CIVICUS discusses Serbia’s democratic backsliding and criminalisation of civil society with Igor Bandović, Director of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), an independent think tank whose work focuses on democratic institutions, governance and security in Serbia and the wider region.

Following mass protests demanding restoration of the rule of law, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced on 27 June that he would resign within weeks and call early presidential and parliamentary elections. However, many in civil society are suspicious, with no date yet set for elections and the potential for Vučić to retain power by becoming prime minister. The ruling Serbian Progressive Party has captured key institutions, suppressed independent media and consolidated power through coercion and patronage. As Vučić frames civic protest as foreign-sponsored subversion, independent civil society groups face surveillance, smear campaigns and state harassment.

What does Vučić’s recent announcement mean for the protest movement?

At this stage, it’s difficult to assess whether it represents a genuine willingness to open the political process or a tactical move aimed at resetting the political landscape under conditions that remain favourable to the ruling party. Much will depend on what follows the announcement, and whether the government ensures genuinely competitive electoral conditions, including equal media access, safeguards against abuse of state resources and independent oversight of the electoral process.

Concessions would be politically dangerous for Vučić. The protests target the core of his system: captured institutions, corruption, media control and impunity. Meaningful concessions would validate the protesters’ central claim that the state is structurally compromised. Vučić controls coercive institutions, media, the parliamentary calendar and patronage networks. His strategy has been to wait, fragment, intimidate and exhaust the movement rather than negotiate.

This reflects the logic of electoral autocracy. You don’t lose power through elections you control, and you don’t concede to movements you can silence. Reform would require dismantling the structures keeping him in power. Rather than negotiate, he manages the crisis through institutional control and delegitimisation of the protest movement.

How does the government attack independent civil society?

The government uses two overlapping mechanisms. First, it focuses on security. Independent civil society is no longer treated as a legitimate participant in democracy but as a national security threat. BCSP’s experience of cyber-espionage is instructive. It was targeted through credential-harvesting and espionage, signalling that watchdog work and international networking are being treated as security issues. Amnesty’s reporting on digital repression and spyware in Serbia confirms a wider pattern of systematic surveillance that targets activists, civil society organisations and journalists. By treating civil society as a security threat, the government uses the state security apparatus, including cyber units, intelligence agencies and surveillance infrastructure, against it.

Second, the ‘colour revolution’ narrative reframes civic protest as foreign subversion. It transforms activists, civil society organisations, opposition figures and students from citizens demanding accountability into instruments of western regime-change operations. This allows the government to avoid addressing the substance of protests, the real grievances about captured institutions, corruption and impunity. Instead, it labels protesters as ‘foreign agents’ and justifies repression as national self-defence.

These two mechanisms work together strategically. Security approaches make independent monitoring dangerous. The colour revolution narrative justifies that danger as counter-intelligence work. Loyalist media amplify the foreign-agent framing and polarise society between ‘patriots’ defending the state and ‘traitors’ serving foreign powers. Monitoring civil society becomes ‘counter-intelligence’ rather than political persecution. BCSP’s analysis describes this as a strategic tool of authoritarian rule, reinforced by Russian-style narratives that have become standard in Serbia’s information ecosystem.

What European Union (EU) leverage exists?

The EU has significant leverage. Serbia wants EU accession credibility, EU funding, investment, market access and travel and visa benefits. Brussels can condition accession chapters, Growth Plan funds and Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance funding, and controls the legitimacy and political access Serbia is seeking. The most tangible recent signal is the possible freezing of around €1.5 billion (approx. US$1.7 billion) over rule-of-law concerns.

The problem is that the EU has often prioritised geopolitical balancing, stability, and management of the Kosovo situation and of migration. It has tolerated Serbian authoritarianism because it values a ‘stable’ Serbia more than Serbian democracy. This sends a clear message that Vučić can consolidate authoritarian control without facing serious consequences from Brussels. Until the EU applies leverage consistently and links all benefits to genuine democratic reform, Vučić has little incentive to change course.

What’s the realistic path to democratic opening?

A democratic opening is realistic but not automatic. The protests have broken fear, widened civic participation and exposed the limits of what analysts call ‘stabilitocracy’, the prioritisation of regime stability over democratic practice. Opening requires more than mobilisation. It needs fair electoral conditions, media access for alternative voices, opposition coordination, protection from repression, and external voices that refuse to normalise authoritarian management.

The most plausible path is not sudden regime collapse, but a negotiated or electorally forced transition under sustained domestic pressure and sharper EU conditionality. This requires three working elements: continued public pressure that prevents apathy, electoral competition where genuine change is possible and consistent EU pressure that makes authoritarianism costly. It is a long-term struggle, not a quick solution.

The protests have proven that Vučić’s system is vulnerable to sustained pressure. His strategy of exhausting public momentum may not work if that pressure continues and if the EU finally applies leverage consistently. The opening will be difficult and contested, but it is not impossible.

For civil society and the protest movement, Vučić’s recent announcement should not be seen as the end of the current mobilisation, but rather as a new phase in which the focus shifts from demanding accountability to ensuring any elections are genuinely free and fair. If the underlying structural problems that triggered the protests remain unaddressed, a change in electoral timing alone is unlikely to resolve Serbia’s broader democratic crisis.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.