CIVICUS discusses Guinea-Bissau’s coup following its presidential election with Victorino Indeque, activist and coordinator of the Guinea-Bissau Human Rights Defenders Network, a coalition of over 30 organisations that works to protect activists, combat human rights violations and defend democracy.

A military coup disrupted Guinea-Bissau’s election process the day before the results were announced. After failed attempts to tamper with the results, the military seized power, claiming to be fighting drug trafficking. Civil society has denounced the coup as a manoeuvre orchestrated by the outgoing president.

What happened in the wake of the election?

At around 1 pm on 26 November, as the team of election observers was meeting with opposition candidate Fernando Dias da Costa, gunshots were heard near the National Electoral Commission in the centre of the capital, Bissau. The gunfire heralded the seizure of power by military personnel calling themselves the High Command for the Restoration of Security and Public Order. The coup leaders immediately suspended the electoral process, closed borders, imposed a curfew and restricted internet use. They justified the intervention by citing institutional and political tension and the need to combat drug trafficking and free the country from the influence of criminal networks.

Civil society believes the coup was staged to interrupt the electoral process after several failed attempts to tamper with the results. On 24 November, during the counting of regional votes in various electoral commissions, the government of President Umaro Sissoco Embaló, who was running for re-election, attempted to tamper with the results. Local residents noticed the manoeuvres and stormed the electoral commissions to stop them. In some locations, the authorities fired weapons to disperse protesters, injuring several people.

Having failed to tamper with the results, the only alternative left to the government was to stage a coup to justify the annulment of the elections. The military announced a one-year transition led by Horta Inta-a, Embaló’s former chief of staff. Inta-a was directly involved in the election campaign alongside Embaló. After the coup, it has become clear Embaló is still the one in control behind the scenes.

Several indications confirm this. Ilídio Vieira Té, who held the position of minister of finance under Embaló, has been appointed prime minister, while continuing to serve as minister of finance. Té is considered Embaló’s right-hand man. In addition, most members of the transitional government are close to Embaló. His strategy is to control the transition from a distance and then run again in the next presidential election.

What position did candidates take on the election results and how did this lead to the coup?

Challenger Dias claimed victory, presenting the regional tally sheets, which is the last stage before the official announcement of the results. Embaló never publicly claimed victory. His propaganda machine, realising he had not won, merely expressed hope for a favourable result to be announced by the National Electoral Commission on 27 November.

When tampering attempts failed, the government chose to orchestrate the coup in collusion with a group of military officers led by Biagué Na Ntam, then chief of staff of the armed forces. Na Ntam had always supported the government and toured the barracks during the campaign to convince the military to vote for Embaló, arguing he was developing the country.

How did regional organisations respond?

The election observation teams from the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and African Inter-Parliamentary Union, led by three former African presidents – Sékouba Konaté of Guinea, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi of Mozambique and Goodluck Ebele Jonathan of Nigeria – concluded the process had been conducted in a regular manner and the results should be released.

After the coup, the AU and ECOWAS took firm decisions. The AU immediately suspended Guinea-Bissau from all its activities and bodies, while ECOWAS condemned the coup and set up a high-level Mediation Commission. These measures have a strong diplomatic and political influence, isolating the country from regional bodies and conditioning financial, military and technical support.

How have drug trafficking networks shaped the political crisis?

Drug trafficking and political instability are deeply intertwined. In September 2024, a Venezuelan jet carrying over 2.6 tonnes of cocaine landed in broad daylight at Osvaldo Vieira International Airport in Bissau. To date, there’s no public record of a conclusive investigation that has determined responsibility among Guinean authorities. This episode shows how drug trafficking operates almost openly in Guinea-Bissau, creating a vicious cycle in which criminal networks finance military and political elites, undermining institutions and perpetuating coups and crises.

The case of José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, former head of the Guinea-Bissau navy, illustrates these links well. The USA’s Drug Enforcement Administration arrested Na Tchuto in a 2013 operation for involvement in international drug trafficking. He is considered one of West Africa’s biggest drug lords, so his case became a symbol of the link between the country’s military elites and cocaine networks.

When he faced an attempted coup on 1 February 2022, Embaló publicly declared that those responsible were drug traffickers and networks linked to organised crime who were trying to get rid of him to use Guinea-Bissau as a platform for cocaine trafficking. However, the continued involvement in the drug trade of military personnel, politicians and security agents is still evident. In 2022, a leaked audio recording circulated in which Augusto Cabi, then secretary of state for public order, spoke with the national director of the judicial police about the alleged involvement of attorney general Bacari Biai in the diversion of 600 kilograms of seized cocaine. The audio went viral and sparked heated controversy. Biai filed criminal complaints for defamation against several public figures, but these complaints never gained traction in court. It was merely a strategy to distract public opinion.

What’s needed to restore democracy?

We are hopeful about the official decision of ECOWAS at the heads of state summit scheduled for 14 December. The expectation is that ECOWAS will not legitimise the seizure of power by force. This is seen as a test of the organisation’s ability to defend democracy in the region at a time when military coups have taken place in several West African countries.

In the recent coup attempt in Benin, ECOWAS reacted immediately by sending troops from its reserve force to support the government and ensure the preservation of constitutional order. We hope it will take an equally firm stance in the case of Guinea-Bissau.