When Bangladesh’s streets erupted in protest in mid-2024, few could have predicted the regime would unravel so quickly. The ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August, after years of growing authoritarianism and mounting discontent, was hailed as a historic opportunity for democratic renewal. Almost a year on, it’s still to be determined whether Bangladesh is evolving towards genuine democracy, or whether one form of repression will replace another.

The interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, faces enormous challenges to deliver change. While it has taken steps to release political prisoners, initiate constitutional reforms, sign international human rights treaties and bring accountability for past human rights violations, persistent abuses, political exclusion and economic instability cast long shadows over the transition. The coming months will be decisive in determining whether Bangladesh can break from its recent authoritarian past.

From fraud to revolution

The roots of Bangladesh’s current political upheaval lie in the deeply flawed general election of 7 January 2024. The vote, which saw Hasina of the Awami League (AL) party secure a fourth consecutive term, was widely dismissed as a foregone conclusion. The main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), boycotted the election in protest at the government’s refusal to had over to a neutral caretaker government to oversee the campaign and voting.

The months leading up to the vote witnessed an intense crackdown. The government jailed thousands of opposition activists and weaponised the criminal justice system to silence dissent, leading to deaths in police custody and enforced disappearances. The crackdown extended to civil society, with human rights activists and journalists facing harassment, arbitrary detention and violence. Alongside this repression, the government sponsored fake opposition candidates to offer a show of competition, resulting in plummeting voter turnout and a crisis of legitimacy.

When rare mass opposition rallies occurred, they were met with overwhelming force. On 28 October, police responded to a major opposition protest in the capital, Dhaka, with rubber bullets, teargas and stun grenades, resulting in at least 16 deaths, while thousands were injured and detained.

The situation deteriorated further after the election. In June 2024, the reinstatement of a controversial quota system for public sector jobs triggered the mass student-led protests that would eventually topple Hasina’s government. The protests quickly evolved into a broader revolt against entrenched corruption, economic inequality and political impunity.

The government’s response was systematically brutal. According to a United Nations fact-finding report, between July and August security forces killed as many as 1,400 people, including many children, often shooting protesters at point-blank range. They denied the injured medical care and intimidated hospital staff. The scale of violence led the military to refuse further involvement, forcing Hasina to resign and flee the country.

Institutional reform and political discord

The interim government identified three priorities: reforms, trials of perpetrators of political violence and elections. Its first months brought significant steps: the interim government released detained protesters and human rights defenders, signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances and established a commission of inquiry into enforced disappearances. The CIVICUS Monitor, which tracks the health of civic freedoms around the world, had downgraded Bangladesh’s civic space to the worst category, closed, under Hasina’s government in December 2023; a year on, it upgraded it, signalling cautious optimism about institutional changes.

The commission of inquiry documented over 1,676 complaints and found evidence of systematic use of enforced disappearances to target political opponents, activists and others expressing dissent, with direct complicity by Hasina and other senior officials. In October, the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal – a domestic court established in 2010 to prosecute individuals for crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and other crimes under international law committed during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War – issued arrest warrants for Hasina and 44 others, including senior members of her cabinet, for massacres and killings during the 2024 protests. However, the tribunal has previously been fraught with violations of fair trial standards, and despite recent amendments, it retains the death penalty, contrary to international norms.

The Constitution Reform Commission has proposed expanding fundamental rights, including introduction of a bicameral parliament and term limits for top offices. Yet the process has been marred by the exclusion of major political players – most notably the AL – and minority groups.

Political tensions intensified as the interim government faced mounting pressure to set a date for a general election. Opposition parties accused it of deliberately stalling. The army chief publicly demanded the election be held by the end of 2025, while student groups and the student-led National Citizens’ Party (NCP), born from the 2024 protests, sought to have it postponed until reforms and justice for protest victims were secured. Yunus initially indicated a general election could be held between December 2025 and June 2026, but the BNP demanded it be held by December 2025, warning of waning support if delays continued. In June the government finally announced it would take place in April 2026.

The most dramatic escalation came in May, when the interim government banned all AL activities under the Anti-Terrorism Act following renewed NCP street protests.  Its justification was allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity during the 2024 crackdown. The Election Commission subsequently suspended the AL’s registration, effectively barring it from future elections and decisively altering Bangladesh’s political landscape.

Critics argue the AL ban is a form of collective punishment that will prevent the establishment of genuine multi-party democracy, while proponents say there’s a need to prohibit a party with a track record of undermining democratic institutions. The move raises a broader concern: if the interim government starts using similar authoritarian tools to the previous regime, it calls into question whether it’s dismantling repressive structures or merely rebranding them.

These aren’t the only challenges. Economically, Bangladesh remains fragile. The country is still recovering from devastating floods in 2024 and the banking sector is stressed by a surge of non-performing loans. Inflation has continued to outpace wage growth, and economic austerity measures agreed with the International Monetary Fund, including subsidy cuts, have sparked renewed protests.

Persistent abuses

Old patterns of repression are stubborn. Human rights groups document ongoing abuses by security forces, including arbitrary arrests of opposition supporters and journalists and denial of due process, and continued lack of accountability for past crimes. In the first two months of 2025 alone, over 1,000 police cases were filed against tens of thousands of people – mainly AL members or perceived supporters – while more than 400 former ministers and leaders have faced investigation. A February crackdown on Hasina’s supporters led to over 1,300 arrests.

Press freedom remains severely threatened. In November, the interim government revoked the accreditation of 167 journalists. Around 140 journalists viewed as aligned with the previous regime have faced charges, with 25 accused of crimes against humanity, forcing many into hiding. Attacks on media outlets, particularly those accused of promoting secular or ‘anti-Islamic’ values, have continued, including vandalism of The Prothom Alo and Daily Star offices.

The draft Cyber Protection Ordinance, intended to replace the repressive Cyber Security Act, under which the old government threw many into jail, has drawn criticism for retaining vague and overly broad provisions such as criminalising defamation, insult and hurting religious sentiments. It grants authorities sweeping powers for warrantless searches and content removal. No substantial amendments have so far been made to address these concerns, and rights groups are warning the law could be used to stifle dissent in the run-up to elections.

Meanwhile, accountability for past atrocities has advanced only haltingly, and families of victims still await justice.

Uncertain path forward

Bangladesh’s journey shows that democratic transitions are difficult, nonlinear and deeply contested processes involving a dynamic interplay of political and social forces amid complex institutional legacies and economic pressures. Democracy isn’t a guaranteed outcome; however, the odds can be raised when political leaders and parties, civil society and the public as a whole practise sustained vigilance, inclusive dialogue and genuine commitment to reform.

Bangladesh’s transition offers both promise and peril. The interim government has taken steps unthinkable under the previous regime: releasing political prisoners, signing international conventions and launching accountability processes. Yet the persistence of arbitrary arrests, attacks on journalists and civil society and the exclusion of key political players suggest that authoritarianism’s shadow still looms large.

The general election will provide a crucial test of whether Bangladesh can finally turn the page on authoritarianism. The answer lies not in the ambitions of any single leader or party, but in whether Bangladeshis – in government, civil society and beyond – can summon the courage to build something genuinely new.

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