CIVICUS discusses a change of government in Hungary with Márta Pardavi, co-chair of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, a human rights organisation that monitors democratic backsliding and defends the rule of law in Hungary.

Péter Magyar’s Tisza Party won a two-thirds supermajority in Hungary’s 12 April parliamentary election, ending 16 years of Viktor Orbán’s rule. For Hungary’s civil society, the result could begin a period of recovery for civic space, democratic freedoms and the rule of law. The result showed that autocratisation processes can be reversed, but dismantling the deep roots of Orbán’s system of control will be a long and difficult task.

Was the election free and fair?

The electoral playing field was fundamentally uneven. Voters could make a free choice but the contest was not fair. The election took place in an environment of systemic boundary-blurring between the state and Orbán’s Fidesz party. Public funds, institutional resources and state communications were consistently used to benefit Fidesz.

Coordinated messaging financed with public funds, within a permissive legal framework with weak oversight and limited judicial control, enabled continuous campaigning and circumvention of safeguard rules.

Yet these structural imbalances could not suppress the clear demand for democratic change. The record turnout of 80 per cent and record votes for the Tisza Party reflect the democratic resilience of Hungarian society. Voters, civil society and independent media persistently exposed abuses of power and kept democratic norms visible under sustained pressure.

What are the consequences of Orbán’s rule?

For 16 years, checks and balances were systematically turned off, leaving executive power largely unconstrained and making accountability increasingly nominal. Civil society organisations and investigative journalists who sought to expose abuses were consistently targeted politically.

For civil society and independent media, this meant years of sustained, targeted pressure. Independent organisations and journalists faced administrative and legal harassment, intrusive scrutiny and smear campaigns. The government systematically eroded the rule of law, limiting independent institutions’ capacity to hold power accountable.

Years of pressure have damaged institutional trust and the independence of civil society. Democratic restoration will require ending these dynamics, recognising the legitimate roles of organised and unorganised civil society, and ensuring it’s meaningfully involved in shaping what comes next.

What risks remain for civil society after the election?

The election result should bring immediate improvement for civil society by easing political pressure and repealing restrictions on civic freedoms. These are commitments Magyar made during the campaign.

But the structural damage inflicted during 16 years of democratic backsliding will not be quickly reversed. There are entrenched institutional legacies and political polarisation to deal with. And there’s also the possibility of reform overreach. Civil society must navigate the transition carefully, balancing demands for oversight with the need for inclusive dialogue.

Civil society’s role will have to shift from resistance to monitoring and accountability. This requires new capacities and coalitions, particularly as polarisation persists and some political forces may resist key reforms.

What would genuine democratic restoration look like?

Genuine restoration requires dismantling institutional distortions and rebuilding a pluralistic constitutional order. Hungarians voted to dismantle the structures that enabled the concentration of power. They expect courts, media and oversight bodies capable of operating independently and holding power accountable.

The rule of law is also about a shared expectation of accountability, fairness and restraint. This is a moment of opportunity but also of responsibility. This moment calls for more than a change in leadership or institutional redesign; it calls for rebuilding people’s trust in institutions and democratic processes.

Sustained investment in citizen engagement, civic space, media pluralism and watchdog capacities will be key to rebalancing a distorted public sphere. The timeline will depend on the new government’s commitment, resources and civil society’s capacity to press for accountability.

What roles should civil society play?

Civil society organisations should focus on keeping the public actively engaged and informed. They must help restore checks and balances by monitoring institutional reforms, supporting judicial independence and safeguarding due process in accountability efforts.

Civil society must also help rebuild trust in democratic institutions after years of weaponisation and abuse. This means working transparently with new government structures while maintaining critical capacity and independence. The transition from resistance to partnership requires careful navigation to ensure civil society does not compromise its watchdog role.

Civil society’s role is to ensure democratic restoration is genuine and inclusive. This means demanding accountability for past abuses while also building the civic and institutional foundations for a democracy where independent voices are protected and valued.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.