COSTA RICA: ‘Institutions and democratic guarantees are being eroded in the name of security’
CIVICUS discusses the results of Costa Rica’s recent election with Ilka Treminio Sánchez, a political science professor and researcher at the University of Costa Rica.
On 1 February, conservative candidate Laura Fernández of the Sovereign People’s Party – Pueblo Soberano – was elected president of Costa Rica with over 40 per cent of the vote. Her campaign focused on public security and the promise of an ‘iron fist’ to tackle record levels of violence, largely linked to drug trafficking. Her victory is the latest in a recent string of conservative wins in Latin America.
What explains Fernández's first-round victory?
It’s still too early to accurately identify the determining variables, as post-election polls are not yet available. However, we can identify some trends.
This was the first time Pueblo Soberano participated in national elections, although it is a continuation of the Social Democratic Progress Party, the platform on which the ruling party ran in 2022. Pueblo Soberano is an electoral vehicle that includes conservative groups such as the National Evangelical Alliance, as well as neoliberal economic groups.
In terms of geographic coverage, Pueblo Soberano’s victory was overwhelming: it won in six of Costa Rica’s seven provinces and over 60 of its 84 cantons. Pre-election polls suggested its electorate was mainly concentrated among men aged 35 to 55 and was particularly strong in the coastal provinces. However, the final result revealed widespread nationwide support, except in a group of cantons in the centre of Costa Rica, where rival candidate Álvaro Ramos won.
A notable feature of this election was Fernández’s explicit association with the outgoing president, Rodrigo Chaves. She presented herself as a continuity candidate, which she framed as a ‘continuity of change’, and announced her intention to appoint Chaves as minister of the presidency once she takes office on 1 May. This position will grant Chaves special immunity from ongoing legal proceedings against him. Their close relationship breaks with Costa Rica’s tradition of new presidents distancing themselves from the outgoing government.
Even more surprisingly, after the election victory, Chaves held a press conference where he announced that the president-elect would take over the ministry of the presidency for the final three months of his government.
Are these results part of a regional trend?
Politics is never completely domestic; regional effects exist. The current regional context is characterised by the erosion of democratic controls by both right-wing and left-wing populists, which has created a more permissive environment for authoritarian leaders to rise. These leaders often present themselves as saviours against supposedly corrupt elites entrenched in institutions and seek to concentrate power by weakening checks and balances. Costa Rica is not immune to these dynamics.
But its case is particularly concerning because it is a democracy that has been established since 1953. It wasn’t part of the wave of transitions to democracy of the 1980s, by which time it already had solid institutions, high levels of social investment and a development model that was a source of national pride. The triumph of a political project openly hostile to that model reflects the existence of accumulated discontent among large parts of the population.
How has violence evolved, and what risks does the ‘iron fist’ rhetoric pose?
The security crisis is undeniable. For decades, Costa Rica maintained low levels of violence compared to the rest of the region. However, since the pandemic, transnational organised crime has become more deeply entrenched, particularly in coastal areas such as Limón. In Europe, there have been repeated reports of Costa Rican export shipments contaminated with cocaine, raising questions about the effectiveness of customs controls.
Groups linked to Central American, Colombian and Mexican networks operate in Costa Rica, and contract killings have expanded, with a consequent increase in collateral victims. In 2025, as in 2024, Costa Rica recorded over 800 homicides, the highest figures in recent history.
In this context, the ‘iron fist’ rhetoric was central and effective in capitalising on public fear. The candidate presented El Salvador’s model as a reference, even though Costa Rica does not have an army, which limits the possibility of repressive dynamics such as those seen in other countries.
Despite the increase in homicides during the current government, budgets for the Judicial Investigation Agency, which is responsible for criminal investigations, were not adequately increased. Instead, the government withdrew specialised drug control forces from strategic areas, and officials held controversial meetings with people who were later arrested for drug-related crimes. Although the government announced the construction of a prison inspired by the Salvadoran model, doubts have been raised about the project’s budgetary and technical feasibility.
However, the main risk is that institutional controls and democratic guarantees will be eroded in the name of security. There have already been reports of the alleged use of state intelligence to intimidate public figures, and worrying signs of politicisation in police forces. During the campaign, Fernández defended the possibility of declaring a state of emergency to tackle insecurity, which would involve suspending fundamental freedoms. Throughout its democratic history, Costa Rica has never resorted to such a mechanism, not even during the pandemic.
What role did civil society play in the election?
Social mobilisation has been limited since the government of Carlos Alvarado Quesada, from 2018 to 2022, when a law was passed that severely restricted the right to strike, particularly affecting the public sector.
During the election campaign, ‘multicoloured caravans’ emerged, made up of various parties and social groups opposed to Chaves and Fernández. However, the enormous fragmentation – 20 parties competed in these elections – and the legal requirements for forming coalitions – including the need to agree a common plan and the distribution of positions and state funding – made it difficult to consolidate a broad opposition front.
As a result, Fernández set the agenda, and her election campaign left out issues critical to Costa Rica’s future. Concerns remain about issues such as the environmental crisis, given that the conservationist discourse that characterised Costa Rica has weakened over the past four years, while opportunities for extractive activities in protected areas have opened up. Education — historically the engine of Costa Rica’s development — also represents a major challenge due to reduced investment that threatens the model based on skilled human capital. An equal danger is posed by the crisis in the public health system, characterised by increasingly long waiting lists, the flight of specialists to the private sector and budgeted hospitals that are not being built.
Finally, in foreign policy, the shift towards alignment with the USA and the abandonment of the traditional multilateral diplomatic approach has gone virtually unnoticed. Costa Rica has aligned itself with other countries in the region with fundamentalist right-wing governments, such as Argentina and El Salvador.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.