Protests have mainly been organised by a new centre-right party, Albania Becomes, led by Adriatik Lapaj. For two months, they have held protests and sit-ins outside the prime minister’s office, calling for Rama’s resignation and presenting him as the heart of systemic corruption.

This mobilisation follows a controversy from last May’s parliamentary election. Lapaj and his coalition partner, Endri Shabani — now Albania’s Ombudsman — of the centre-right Hashtag Initiative clashed over the single parliamentary seat secured by their coalition. Neither would give way and the seat ultimately went to a relative of Lapaj who had been placed on the coalition’s closed list. This sparked criticism because the coalition had campaigned against closed lists, arguing they lack democratic legitimacy. Under the closed list system, party leaders determine who enters parliament, limiting voters’ influence.

This episode damaged Lapaj’s public image, and his current mobilisation efforts can be interpreted as an attempt at political rehabilitation to regain public trust.

Former prime minister and long-time Democratic Party leader Sali Berisha is attempting a political comeback. His party remains weakened by internal divisions, limited reform and continued reliance on his authoritarian leadership.

Berisha was previously placed under house arrest on corruption charges and has been accused of being responsible for the deaths of four protesters outside the prime minister’s office in 2011. He is now pursuing a dual strategy: co-opting Lapaj’s protest movement – and potentially his party – and seeking to reclaim the political influence he has steadily lost since his defeat in the 2013 election. Recently he has also adopted increasingly far-right rhetoric to align with broader international political trends.

While both Berisha and Lapaj appear to be using the protests to advance their personal political ambitions, their cooperation is fragile and likely unsustainable. Underlying tensions have already emerged, driven by the desire of both to dominate the movement.

Meanwhile, a protest around similar demands was organised by the radical left-wing Together Movement, which emerged from student-led grassroots activism. However, wary of Berisha and Lapaj monopolising the cause, they eventually withdrew. As a result, although corruption is widely recognised as a serious problem, no political force commands enough public trust to unite these demands or turn them into sustained institutional change.

The government has not treated the protests as a serious political threat because the opposition is divided and lacks broad public support. With the ruling Socialist Party controlling key state institutions, it’s not likely that protests will have immediate political consequences.

Civic space in Albania is formally quite open but substantively constrained. While protests are permitted, they are tolerated only when they do not significantly challenge the political status quo. During the recent protests, several arrests of protesters and bystanders have been reported, primarily in connection with the use of pyrotechnics and teargas, but also as a means for the authorities to assert control and project power. Albania currently shows features of a semi-authoritarian system, where the government maintains a formal commitment to constitutional norms but weakens accountability and oversight in practice.

They are very different. Recent student-led protests in Serbia, for example, have been grassroots, largely leaderless and driven by demands for accountability and structural reform. In that context, corruption was a genuine collective cause fuelled by shared rage.

In Albania, the protests are tethered to party politics. They are shaped by opposition leaders trying to regain influence after losing credibility. The demonstrations are staged to give these figures visibility. Their emphasis is less on systemic reform and more on shifting the balance of political power.

So, while corruption is central in both cases, in Albania it is primarily instrumentalised within political competition rather than functioning as an autonomous driver of mobilisation.