CIVICUS discusses conflict and human rights violations in Ethiopia’s Amhara region with Robel Alemu, Communications Director of the Amhara Association of North America (AAA), a US-based organisation working to promote human rights in Ethiopia.

The Amhara region is experiencing severe violence, with over 2,600 civilian deaths and 700 injuries documented since August 2023. The conflict involves Ethiopian state forces, militias and rebel groups, with civilians disproportionately affected by drone strikes, massacres and summary executions. Human rights abuses such as sexual violence and enforced disappearances have been reported, along with telecommunications blackouts aimed at preventing media coverage. A humanitarian aid blockade has exacerbated the crisis, with over two million people in urgent need of assistance. International bodies are calling for coordinated action to prevent further atrocities.

How has the conflict in Amhara region evolved over the past year?

This conflict is an extension of that which took place in northern Ethiopia between 2020 and 2022. Shifts in political dynamics and alignments have since complicated the situation, resulting in four years of war-like conditions for millions of people in Amhara and surrounding regions.

In November 2022, a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) between the regime led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) put an end to the fighting in Tigray. But the fact that the Fano, a voluntary Amhara defence force, was excluded from the agreement left key issues such as land disputes unresolved, paving the way for further violence.

In April 2023, the military responded to widespread protests in Amhara by opening fire on unarmed protesters. By the end of the month, a federal joint operation led by the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) was launched to disarm so-called ‘extremist’ forces, essentially targeting Fano forces. This followed the controversial disbandment and restructuring of the Amhara Regional Special Forces, which had played a key role alongside Fano in repelling advancing Oromo and Tigrayan ethno-nationalist forces during the northern war.

Fighting has escalated since April 2023, and in late July Fano entered major cities, prompting Abiy to declare a state of emergency. This escalated the siege of Amhara and brought further human rights abuses. Over the past year, government forces have struggled to control the region, with Fano taking over rural areas and entering several major cities, and government forces facing low morale, capture and defections.

These developments point to a possible Fano takeover of Amhara, which could have significant regional implications. Ongoing tensions in neighbouring countries, including conflict in Sudan and diplomatic friction with Eritrea and Somalia, further complicate the situation.

Abiy’s draconian rule has been marked by the collapse of the rule of law and civic freedoms, impunity and the betrayal of former allies. Despite coming to power after popular protests in Amhara and his homeland, Oromia, in 2018, Abiy has ignored Amhara grievances while addressing only those of the Oromo community. For example, instead of addressing the demands of Amhara protests in 2021, 2022 and 2023 over ending Amhara genocide, granting political representation and initiating constitutional reform, he has responded with violence and collective punishment.

In sum, while the violence has structural roots, Abiy bears much of the responsibility for the recent outbreaks.

What’s the role of state and non-state forces in the conflict?

The main combatants in the Amhara conflict are Fano and the joint state force. Although Fano fought alongside the army in the northern war, Fano forces aren’t ‘state militias’: they aren’t organised, trained, armed or paid by the state. The joint state force, however, consists mainly of the ENDF, regional militias, riot dispersal units and the police.

The Oromia Regional Special Forces (OSF) have also been involved. There have been reports of OSF soldiers disguised in ENDF uniforms committing massacres against Amhara communities in Amhara and Oromia , including in Bahir Dar city, the Amhara region capital.

Ethno-nationalist militias from neighbouring regions, sometimes with state support, have also targeted Amhara communities. On 1 October, TPLF forces opened fire on civilians in Alamata city after months of abuses and the displacement of tens of thousands of Amhara residents with the complicity of the ENDF. In June, TPLF forces attacked a small village, Ali Tara in Adarkay, killing civilians and burning children alive. Meanwhile, Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) fighters from the Oromo Special Zone have also targeted Amhara communities in southeastern Amhara since 2019, and the ENDF, OLA and OSF have carried out joint attacks on Amhara communities in Oromia.

How has the conflict affected local people?

Over the past year, we have documented human rights abuses that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, with over 3,300 civilian casualties recorded across 200 civilian massacres and 53 drone strikes. Women, children, older people and people with disabilities have been disproportionately affected. Abuses include sexual violence, mass displacement, property destruction, looting, denial of humanitarian aid, collective punishment and hate speech, as well as mass arrests of civil society leaders, human rights defenders and journalists. At least 4,178 schools have been closed and many converted into ENDF military camps, leaving over 4.1 million children without education. Communications blackouts have further hampered investigations.

The government has deliberately restricted humanitarian access, leading to starvation among internally displaced people, particularly survivors of ethnic violence in Oromia. Systematic attacks on medical facilities have severely limited access to healthcare, and the diversion of ambulances for military use has reduced emergency services, worsening mortality from childbirth and treatable diseases. People are in urgent need of food, water and medical supplies.

How is civil society responding to the humanitarian and human rights crisis?

The crackdown on civic space has severely hampered civil society’s response. In particular, following protests in 2023 and the subsequent declaration of a state of emergency, the government has profiled and arrested numerous human rights defenders.

As a result, much of the advocacy and humanitarian relief has been carried out by diaspora groups, largely funded by community donations. These organisations run independent media, deliver humanitarian aid and raise awareness of the crisis. They support orphaned children, give agricultural equipment to conflict-affected communities and provide medical care, including psychosocial support for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence. However, their work is often hampered by financial constraints and limited access to affected areas.

Diaspora groups are also engaged in advocacy and citizen diplomacy with policymakers across Australia, Europe and North America, pushing for greater international support for humanitarian aid and accountability.

How has the international community responded?

Since the signing of the COHA, international pressure has eased. In the early stages of the northern conflict, when fighting was confined to Tigray, it was strong, with almost daily direct condemnation of the government’s human rights abuses and calls for peace. However, as the conflict spread to Afar and Amhara, international pressure waned, and the humanitarian crisis received less attention. Recent financial support for the Abiy regime from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank is yet another sign of selective concern for human rights and peacebuilding.

Experts warned that the exclusionary COHA would fail to achieve lasting peace because it ignored the Amhara community. However, this warning was ignored and, as a result, conflict in Amhara resumed in 2023. The failure of the COHA is an important lesson in what not to do.

The international community must stop enabling the genocidal war on Ethiopia’s Amhara people. It must unequivocally condemn atrocities against civilians and address urgent humanitarian needs. And if it is serious about putting an end to the abuses, it must impose targeted sanctions on regime officials and military leaders implicated in rights abuses, including Abiy and Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, who should also be prosecuted for war crimes at the International Criminal Court. And international financial institutions must stop any financial support that could enable further military action against civilians.

Get in touch with the AAA through its website or Facebook page, and follow @AAA_Amhara and @TheFitawrari on Twitter.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.