Not really. Kazakhstan already had an extremely strong presidency, and the new constitution removes the few remaining restraints. The constitutional court, which previously had some independence, will become even more subordinate to the president’s will. The president will appoint judges and they will be confirmed by a parliament that cannot refuse without risking dissolution. This means the court will never rule against the president on fundamental issues.

Rights protections will weaken because there will be no independent body to enforce them. With a weaker parliament and a judiciary entirely dependent on the president, there will be no effective institutional avenue for defending rights against state abuse. Protest rights, already severely restricted, are unprotected. Permits are required but impossible to obtain, peaceful gatherings are blocked and organisers face arrest. The new constitution only strengthens the executive’s ability to restrict protests.

Most dangerous is the combination of unchecked executive power with the parliamentary dissolution mechanism. If parliament dares vote against a presidential nominee twice and the president dissolves it by decree, the president can continue to rule by decree in the interim period before new elections are held and a new parliament convenes. In Kazakhstan’s experience, such periods can last months. There’s no mechanism to stop a president dissolving and reconvening parliament at will to rule indefinitely by decree.

The government has arrested activists, detained journalists and prosecuted civil society figures who dared to criticise the constitutional process or call for a boycott. One colleague from Transparency Kazakhstan is now in pretrial detention facing up to four years in prison. His offence was to post a call for a ‘smart boycott’ on social media, in which he explained how people could abstain without facing legal consequences. The government criminally charged him for obstructing the exercise of electoral rights.

According to documents leaked from the presidential administration, the government instructed university deans to organise students to post positive content about the constitution. Authorities have staffed electoral commissions with state employees and teachers dependent on government budgets and are pressuring public servants to vote, even requiring them to photograph their ballots.

The government isn’t trying to hide its repression. It’s openly using the security apparatus to silence critics, confident there won’t be much international condemnation. Kazakhstan’s location between China and Russia, combined with its strategic importance, means western pressure will be muted.

This isn’t really a referendum; it’s a political technology event, orchestrated from the beginning. There will be no genuine choice: voters will be asked to approve the entire constitution. The government controls the electoral commission’s system and the media and has demonstrated its willingness to manipulate results. In a 2022 referendum, authorities pressured public servants to photograph their ballots and report their votes to their superiors. We expect similar coercion this time, combined with falsified turnout figures.

Civil society’s capacity to organise against this charade is severely constrained. We don’t have the freedom to hold rallies, run mass campaigns or conduct public outreach. There are no independent media platforms. All television and radio are state-controlled or aligned with state interests. We work through limited channels, such as Telegram, YouTube and international platforms.

What we are doing is providing legal analysis of the constitution, showing how it removes checks and balances, how it compares unfavourably to the 1993 and 1995 constitutions and why it is dangerous. We are documenting the government’s repressive response and raising awareness internationally. Although international pressure will be limited, documentation and visibility matter for historical record and future accountability.

We are realistic about our limitations. Most people in Kazakhstan don’t care about the constitution or are too afraid to express opposition. There’s what we call ‘learned helplessness’ – people fear that opposing the government will bring personal consequences, and this is not an irrational fear. We cannot stop this referendum from passing. Its outcome is predetermined. But we can ensure the world knows what happened and why, and maintain networks for future resistance.

Once the referendum passes and the new constitution enters into force on 1 July, parliament will be dissolved and elections held under the new electoral system to ensure ruling party dominance. The president will rule by decree for months while new institutions are organised. Appointments to the constitutional court, security apparatus and other key positions will entrench the control system further. Opposition figures will continue to be marginalised or imprisoned. Independent media will remain suppressed.

The long-term implication is that Kazakhstan is locking itself into a system from which escape becomes progressively harder. Nursultan Nazarbayev, the first president of Kazakhstan, ruled for 30 years, and after stepping down retained power through constitutional protections. The new constitution ensures that future presidents will have the tools to consolidate power even more completely. It’s a system designed to survive power transitions and prevent any possibility of democratic change.

Young people are already disconnected from politics, demoralised by the apparent futility of resistance. Without some dramatic external shock or internal collapse, which is possible but not predictable, Kazakhstan will likely remain authoritarian for decades to come.