It is a gap between the formal governance structures and the actual power dynamics within the system. There is authority without resources. The governing boards of agencies, funds and programmes control barely 10 to 20 per cent of what is implemented, meaning the remaining 80 per cent operates without formal oversight or evaluation.

There are also resources without oversight. Just 10 donors provide 70 per cent of the system’s resources. The USA remains the leading donor, followed by China, Germany, France and the UK, while the Gulf states are gaining influence and seeking greater recognition. For the most part, these countries make contributions earmarked for specific projects or themes. These funds fall outside the scope of formal governance structures.

And, finally, there are those without a voice. The countries most in need of cooperation and technical assistance are those with the least influence over the system, including in the allocation of resources, the setting of priorities and the making of operational decisions.

Funding is both the system’s main driver and one of its major constraints. Influence is heavily concentrated among a few donors who impose their priorities on the system, dictating in which countries or on which issues the resources they provide are invested. This reduces the system’s scope for decision-making and, in many cases, turns it into an executor of bilateral agendas.

This model also has concrete effects on how the system operates. Sixty per cent of contributions are small-scale, under a million dollars, which multiplies transaction costs and increases bureaucracy. In some cases, the cost of managing the funds ends up being greater than the benefits that reach people, or that help protect the environment and human rights.

The impact is political as well as financial. In recent years, there has been a clear shift in the system’s priorities. Issues such as climate change and gender equality, which until recently occupied a central place, are losing ground. When governments change and anti-rights figures come to power, these agendas are revised or dismantled, which affects the continuity of policies that require time and consistency.

This shift is also reflected in the language used and how these agendas are discussed. The multilateral system is increasingly being called into question, with arguments that cast doubt on the value of the SDGs and the role of the UN, which ultimately undermines its legitimacy.

The impact is clear: a system that took years to build can be rapidly eroded when it is consistently undermined. And, although it is far from perfect, dismantling it is not the solution, as rebuilding it would be very difficult.

Civil society has little influence over the system. There are financial barriers. Budgets are limited and simply attending meetings represents a significant expense for many organisations. Further, the accreditation system tends to favour organisations from the global north.

And, although over 6,000 organisations have consultative status with the UN, that number does not translate into real participation. The problem is not just one of quantity but of quality. The mechanisms in place are too limited for civil society to have a meaningful impact. Added to this is another structural obstacle: the UN NGO Committee, comprising countries such as China, Cuba and Nicaragua, actively restricts access to consultative status, blocking the entry of new organisations. This is not oversight; it is a deliberate means of keeping civil society’s voice confined in multilateral forums.

Some self-criticism is also needed. Civil society has not always been able to demonstrate the value it can bring to these processes. We remain focused on overly broad discussions that yield no specific contributions and, in some cases, we fight battles we cannot win. The UN is a body of states. We can influence processes, and we have done so successfully, but demanding a vote as well as a voice is not only unrealistic but also raises difficult questions about legitimacy and representation.

The challenge lies elsewhere: we must make better use of our technical capabilities, build stronger alliances and work in a more coordinated manner. It is not easy, particularly because it involves convincing ourselves it is worth it to try to exert influence from the global south on global processes where results will only be seen in the long term. But without that balance, the risk is that decisions will become even less representative. We must forge stronger regional alliances that allow us to create shared public goods and common agendas that can then be linked at the global level. Africa is already doing this; it is time for the Latin American and Caribbean region to start acting as a bloc too.

There are various possible paths. In the short term, one option is to focus on improving the system’s effectiveness, working within the existing rules rather than investing energy in reforms that may take years to materialise. More gradual changes can also be promoted, by reviewing mandates and reducing duplication. Building coalitions to drive deeper transformations will depend on the political will of the states.

The problems are quite clear. There is a disconnect between funding and governance: decision-makers do not always control the resources, and this limits the system’s ability to act coherently. At the same time, decision-making remains largely non-inclusive, and many of the commitments made are not followed through consistently.

In this context, any reform must bridge these gaps by better aligning resources with decision-making structures, opening up governance spaces and ensuring that monitoring and accountability mechanisms actually work.