Georgia and Kyrgyzstan didn’t have much in common, aside from being former Soviet states. But now they’re both part of a growing and troubling trend. Kyrgyzstan has recently passed a law to force civil society and media groups that receive international funding to register as ‘foreign representatives’. In Georgia, a similar bill just passed its first parliamentary reading amid mass protests.

Bad news for civil society

These laws are a tool for vilification. Calling something a foreign agent or representative inevitably stokes suspicion and stigma, invoking images of treachery and espionage. Because such laws paint civil society and independent media as mouthpieces of foreign paymasters, they enable states and politicians to downplay legitimate scrutiny and criticism. They also often tie up organisations in lengthy compliance and reporting procedures, sucking resources away from what they’re supposed to be doing.

In many countries, civil society groups and independent media struggle to sustain themselves on domestic funding. Resources tend to be particularly constrained where civic space is heavily restricted – as in Kyrgyzstan – and government bodies channel domestic support to organisations aligned with or uncritical of the state. That’s why civil society often turns to international sources, including donor agencies, philanthropic foundations and multilateral bodies. But receiving foreign funding isn’t the same as agreeing to represent donors’ interests.

Those pushing foreign agents laws often argue civil society must be regulated so it doesn’t misuse resources. But wherever such laws have been introduced, civil society groups and independent media have already been subject to legislation and regulations on matters such as registration, reporting and accounting, often to an excessive and intrusive extent.

The clearest indication of what lies behind foreign agents laws is found in Russia. Vladimir Putin set the template in 2012, and has since changed the law to make it even more restrictive. It now applies to individuals as well as organisations and gives the government the power to shut down organisations. Other states strongly opposed to civil society’s scrutiny and dissent have since adopted similar laws, including Israel, Kazakhstan and Nicaragua. In each, a foreign agents law has been part of a wider pattern of growing hostility towards civil society and independent media.

Georgia looks to Russia

This is the Georgian government’s second attempt to introduce a foreign agents law. It withdrew an earlier proposal in March 2023 following mass protests, calls from hundreds of Georgian civil society organisations (CSOs) and international criticism. The law was first proposed by People’s Power, an anti-west party that split away from the ruling Georgian Dream party the year before, but Georgian Dream quickly championed it.

The new version is virtually the same. It says that organisations that receive 20 per cent or more of funding from foreign sources will have to register as ‘pursuing the interests of a foreign power’. Georgian Dream has claimed money floods in for what it calls ‘radical’ CSOs and media ahead of elections.

Georgia’s next election is due in October, and this may be one reason the bill was reintroduced. With a divided opposition, opinion polls suggest Georgian Dream will stay in government, but its support may fall. Having grown accustomed to power, which it’s held since 2012, it seems keen to make the most of the advantages it currently enjoys and shut down independent sources of scrutiny. Its parliamentary majority means it will be able to override the veto the president has pledged to apply.

Georgia has stood out as one of the few ex-Soviet countries that broadly respects civic freedoms. But the current government has backtracked. Last year the European Union (EU)-Georgia Civil Society Platform – a body established under the Association Agreement between the EU and Georgia towards the country’s potential membership of the EU – criticised a sustained government smear campaign against civil society. Freedom House pointed to growing harassment and violence against journalists.

When the government attempted to pass the law in 2023, thousands protested outside parliament. It’s been a similar story this time, with nightly demonstrations. An estimated 20,000 took part in a recent protest in the capital, Tbilisi. And this year and last, they’ve been met with violence and arrests. Security forces have used rubber bullets, stun grenades, teargas and water cannon against recent protests and detained scores of people. Opposition leader Levan Khabeishvili was among those severely beaten.

Many are protesting because they believe Georgia’s future is at stake. The fact that the proposed law is evidently inspired by Russia’s is reason enough for concern.

For Georgia, as for so many former Eastern bloc states, the key post-independence question has been how to balance relations between Russia and the EU, with both keen to exert influence. Georgia-Russia relations have often been hostile. The two went to war in 2008, and two breakaway Georgian regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, remain Russian-affiliated. Georgian Dream, founded by billionaire oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, claims to support both integration with the EU and NATO and the normalisation of relations with Russia.

But critics claim Georgian Dream has moved closer to Putin. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, who took over the role in February and has made the foreign agents law a priority, has a history of making anti-western statements. Relations with Russia have warmed since Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In May 2023, for example, Russia removed visa restrictions on Georgian citizens and ended a ban on Russian airlines flying to Georgia.

In common with many countries, there’s a generational divide, with younger Georgians overwhelmingly identifying as European and wanting to join the EU. They’re leading the protests, with many waving EU flags.

It isn’t only on its foreign agents bill that Georgia is following in Russia’s footsteps. The government has also introduced a law to ban what it calls ‘gay propaganda’ and amend the constitution to, it says, protect children and ‘family values’. Russia passed a similar law in 2013, which it amended even more harshly in 2022. Under Putin, LGBQTI+ identities are smeared as a western imposition. Georgia is heading down a similar path.

Kyrgyzstan goes downhill

The fact that foreign agents laws come amid and signal greater repression is clear in Kyrgyzstan. Civil society and independent media once enjoyed more freedom than in other Central Asian countries, but that’s changed under President Sadyr Japarov, who came to power following mass democracy protests in 2020. He was released from jail to decisively win the January 2021 presidential election, but he’s been no democratiser. A referendum held alongside the presidential vote strengthened his powers, making Japarov the country’s most powerful ever leader. Civic space has deteriorated appreciably.

State authorities are increasingly subjecting journalists to harassment and intimidation, including through office raids, detentions, website blocks and liquidation attempts. And, as in Georgia and Russia, Japarov has targeted LGBTQI+ people. A law introduced last year, supposedly to protect children, bans the sharing of information that ‘promotes non-traditional sexual relations’, limiting LGBTQI+ activists’ ability to advocate for rights.

On 2 April, Japarov announced he’d signed into law a bill increasing state controls on CSOs that receive foreign funding. They’ll be labelled as ‘foreign representatives’ and subjected to enhanced scrutiny and reporting requirements if they’re deemed to engage in ‘political activity’. Advocacy and campaigning – standard ways civil society tries to engage the public and improve policy – are classed as political activities, and in practice, almost any activity could be penalised. CSOs that violate the law can be suspended and ultimately closed down.

The law is almost identical to that introduced in Russia in 2012. Japarov, who frequently vilifies civil society and independent media, has defended it with claims that some CSO leaders are using donor funds for their own ends, even though CSOs are already subject to extensive state scrutiny. And it’s already having an impact: Open Society Foundations, which supports civil society, announced it would close its foundation in Kyrgyzstan.

It isn’t stopping there. Another law to further restrict CSOs is in the pipeline, while a further draft law would give the state excessive control over media organisations, websites and blogs, introducing strict registration requirements. In March, following extensive criticism, the draft was withdrawn for further consultation, but this doesn’t mean the danger’s over: a previous round of consultations ignored key recommendations from media representatives.

Kyrgyzstan’s foreign agents law has been warmly supported by Russia, as has Georgia’s. Russia’s Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has claimed pro-western CSOs are spreading anti-Russian sentiment in Central Asian countries to hinder regional cooperation in the context of its war.

Kyrgyzstan is a member of a string of regional bodies Russia established following the collapse of the Soviet Union, including the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Russia’s mini version of NATO. Kyrgyzstan’s economy relies heavily on trade with Russia, which has grown during the war. Kyrgyz companies have been accused of helping Russia evade sanctions. An estimated 1.2 million workers from Kyrgyzstan live in Russia, whose remittances make up around 30 per cent of the country’s GDP.

Putin visited Kyrgyzstan in October 2023, his first international trip since the International Criminal Court issued a war crimes arrest warrant. He was there to celebrate the anniversary of the founding of a Russian airbase in the country, and took the opportunity to remind people that Kyrgyzstan relies on Russian fuel for their cars.

The government has repeatedly banned protests, partly in response to anti-war protests outside the Russian embassy. Last year it instituted a facial recognition system and agreed to share data with Russia on people living in the country, measures that could be used to target the thousands of Russians who’ve fled to Kyrgyzstan since the start of the invasion of Ukraine. In May 2023, the Kyrgyz authorities returned anti-war activist Alexei Rozhkov to the Russian authorities.

EU makes a dangerous move

Georgia’s recent moves might be expected to put it at odds with the EU. Last December, the EU granted Georgia candidate status, beginning the long process of negotiations to join the bloc. As part of this, Georgia is required to pass a huge body of EU laws, encompassing a commitment to fundamental freedoms, among them the key civic rights of assembly, association and expression. Other measures Georgia needs to make progress on, such as tackling corruption, can only be ensured by a free civil society.

Foreign agents laws are incompatible with international standards on freedom of association, as set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, because they impede the ability of organisations to function. In 2022, the European Court of Human Rights – a body with membership wider than the EU’s, including Georgia – found that Russia’s foreign agents measures violated freedom of association and expression protections under the European Convention on Human Rights In 2020, the EU’s own Court of Justice found Hungary’s foreign agents law unlawful, concluding that it stigmatised CSOs.

The EU duly criticised the Georgian government’s decision to reintroduce the draft law, as it did last year. But its expressions of concern have been undercut by its plan to introduce its own directive on representation of foreign countries.

There’s little doubt the EU and its member states are subject to interference attempts. The Qatari government, for example, is alleged to have channelled cash to European Parliament members in return for them intervening on its behalf. European Parliamentary elections are due in June, with far-right parties expected to make gains, and ahead of voting Russia has made intense influencing efforts.

But European civil society is clear the EU is making the wrong move. The evidence is abundant from elsewhere that whatever the intentions of such laws, they invariably get used against civil society and independent media. At the national level, EU states – many of them backsliding on civic space – will be free to interpret the directive as they wish, putting a dangerous new tool in the hands of rising repressive forces. A vaguely worded directive leaves considerable scope for interpretation. Almost any organisation receiving funding from almost any non-EU donor could be affected.

The directive also undermines the legitimacy of the EU’s criticism of states that introduce foreign agents laws with the clear purpose of restricting civil society. Civil society has long called these ‘Russian-style laws’, but now their proponents can claim they’re following the EU’s lead, as Georgian politicians have already done.

The EU must think again, and democratic states must urge Georgia and Kyrgyzstan to backtrack. It’s not yet the case that these laws are common around the world, as the Kyrgyzstan government has falsely claimed – but they’re spreading. Several other states are currently considering adopting them. It isn’t too late to change course, but it’s imperative to do so now, before these regressive laws become the new normal.

Kyrgyzstan is currently on the CIVICUS Monitor Watch List, which identifies countries in which a severe and abrupt deterioration in the quality of civic space is taking place.

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