Côte d’Ivoire’s presidential election saw 84-year-old Alassane Ouattara win a fourth term after authorities barred major opposition candidates and banned protests, arresting hundreds who defied restrictions. In the subsequent parliamentary election, Ouattara’s party won 80 per cent of seats. The results consolidated a pattern established since Ouattara took power in 2011: systematic capture of electoral bodies, the judiciary and security forces has created a hybrid regime that maintains democratic forms without offering the substance needed for genuine competition. With over 60 per cent of its population under 25, Côte d’Ivoire remains among the ranks of African countries led by people several generations older.

On 29 December, Côte d’Ivoire’s Independent Electoral Commission announced that the ruling party, Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), had won 197 of 255 seats in the legislative election held two days before.

This parliamentary landslide completed a two-month electoral cycle that consolidated 84-year-old President Alassane Ouattara’s grip on power. In October’s presidential election, major opposition candidates were barred from the ballot. When protesters challenged their exclusion, hundreds were arrested. Amid an opposition boycott, voter turnout was just 35 per cent.

With almost 90 per cent of the October vote, Ouattara, in power since 2011, won a fourth term that’s widely seen as unconstitutional. The constitution sets a two-term limit, but the government-aligned Constitutional Council conveniently ruled that constitutional changes made in 2016 had created a new republic and reset the count.

When he was sworn in on 8 December, Ouattara spoke of ‘generational transition’, suggesting an eventual handover to younger leaders. But there’s no sign he’s easing his grip on power. The legislative election, held under restrictive conditions, told quite a different story.

President Alassane Ouattara is sworn in on 8 December 2025. Photo by Sia Kambou/Reuters via Gallo Images.

Vote without voice

The presidential election took place amid systematic civic space restrictions that effectively silenced opposition voices. In 2024, the Council of Ministers adopted a new NGO law, ostensibly seeking to combat transnational organised crime but containing numerous provisions that restrict civil society groups. The law imposes heavy reporting requirements and grants authorities sweeping powers to dissolve organisations through executive decree. It provides no avenue to appeal against dissolution decisions and criminalises the continued operation of dissolved organisations, potentially subjecting members to steep fines and prison sentences.

The election was marked by the systematic exclusion of major opposition candidates through administrative and judicial means. The Constitutional Council barred former president Laurent Gbagbo of the African Peoples’ Party-Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI) due to a criminal conviction for diverting funds from the Central Bank of West African States, and Tidjane Thiam, a former Credit Suisse CEO who leads the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), for acquiring French citizenship.

As voting approached, authorities deployed sweeping protest restrictions. On 2 October, the National Security Council announced that all ‘necessary measures’ would be taken to maintain order, including a ban on any meeting or public gathering to protest against the Constitutional Council’s decision to allow Ouattara to stand again. A 10 October decree banned all protests and meetings in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire’s largest city.

The following day, security forces used teargas to disperse a protest by the Front Commun, a PDCI and PPA-CI coalition, against their candidates’ exclusion and Ouattara’s candidacy. According to authorities, 237 people were arrested that day in Abidjan and 18 in Dobou, and one person was killed on 13 October in Bonoua.

Another decree on 17 October banned meetings and public demonstrations by political parties for two months, with only gatherings by the five presidential candidates allowed. This effectively banned any protest by the two largest opposition parties. By 21 October, over 80 protesters had been sentenced to three years in prison.

Despite logistical delays and a limited presence of opposition representatives at polling stations, international observer missions, including from the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, reported that election day proceeded peacefully. However, according to official figures, violence in the days around the election resulted in 11 deaths and over 1,650 arrests.

Political disaffection was reflected by a low turnout of around 50 per cent. Opposition candidates who remained in the race fared poorly. Former Commerce Minister Jean-Louis Billon got three per cent, while former first lady Simone Gbagbo took just 2.4 per cent.

Power consolidated

The 27 December legislative election could have offered a chance for opposition parties to gain enough representation to keep the executive in check. Instead, it reinforced the RHDP’s dominance. Its 197 seats, up from the 139 it secured in 2021, give it an 80 per cent supermajority, granting the government virtually unchecked power.

In November, the PPA-CI announced it would boycott the election, citing the absence of conditions for a credible vote. When 22 senior party officials defied the decision and registered as independent candidates, Gbagbo removed them from all positions.

Authorities arrested several opposition figures ahead of the vote. Police arrested senior PPA-CI official Damana Pickass over accusations of inciting ‘popular insurrection’ during the October election. On 26 November, authorities arrested PDCI spokesperson Brédoumy Soumaïla Traoré, charging him with incitement to insurrection and conspiracy against state authority. The PDCI denounced this as illegal and arbitrary but maintained its decision to take part in the election.

As a result, the PDCI emerged as the main opposition force, with 32 seats, while independent candidates – many of them expelled PPA-CI members who defied Gbagbo’s boycott –  took 23 seats, becoming the third-largest bloc.

A longstanding pattern

No presidential election in three decades has resulted in peaceful and democratic transition of power in Côte d’Ivoire. Following the death of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993, his successor Henri Konan Bédié formulated the exclusionary concept of Ivorité, which discriminated against northerners and Muslims by establishing ethnic criteria for presidential candidacy. The army ousted him in December 1999.

The 2000 presidential election, marked by the exclusion of opposition candidates including Ouattara, was followed by a military rebellion in September 2002 that grew into a civil war dividing the country between a government-controlled south and rebel-held north. The conflict formally ended with the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in March 2007.

After years of being barred from running by discriminatory nationality laws, Ouattara was finally allowed to compete and won the 2010 presidential election. When Gbagbo, the defeated incumbent, refused to accept the results, a violent post-electoral conflict erupted in which at least 3,000 people were killed and over 150 women were raped. The crisis ended after six months in April 2011 when Ouattara’s forces, backed by France and the United Nations, prevailed and detained Gbagbo.

Following his rise to the presidency, Ouattara moved quickly to capture key institutions. He merged the rebel Forces Nouvelles that brought him to power with cooperative elements of the national army into the new Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, appointing rebel leader Guillaume Soro as prime minister and defence minister. To ensure security forces remained loyal, he sidelined professional officers from the previous regime.

In 2015 Ouattara replaced the Constitutional Council president, who was loyal to Gbagbo, with a longtime associate. In 2020, he appointed a RHDP activist and his personal lawyer as Constitutional Council members. The Independent Electoral Commission remained under effective government control despite reforms following a 2016 African Court ruling that found its composition unduly favoured the ruling party and incumbent president.

Institutional control enabled successive electoral victories. Ouattara’s Rally of the Republicans (RDR) secured 127 of 255 seats in the December 2011 parliamentary election. The RDR was part of the RHDP, a political coalition formed in 2005 that included the PDCI and several smaller parties. In 2015, the RHDP coalition united behind Ouattara and he won re-election with around 84 per cent in a vote that was notably peaceful compared to previous ones but where there were no real alternatives: Gbagbo was imprisoned on charges that were ultimately dismissed at the International Criminal Court, the opposition Front Populaire Ivorien was fractured and weakened and the PDCI chose to support Ouattara. In the 2016 legislative election the RHDP coalition won 167 seats and in 2018 it transformed from a coalition into a unified party, but with the PDCI refusing to join and moving into opposition.

Despite earlier pledges to step down, in 2020 Ouattara sought a controversial third term, triggering an opposition boycott and protests that resulted in at least 85 deaths. He was re-elected with a reported 94 per cent of votes. By his 2025 fourth-term victory, the RHDP firmly controlled the National Assembly and Senate, 80 per cent of regional governments and two-thirds of municipalities.

Looking ahead

While they took place in peaceful conditions and there’s no indication ballots weren’t properly counted, Côte d’Ivoire’s 2025 elections were constrained by the systematic exclusion of viable opposition candidates and severe restrictions on civic freedoms that prevented contestation and debate. Côte d’Ivoire maintains democratic forms such as periodic elections and multiple parties, but it lacks the substance of genuine competition.

A fifth Ouattara candidacy in 2030 seems unlikely, given he’ll be 88. But without reforms to electoral institutions and moves to restore civic freedoms, any eventual succession will likely mean a handover to someone from his inner circle, replicating the system of managed competition.

Low voter turnout signals growing disillusionment, particularly among young voters. This reflects a broader pattern that sees Africa’s youthful populations often governed by leaders several generations removed. Ouattara at 84 heads a country with a median age of just 18.3. Numerous other examples dot the continent, with the most extreme instance coming in Cameroon, where a non-competitive election in October secured an eighth term for 92 year-old President Paul Biya.

Recent years have seen Gen Z-led protests in multiple African countries, including Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania, as young people have demanded the economic and political change older politicians are blocking. Senegal’s democratic election of 44-year-old Bassirou Diomaye Faye in 2024 demonstrated that generational renewal through the ballot box is possible. But examples are rare.

For Côte d’Ivoire, where over 60 per cent of the population is under 25, generational transition isn’t just about Ouattara’s succession but more fundamentally about whether the political system can accommodate young people’s demands.

The 2025 elections have closed off peaceful paths to change for now. The RHDP’s supermajority makes electoral reform impossible, while harsh prison sentences for protesters raise the costs of street mobilisation. Civil society is hampered by restrictive legislation. Meanwhile, democratic powers such as France remain largely silent because they see Côte d’Ivoire as an essential partner for regional stability. As it stands, Côte d’Ivoire will only break the pattern if Ouattara’s eventual departure opens space for genuine democratic competition rather than just produces another managed succession.

OUR CALLS FOR ACTION

  • The Ivorian government must undertake comprehensive electoral reforms and restore freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly.
  • Ivorian civil society should continue advocating and mobilising for democratic reforms while documenting civic space violations and human rights abuses.
  • The international community should publicly condemn civic space violations, call for the release of imprisoned opposition figures and protesters and maintain consistent pressure for democratic standards.

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Cover photo by Sia Kambou/Reuters via Gallo Images.