‘The election served to legitimise power rather than reflect the popular will’
CIVICUS discusses Cameroon’s recent election and the state of its civil society with Civic Watch, a local youth-led civil society organisation that advocates for information integrity, youth engagement and mobilisation.
On 7 October, Cameroon’s Constitutional Council declared 92-year-old President Paul Biya the winner of the presidential election with 53.66 per cent of the vote, extending his 43-year rule with an eighth seven-year term. Marred by allegations of fraud, intimidation and violence, the announcement of the result sparked protests in which at least four people were killed and over a hundred detained.
How has Biya’s four-decade rule shaped everyday life?
Biya’s rule has profoundly shaped Cameroon’s economic, political and social reality. Since coming to power in 1982, he has maintained tight control over every state institution, turning what should be a multi-party democracy into a de facto one-man system. Biya dominates all branches of government: he appoints judges, controls the security forces and commands a parliamentary majority that rarely challenges executive decisions.
For everyday people, this concentration of power translates into corruption, declining public services and deepening poverty. Many young people see migration as their only path to a better future, hollowing out communities and creating a pervasive sense of hopelessness. Even highly educated graduates find themselves unemployed or underemployed, trapped in an economy that rewards loyalty over merit. Lack of accountability has allowed mismanagement to persist unchecked, particularly in education, health and infrastructure.
In the English-speaking regions, Biya’s policies have created division and fuelled a violent conflict that has lasted close to a decade. Once prosperous towns have become ghost cities. Mondays are enforced ‘ghost town’ days, when schools and businesses are shut in protest against state repression. Civilians face violence from both government forces and separatist militias, and impunity remains the norm.
Was there genuine political competition in this election?
This election presented a slightly different political dynamic, with a visible challenge from Issa Tchiroma Bakary, a former minister and veteran politician who resigned from Biya’s government just two months before the vote to contest the presidency. Known for his bilingualism and populist tone, Tchiroma was able to connect with voters across linguistic and regional lines. His campaign – one of the few to reach conflict-affected zones – resonated strongly among young and urban voters who craved change.
Despite the government’s use of state resources and its control of electoral institutions, the opposition’s visibility was unprecedented. Tchiroma officially secured around 35 per cent of the vote, a strong showing by Cameroonian standards. In the diaspora, he reportedly won by a large margin. However, the state’s near-total control over the electoral process – from voter registration to result tabulation – ensured Biya’s re-election. For many observers, this was not an election but a reaffirmation of power. The dominance of the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement and the suppression of dissenting voices ensured that real political competition remained illusory.
What evidence was there of electoral fraud?
Allegations of fraud emerged almost immediately after the polls closed. Several election officials publicly claimed they had been pressured or bribed to manipulate results. Civil society monitors and citizen journalists documented irregularities such as ballot stuffing, ghost voters, intimidation at polling stations and discrepancies between counted and reported votes.
Social media played a major role in exposing these practices. Photos and videos circulated widely showing polling stations where pre-filled ballots were discovered or observers were denied access. Although the government dismissed these reports as disinformation, the consistency of testimonies across regions suggested a coordinated pattern of manipulation. For many people, these irregularities reinforced a sense of futility: that the election served only to legitimise power rather than reflect the popular will.
How did people react to the official results?
When the results were announced, protests erupted in several major cities. They began in Garoua, where Tchiroma had strong support, and quickly spread to Bafoussam, Douala and the capital, Yaoundé. Protesters denounced electoral fraud and demanded a rerun of the vote under international supervision.
Security forces responded with arrests, teargas and, in some areas, live ammunition. Human rights organisations documented several deaths and dozens of injuries. Internet restrictions followed, particularly in English-speaking regions, to prevent mobilisation and limit the circulation of videos showing police violence.
In response to the crackdown, civil society groups and student movements organised silent marches, sit-ins and online campaigns under hashtags such as #BiyaMustGo and #LetCameroonVote, demanding accountability and democratic reforms. However, fear was pervasive. The memory of deadly repression – particularly of protests in 2019 – still deterred many from taking to the streets.
How are civil society groups challenging the regime, and what risks do they face?
Civil society operates under constant threat. Independent organisations must navigate complex bureaucratic requirements and face regular harassment from authorities. Some groups are denied registration or have their permits arbitrarily revoked. The government has also created GONGOs – government-organised NGOs – to simulate civic engagement while discrediting independent voices.
Human rights defenders and journalists are frequent targets of defamation, intimidation and surveillance campaigns. Laws on anti-terrorism and cybercrime are used to silence dissent, with activists often detained without trial. Funding is another constraint: many donors have withdrawn due to the high-risk environment and restrictions on foreign funding.
Civic work is particularly dangerous in conflict zones. Humanitarian workers risk abduction by separatist groups and violence from security forces. Yet despite these conditions, grassroots organisations continue documenting abuses, supporting displaced communities and advocating for peace.
What would it take for a transition to democracy to happen?
Change must begin at the grassroots level. Civic education is needed to promote sustained engagement, not just mobilisation during election cycles. Voter turnout remains low, particularly among young people, due to widespread disillusionment. Donors and international partners should prioritise long-term democracy-building efforts, supporting independent media, civic literacy and women’s and youth movements.
However, replacing Biya alone will not dismantle the entrenched system of patronage and corruption. A peaceful transition requires institutional reform, starting with the electoral commission and judiciary, and a commitment to accountability and transparency.