CIVICUS discusses Ukraine’s recent anticorruption protests with Oksana Huss, co-founder of the global Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network and board member of Transparency International Ukraine, one of the country’s major anticorruption organisations.

Ukraine witnessed its first major protests since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022 when parliament moved to weaken key anticorruption institutions. Civil society responded immediately: activists and watchdog groups took to the streets in Kyiv, the capital, and other cities, with protests gaining momentum despite ongoing Russian missile attacks. Following several days of sustained public pressure, international criticism and European Union (EU) threats to freeze funding, parliament reversed course and voted to restore the agencies’ independence. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the reversal into law the same day, marking a defeat for what protesters saw as an attempted power grab.

What changes did parliament make to anticorruption bodies, and why were they controversial?

Ukraine’s anticorruption system is highly sophisticated. It was created in the aftermath of the 2013 to 2014 Revolution of Dignity, when people ousted an authoritarian and corrupt government. Civil society united in the Reanimation Package of Reforms Coalition, which made the struggle against corruption a top priority. Four key institutions were established: the National Agency for Corruption Prevention, the National Anticorruption Bureau, the Specialised Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office and the High Anticorruption Court. Heads and judges are selected through rigorous, transparent processes involving civil society and international partners.

On 22 July, parliament passed a law curbing the independence of the Specialised Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office by allowing the politically appointed Prosecutor General to reassign cases. This meant creating conflicts of interest that would threaten the entire system.

How did civil society respond?

Public outrage was instant. Dozens of civil society organisations condemned the law and appealed to President Zelenskyy to veto it. Within two days, protests had erupted in 22 cities, including some on the frontline, led mainly by young people under 25, many soon to be conscripted and too young to have voted in the last presidential election in 2019.

Their demands were clear: reverse the law and follow proper parliamentary procedures, which had been bypassed when the changes were bundled into unrelated legislation on missing persons, and stay on the EU accession path by making the institutional reforms required for EU membership. Significantly, they didn’t call for Zelenskyy’s removal. Even critics of the anticorruption bodies joined in, agreeing that dismantling them was unacceptable.

What do the protests and the government’s response reveal about Ukraine’s democracy?

We are at war and under martial law, which means assembly rights are restricted. There’s also an unwritten understanding that civil society should avoid public criticism while the government continues to defend our country. These events broke that informal pact.

Despite the risks, protests were peaceful, showing that even in wartime, Ukrainians insist on democratic accountability. The government’s response was equally significant. The authorities allowed protests to proceed peacefully, with dialogue police – officers trained in diffusing tensions – present, and there was no repression.

Following protests that focused on the specialised anticorruption prosecutor, Zelenskyy quickly acknowledged protesters’ concerns, pledged to restore the prosecutor’s independence and introduced a draft law to reverse the changes, which parliament – recalled from recess – passed within a week. This showed that Ukraine’s democracy remains functional, with institutional checks still working despite the war. The challenge now is to channel this energy into constructive action, not destabilisation – something Russia could exploit.

What role did international pressure play?

Ukraine’s anticorruption system was built through a ‘sandwich’ effect: domestic pressure from civil society and external pressure from international partners. This was also the case now, with the EU’s financial leverage proving decisive.

The EU-Ukraine Facility, the EU’s main funding mechanism for Ukraine, ties funding to reform commitments, many of which should be co-designed with civil society. By early 2025, Ukraine had already missed several reform targets, including to appoint the head of the Bureau for Economic Security.

When the independence of the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office was curtailed, the EU cut €1.5 billion (approx. US$1.75 billion) from the first half of the year’s funding. This financial pressure, combined with vocal statements from EU leaders, helped push for the law’s reversal.

What safeguards are needed to prevent future attempts to weaken these institutions?

Domestically, Ukraine must stay on its democratic reform path and continue listening to people who see anticorruption as integral to resisting authoritarianism. Internationally, democratic allies need to reaffirm and strengthen their normative agenda on governance and anticorruption, filling the gap left by US disengagement.

Military aid and governance reforms should not be linked: Ukraine deserves defence support because it’s the victim of an illegal war of aggression. But governance commitments must still be upheld, both to honour the sacrifices made since the Revolution of Dignity and to ensure Ukraine’s long-term democratic future, including progress towards European integration.