dialogue among all parties, the appointment of a special envoy, allowing humanitarian assistance by ASEAN and allowing an ASEAN special envoy to visit Myanmar to meet with all parties.

This approach is fundamentally flawed because it’s based on engagement with the illegitimate junta, which is committing gross human rights violations, while failing to publicly recognise the National Unity Government (NUG), a government in exile formed by elected members of the parliament that was dissolved in the coup.

Despite calls from civil society to go beyond the 5PC and formally recognise the NUG, ASEAN has maintained its stance. When Indonesia chaired ASEAN in 2023, 180 meetings were held with various stakeholders, but not with the NUG. Under Laos, ASEAN has continued talking to the wrong party.

Indonesia’s legacy includes the establishment of a troika mechanism including the current, former and incoming chairs, whose purpose is to discuss how ASEAN can better address the crisis in Myanmar. But if the ASEAN envoy continues to rotate with each new chair, it will do little to improve the situation.

The only positive is that the Myanmar crisis has been on the ASEAN agenda for three years now. We can expect some decisions to be made at the leaders’ summit, but their effectiveness remains uncertain.

Civil society’s ability to influence and meaningfully engage with ASEAN’s decision-making process is limited – and we are getting tired of it. We are given very little information and spaces to interact with state representatives. One of these is the interface dialogue between the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and civil society, an annual meeting that civil society is invited to for thematic discussions. However, the process is opaque, which makes us doubt that our input is taken into account.

For instance, the AICHR is currently discussing an Environmental Rights Framework and declaration, and several civil society groups have been involved in this process. They’ve held meetings, taken part in consultations and shared input with the Working Group on Environmental Rights, tasked with developing the framework and declaration. But our input, particularly when it is about recognising and protecting human rights, environmental defenders and Indigenous groups, is continually neglected. Power imbalances further hinder meaningful engagement.

The ACSC/APF also used to have an interface meeting with ASEAN leaders as part of the official summit agenda, but in recent years our requests for such meetings have been ignored.

We don’t expect much. There may be some decisions on Myanmar, but it is unclear whether they will lead to meaningful change. To make real progress, ASEAN needs to go beyond the 5PC and recognise the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar.

However, we believe civil society should continue to monitor the summit and maintain its advocacy efforts, particularly as the chair passes to Malaysia in 2025.