Expectations must remain modest. At this stage, the priority is not achieving a comprehensive settlement but preventing renewed violence. This was the immediate goal agreed at the 8 August Washington summit, when both sides promised to renounce conflict, close the chapter of enmity and rule out revenge.

The fate of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has acknowledged that their return to the territory is unrealistic and warned that raising the issue could destabilise fragile progress. For this reason, this topic has been excluded from the current discussions.

There’s also a constitutional hurdle. Azerbaijan insists no treaty can be signed until Armenia amends its constitution, which still refers to unification with Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia has scheduled a referendum on constitutional change for 2027, after parliamentary elections in 2026. Unless an interim arrangement is reached, this could delay the treaty for years. This also means the outcome will depend heavily on Armenian domestic politics, since it’s uncertain whether the public will support removing the contested clause.

The peace process could transform regional dynamics across the South Caucasus. By reducing the threat of war, it creates opportunities for economic integration, infrastructure development and cross-border cooperation. Azerbaijan, in particular, has plans to position itself as a logistics hub along the Middle Corridor, a trade route linking East Asia with Europe. Inclusion of Armenia in this corridor would bring economic benefits to both sides and help build confidence through practical cooperation.

For Armenia, participation could ease isolation, diversify the economy and create incentives for democratic reform. For Azerbaijan, greater international scrutiny during the implementation phase could encourage improved transparency. If sustained by inclusive policies and international engagement, this agreement could help shift the South Caucasus from a conflict-driven region into one that’s more connected and dynamic.

While the main credit belongs to Armenia and Azerbaijan, international partners have played a supporting role. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, Russia and the USA, was tasked with facilitating a resolution since the early 1990s, but failed to produce results, largely because the two sides refused to compromise under external pressure and because of divisions among mediators. The Brussels process, led by the EU, helped sustain dialogue but lacked the tools to enforce progress.

US involvement has recently gained significance. Washington has promoted the so-called TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity), a proposal to develop trade routes that would respect Armenia’s sovereignty while offering mutual economic benefits. Unlike earlier plans, TRIPP is presented as a balanced compromise, though it remains to be seen how it will work in practice, as technical details are still unclear and the agreement has not yet been formally signed.

Civil society has an essential role in preparing societies for peace, but the challenges are enormous. Entire generations in both countries grew up in an environment of war, displacement and hostility, with little to no contact with the other side. It will take time and long-term investment in dialogue initiatives to rebuild trust.

However, there are reasons for hope. The agreement includes provisions on intolerance and missing people that were unexpected but very welcome. One article commits both governments to reject hatred, extremism and discrimination, a necessary step given decades of hostile rhetoric. Another calls for cooperation to locate and return remains of missing people and establish investigations. These steps can serve as a foundation for transitional justice by acknowledging suffering and promoting accountability, which are essential to reconciliation.