CIVICUS discusses Italy’s new electoral law with Roberto D’Alimonte, director of LUISS University’s Centre for Electoral Studies, a research centre that studies representative institutions, electoral processes and the quality of democracy in Italy and elsewhere in Europe.

On 8 October, Italy’s parliament passed an electoral law that will govern the 2027 general election. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s right-wing coalition says it will guarantee stable governing majorities. Opposition parties and civil society warn it could turn a minority of votes into dominant parliamentary power and have vowed to challenge it before the Constitutional Court.

What’s changed?

The new law replaces Italy’s mixed electoral system with proportional representation plus a majority bonus. A coalition that wins at least 42 per cent of the vote in both chambers gets an extra 70 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 35 in the Senate, which secures an absolute majority in both chambers, though its total can’t exceed 220 deputies and 113 senators. If no coalition reaches the threshold, all seats are distributed proportionally.

The new law also requires coalitions and parties running alone to name a candidate for prime minister before an election. Coalition partners must agree on a common candidate and programme. But the president still holds the constitutional power to appoint the prime minister.

Finally, parties without parliamentary representation must now collect at least 6,000 signatures in each multi-member constituency where they field a list, up from 1,500.

How convincing is the government’s case for the changes?

Prime Minister Meloni argues that the new law will ensure the kind of political stability Italy has enjoyed over the past four years. But the law contains a contradiction. If no coalition reaches the 42 per cent threshold, it would be difficult to form a functioning government, given how fragmented and polarised the political system is.

Fixing this would have required a second round of voting, but Meloni couldn’t get her coalition partners to back one. They objected that it would benefit the centre-left, which some believe is better placed to mobilise voters and bring different political forces together in the second round. Without a second round, Meloni is betting on her coalition winning the next election. If it does not, and nobody else does it, she might be forced into a post-electoral coalition with the Democratic Party, which is precisely the outcome she wants to avoid.

What are critics’ main concerns?

The main concern is the majority bonus. A coalition can win an absolute majority of seats with less than half the national vote. And the bonus undermines proportional representation. While some disproportionality may be justified for the sake of stability, critics think that the bonus is excessive, although I am not one of them.

The requirement to name a prime ministerial candidate before the election has also drawn criticism. Some on the left see it as a back-door attempt to introduce direct election of the prime minister, which could change Italy’s form of government. It does not, but it is a good rhetorical argument.

Access to elections is another issue. The higher signature threshold could raise barriers for parties without parliamentary representation, making it harder for new political forces to compete.

Gender representation is also at stake. The candidate heading each list is guaranteed a seat if the party wins representation in that constituency, regardless of how many preference votes other candidates receive. Names on each list must alternate between women and men, but the law sets no gender quota for the top spots. A 60:40 or 50:50 quota would have been appropriate. Instead, parties will decide how many women head their lists.

How likely is it that the changes will be overturned, and what does it mean for Italian democracy?

I don’t expect the amendment to be overturned in its entirety. The Constitutional Court may rule against less central aspects, such as the number of signatures parties need to stand in elections. But I don’t expect it to strike down the two most consequential provisions, the majority bonus and the 42 per cent threshold.

In any case, democracy in Italy is not in danger. The problem is its quality. As in other western liberal democracies, trust between voters and political elites is largely missing. Without this critical ingredient, liberal democracies cannot function well.

I remain optimistic that democracies will overcome these challenges, but it will take time and effort, and young people will need to take on greater responsibility. We can already see young people stepping up in other European countries, where students and broader civil society are mobilising and organising.

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