CIVICUS discusses Djibouti’s presidential election with Adam Daud Ahmed, a political and security analyst specialising in governance, security and political dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

On 10 April, President Ismail Omar Guelleh won a sixth consecutive term, enabling him to extend his 27 years in power. The election followed a constitutional amendment that allowed Guelleh to run despite exceeding the previous maximum age for presidential candidates. Most opposition parties boycotted the election over concerns about impartiality, and human rights groups condemned it as a foregone conclusion, citing political repression of activists, journalists and opponents.

What do the election process and results tell us about democracy in Djibouti?

Djibouti’s election looks less like a democratic exercise and more like a ritual confirmation of permanent power. This does not necessarily mean the government completely lacks public support, but it suggests that alternative voices are not being meaningfully accommodated within the system.

A 97.81 per cent result amid a major opposition boycott points to a serious deficit in political competition. Elections should give people a real choice. When major opposition groups boycott the election, as the Movement for Democratic Renewal and the Union for National Salvation did, it raises fundamental questions about whether that choice truly exists.

The opposition has boycotted elections since 2016, citing electoral impartiality concerns. Their continued absence in 2026 signals that core grievances remain unaddressed.

How did the constitutional amendment affect the election’s legitimacy?

Passed shortly before the election, the amendment that removed the presidential age limit, previously set at 75 years old, significantly undermined perceptions of legitimacy. Constitutions provide stable, predictable rules. When those rules change at a critical moment, particularly to benefit the incumbent, confidence in fairness weakens.

This decision reinforces concerns that institutional frameworks are being adapted to ensure continuity rather than uphold equal standards for all candidates. The 78-year-old incumbent could now run again, something the previous constitution prohibited.

Over time, such constitutional manipulation erodes trust in elections and in governance itself. When fundamental rules are rewritten to serve incumbents, people lose faith in institutional impartiality.

How much space is there for dissent?

Civic space in Djibouti is severely restricted for critical or dissenting voices. Civil society, independent media and opposition groups exist formally, but their ability to operate is constrained by administrative barriers, legal restrictions and political sensitivities.

Those who speak out risk detention, harassment and legal pressure. This discourages open expression and produces self-censorship, narrowing public debate and making accountability difficult.

Strengthening protections for civic space is essential if people are to participate fully and hold institutions accountable. Without this, the climate of fear perpetuates political control.

How does Djibouti’s strategic position shield it from international accountability?

Djibouti’s strategic location at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical global shipping route, gives it considerable geopolitical importance. China, France, Italy, Japan and the USA all operate military bases there for counterterrorism, maritime security and regional stability purposes.

Because of this strategic role, international engagement is often driven by security priorities rather than governance concerns. While these security interests are legitimate, they can overshadow democratic reforms and human rights, reducing external pressure on the government.

Strategic considerations may limit how far international partners push on democratic reforms. A balanced approach, integrating security cooperation with consistent support for civic freedoms, would be important for long-term stability.

What would real political reform look like?

Real reform would require independent electoral processes, protection of freedoms of association and expression, and civil society and media operating without fear. It also means reinforcing constitutional safeguards that limit the concentration of power and support transparent political transitions.

Reform will likely only happen gradually. The current system emphasises continuity, and Djibouti’s strategic importance reinforces that tendency. But pressures, including a growing youth population, economic challenges and evolving regional dynamics, may gradually create incentives for more inclusive governance.

Long-term stability will depend not only on Djibouti’s strategic role but on its ability to build a system that is more open, accountable and responsive. Without this, underlying tensions around democratic legitimacy will persist.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.