CIVICUS discusses attempts to hold the Myanmar regime accountable for atrocities against Rohingya people with Nay San Lwin, co-founder of the Free Rohingya Coalition and co-chair of the Arakan Rohingya National Council, two organisations that advocate for Rohingya rights and justice.

In April, civil society organisations filed a genocide complaint against Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing before Indonesian authorities, under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Min Aung Hlaing has led Myanmar since the 2021 military coup and became president in April, despite facing multiple international legal proceedings over atrocities committed against the country’s Rohingya minority. The Indonesia filing is particularly significant because, as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia has traditionally upheld the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring states.

How does Min Aung Hlaing becoming president affect accountability efforts?

Min Aung Hlaing’s elevation to the presidency doesn’t change the nature of the crimes he’s committed against Rohingya people. His title may have changed, but the crimes, and the victims’ suffering, remain the same. Filing a genocide complaint sends a clear message that holding power doesn’t guarantee impunity.

Regardless of whether Min Aung Hlaing serves as president, commander-in-chief or any other role, the demand for accountability endures. For victims and survivors, justice is not defined by his position, but by whether credible efforts are made to investigate and prosecute those responsible.

How significant is Indonesia’s recognition of universal jurisdiction, and what precedent could it set?

There’s already a universal jurisdiction case before an Argentine Federal Court. But the Indonesia filing is different and potentially more significant, because Indonesia is a member of ASEAN, which has traditionally upheld a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states.

If an Indonesian court investigates and prosecutes these crimes, the impact could be felt not just in Myanmar but across ASEAN. As the region’s largest and most influential country, Indonesia could signal a willingness to take a more assertive leadership role. A similar attempt was made when Chin activists filed a case in Timor-Leste, a newer ASEAN member, but that effort led to diplomatic tensions with Myanmar.

Much will depend on how Indonesian authorities proceed. If handled decisively, this case could set an important precedent for accountability in Southeast Asia and offer renewed hope for justice for Rohingya people.

Why has Min Aung Hlaing faced no consequences so far, and what would it take to change that?

The International Criminal Court has not publicly confirmed the existence of an arrest warrant. If one exists, it may have been issued confidentially. Argentina, by contrast, has issued an arrest warrant under universal jurisdiction, but enforcement depends on international mechanisms such as Interpol and, ultimately, the cooperation of other states.

The main reason Min Aung Hlaing has faced no real consequences is the gap between legal action and political will. Many countries formally commit to international justice and human rights but in practice prioritise diplomatic, economic and strategic interests. This makes enforcing arrest warrants extremely difficult. Arrest warrants, however, still carry important weight, because they formally designate a person as wanted, damage legitimacy and reputation, restrict international travel and increase diplomatic pressure.

For consequences to materialise, decisive state action is needed, particularly from countries willing to enforce these warrants if the opportunity arises. Over time, as pressure builds and political circumstances shift, enforcement becomes more likely.

What’s the situation of Rohingya people five years after the coup?

Rohingya civil society organisations cannot operate inside Myanmar. Rohingya people are not allowed to exist as a recognised community. Their very identity continues to be denied. Five years on, the situation hasn’t improved. The mass violence of 2017, which amounted to genocide, has not ended. For Rohingya people, the genocide is ongoing.

Since 2012, approximately 130,000 Rohingya people have been confined to camps in Sittwe, Rakhine State, in conditions resembling those of concentration camps, without adequate education, healthcare or humanitarian aid. In areas now controlled by the Arakan Army, an ethnic Rakhine rebel group, the situation has worsened significantly.

Since early 2024, at least 180,000 Rohingya people have fled to Bangladesh amid reports of mass killings and deadly drone attacks on civilians attempting to escape. At least 2,500 have reportedly been killed in recent months. Regardless of who controls the territory, violence, displacement and persecution continue.

What responsibility does ASEAN bear?

The Rohingya genocide has directly affected several ASEAN countries, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, as Rohingya refugees have fled there, by dangerous sea routes, since 2006. However, there’s been no sustained or coordinated regional pressure on Myanmar’s military regime. Thousands of Rohingya people remain detained in Malaysia and Thailand.

ASEAN began responding more formally after the 2021 coup, excluding military leadership from high-level summits and adopting the Five-Point Consensus, a framework for resolving the crisis. But that framework has remained largely unimplemented over the past five years and the bloc is divided. ASEAN’s longstanding principles of non-interference, combined with the absence of sanctions or consistently strong political statements, have in practice allowed the military regime to continue with limited regional consequences.

If the legal process in Indonesia moves forward, it could shift the regional dynamic, even if only slightly, by encouraging other ASEAN members to reconsider their level of engagement.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.