‘The election felt like a formality because it took place in a context hostile for dissent, pluralism and rights’
CIVICUS discusses civic space and democratic participation in Iraq with Iraqi human rights defender Hasan Ibrahim.
Iraq’s November 2025 parliamentary election took place against a backdrop of severely restricted civic space where meaningful political participation is close to impossible. Civil society activists and journalists face arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance and violent repression from state authorities and militias. Vaguely worded laws enable the prosecution of dissenting voices, while warrantless raids and revenge campaigns against protesters have become routine. In these conditions, elections function as exercises in elite power distribution rather than genuine democratic contests.
What was the context for the election?
The context is of systematic repression of civil society activists, journalists and organisations. Civil society organisations are increasingly forced to work only on approved topics, and the government has proposed restrictive amendments to the Freedom of Assembly and Peaceful Demonstration Law. This is particularly significant in light of the fact that it was protests in October 2019 that brought the current government to power, reshaping Iraq’s political landscape.
Despite enjoying a degree of public approval, the government has also pushed through a series of regressive laws, including amendments to the anti-prostitution law, now explicitly reframed as the anti-prostitution and homosexuality law, changes to the personal status law and a ban on using the term gender.
The election took place in an increasingly hostile context for dissent, pluralism and rights. Party-affiliated militias intimidated voters and distorted political competition. If I had to describe it in one word, it would be repetitive. It followed the same pattern as previous elections: familiar party figures, recycled slogans, unclear political programmes and the same rhetoric from Kurdistan parties claiming nothing will change for Kurds. It felt like a formality, with power simply circulating back to the same politicians and parties.
What tactics does the government use to silence dissent?
Laws are among the most effective tools of repression. Broad and vaguely worded umbrella laws such as the so-called indecent content law and public morality provisions are used to criminalise expression, particularly online. While these laws are often framed as targeting immoral behaviour, they are increasingly used to punish government critics and human rights defenders. The government also wields corruption-related accusations selectively against opponents.
Authorities also weaponise religious narratives and social norms. They routinely accuse opposition voices of promoting western agendas and encourage community harassment and public shaming. Influential figures and religious institutions mobilise to delegitimise activists, particularly those working on gender rights. LGBTQI+ activists face even more extreme risks.
At its most visible, dissent is silenced through arrests, intimidation and surveillance. At its most severe, particularly when militias are involved, it can take the form of kidnapping, torture and enforced disappearance.
Is the situation different in the Kurdistan region?
The CIVICUS Monitor rates Iraq’s civic space as closed, although the situation is not uniform. Conditions in the Kurdistan region appear slightly more open, while remaining tightly monitored.
The regional government has sought to maintain international legitimacy by refusing to implement the anti-prostitution and homosexuality law and the amended personal status law. However, civil society organisations are still required to report all activities to authorities for prior approval and media outlets are firmly controlled by ruling parties. For example, during teachers’ protests in the city of Sulaymaniyah in 2025, coverage was extremely limited, largely confined to English-language reporting and absent from Kurdish-language television and local media.
How does civil society operate in these conditions?
Civil society is very fragmented. Politically connected organisations operate comfortably within government-approved frameworks, focusing on depoliticised activities such as economic empowerment, environmental initiatives and youth programmes. In return, they enjoy access to funding and operational freedom.
Groups with international support that work cautiously on sensitive issues, often through government partnerships, occupy a grey zone. They tend to prioritise capacity development and policy work, such as implementing national action plans on women, peace and security. While tolerated, their impact often remains limited to paper and policy spaces.
LGBTQI+ rights and women’s rights organisations and grassroots groups that challenge dominant narratives are far more vulnerable. They are frequently accused of demoralising society and are subjected to pressure and surveillance. Out of fear, even feminist organisations sometimes avoid using terms such as gender justice. Many operate with minimal visibility, relying on informal strategies and personal networks to continue their work.
LGBTQI+ activists and organisations tend to rely on informal networks, mutual aid and remote work, knowing that visibility can put them, their families and communities at risk. Because they face so many obstacles to their work, LGBTQI+ communities are often sidelined or abandoned entirely.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.


