CIVICUS discusses far-right successes in recent regional elections in Germany with Viktoria Kamuf, research associate at the Institute for Democracy and Civil Society, a research organisation based in the German state of Thuringia.

The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party made significant gains in state elections in Saxony and Thuringia on 1 September. In Thuringia, the AfD won over 32 per cent of the vote, overtaking the Christian Democrats (CDU) and becoming the first far-right party to win the most seats in a state election since the Second World War. In Saxony, the AfD almost matched the CDU with around 31 per cent of the vote. The results signal growing support for nationalist, anti-immigrant policies in eastern Germany. Other parties have ruled out forming coalitions with the AfD, but even if excluded from government it will have political influence.

How unexpected were the results of elections in Saxony and Thuringia?

The results were anything but unexpected. Previous local and regional elections, as well as the European Union (EU) parliamentary elections and numerous opinion polls, had pointed to growing support for the AfD and a decline in support for democratic parties, particularly those in governing coalitions at state and national levels.

In the June European Parliament elections, the AfD won 30.7 per cent of the vote in Thuringia, very similar to the 32.8 per cent it won in the state election a few months later. Similar patterns were seen in other eastern German states, where support for the AfD was well above the national average of 15.9 per cent in the EU elections.

The key question before the state elections in Saxony and Thuringia was therefore not whether the far right would make a strong showing but how big its vote share would be. In the end, the AfD emerged as the leading party in Thuringia, securing more than a third of the seats and gaining considerable influence over decisions in the state parliament. In Saxony it narrowly missed becoming the largest party, winning 30.6 per cent of the vote, just behind the CDU’s 31.9 per cent.

These results reflect a wider trend in Thuringia, where open support for far-right, anti-democratic and racist ideologies has become increasingly common in recent years. In 2015 and 2016, the state witnessed a surge in anti-immigration protests, even in small rural areas. While these protests waned after 2017, they resurfaced during the COVID-19 pandemic, uniting conspiracy theorists, Holocaust deniers and neo-Nazis against the democratic state. Even after pandemic restrictions were lifted, these groups rallied around new causes, such as the Russian war in Ukraine and the European energy crisis, with protests continuing in many Thuringian cities.

Democratic, anti-fascist and anti-racist activists have consistently worked to counter these forces, but face increasing emotional and physical pressure. Organisations supporting victims of far-right, racist and antisemitic violence have reported an increase in such incidents and warned that the AfD’s recent electoral success could further threaten democratic politicians, activists and excluded communities.

What explains the AfD’s success?

For many years, large sections of the German public saw the rise of the AfD as a temporary ‘protest vote’ and assumed its support would plateau – but they were wrong. It’s not solely a reaction to the policies of the ruling coalitions, as some conservative politicians have suggested, although dissatisfaction with the government and the way this dissatisfaction was channelled during the election campaign certainly plays a role.

In essence, the AfD’s success can be attributed to a combination of global crises, such as climate change and the war in Ukraine, national politics, unresolved issues from German reunification and local factors such as socio-demographic changes, a decline in infrastructure and political culture. While support for the AfD is growing across Thuringia, its popularity varies significantly from region to region, suggesting that local conditions are as important as broader political and social trends. However, it’s important to recognise that AfD voters do not simply tolerate the party’s far-right stance; many are actively attracted to it, particularly because of its strong racist anti-immigration platform.

What kind of government can we expect after the elections?

Government formation in Thuringia will be a challenge. All democratic parties have ruled out a coalition with the AfD, leaving only one viable majority coalition: the CDU, the Left Party and the newly formed Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), which together have 50 out of 88 seats. However, the CDU continues to reject the idea of a partnership with the Left Party, and the political positioning of the BSW remains difficult to define.

The BSW won 15.8 per cent of the vote in its first state election. While it leans to the left on national socio-economic issues such as raising the minimum wage, it also advocates a tougher anti-immigration policy and an end to arms supplies to Ukraine, positions that are more in line with the AfD, making its coexistence with the CDU and the Left Party difficult.

Another possible coalition involving the CDU, BSW and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) is under discussion. However, this arrangement would fall one seat short of a majority and would require the support of either the AfD or the Left Party to pass legislation. Thuringia has already experienced a minority government in 2019, when the Left, the SPD and the Greens – who this time failed to reach the five per cent threshold required to win seats – relied on the CDU’s cooperation. Minority government is inherently unstable, as every decision requires complex negotiations.

While the shape of the next government in Thuringia remains uncertain, one thing is clear: political instability is likely to continue. This could benefit the far right, which thrives on exploiting fear and insecurity.

There are voices within the CDU calling for some form of cooperation with the AfD, which could further erode the democratic ‘firewall’ against the far right. To counter the AfD’s influence, democratic parties must take a firm stand against its anti-democratic and hateful politics and resist the normalisation of its ideology.

How much influence do you think the far right will now have in state and federal politics?

The AfD will be able to use its strength in local, regional and state parliaments to shape or at least block political decision-making processes and obstruct the work of democratic institutions and organisations. Its success will also contribute to the establishment and normalisation of its political and ideological positions in public debate and everyday life.

At the parliamentary level in Thuringia, the AfD is now able to block any kind of decision that requires a two-thirds majority, such as amendments to the state constitution, the dissolution of parliament and key appointments to several parliamentary bodies. An AfD representative could even be elected president of the state parliament, a position with considerable influence.

Following local and regional elections in May and June, the AfD was able to further consolidate its position in town and district councils across Thuringia. This gives the party new opportunities to shape or obstruct local policies and structures, including the funding of civil society initiatives and the work of local equality and integration officers.

In the district of Bautzen in Saxony, the AfD has already tried to abolish the position of foreigners’ commissioner, even though it has no authority to do so. It can be expected to continue to try to obstruct the work of democratic institutions.

The success of the far right has wider implications. It may give its supporters a sense of legitimacy, encouraging them to openly express or act on their views. This could manifest itself in public displays of racism, a general coarsening of discourse and verbal and physical attacks on perceived political enemies, as well as on groups facing discrimination, such as Jews, LGBTQI+ people and refugees. Democratic civil society needs to monitor parliamentary decision-making and address the wider impact of far-right electoral successes on local communities, and support them in countering far-right ideology and propaganda.

Is Germany in danger of democratic decline?

I wouldn’t say that. All of Germany’s institutions, including civil society, remain active and committed to upholding democracy. However, the far right’s growing electoral success poses a clear and immediate threat. Democratic political parties must consistently and unequivocally reject any form of collaboration with the AfD. Engaging in negotiations, relying on AfD votes to pass laws or pursuing joint policy proposals risks further legitimising it. Given the current political landscape at municipal, regional and state levels, they’ll find this increasingly challenging. Still, they must hold firm to their principles and communicate their decisions transparently to the public.

Far-right influence extends beyond parliament, so the fight for a robust, pluralistic democracy must be waged beyond parliament. Past civil society strategies failed to stem the far right’s electoral rise. Continuing with the same tactics is no longer an option. It may not be a question of doing more, but doing things differently.

In the run-up to the elections, we saw that short-term campaigns aimed at reaching as many people as possible were ineffective in reducing AfD support. What’s needed now are long-term, stable support structures for civil society, particularly in regions like Brandenburg, where state elections took place on 22 September, Saxony and Thuringia. Support networks need to be both supra-regional and locally rooted, coordinating closely with local civil society. They must support those directly affected by right-wing extremist violence and group-based hostility and the organisations supporting them.

Democratic civil society must also focus on developing and implementing its own visions for the future, not just exposing and criticising the AfD. They must bring to the fore key issues such as socio-economic transformation, demographic change in rural areas, infrastructure, social justice and education. We need to ask ourselves how we imagine the democratic, pluralistic society of the future, and how we can start building it today.