CIVICUS speaks about the challenges facing democracy defenders with Lisbeth Pilegaard, chair of the Executive Committee and a board member of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), a European grant-making organisation that supports activists, independent media and pro-democracy movements.

The collapse of US democracy funding in 2025 left a gap that exposed how fragile the international support architecture for civil society and independent media has become. The EED, which has long operated at the margins of conventional donor practice by funding activists, exiled journalists and unregistered groups in contexts other donors consider too risky, found itself at the centre of efforts to respond.

What’s the state of democracy today?

Threats to democracy are real and multiplying. Many governments are restricting civil society organisations (CSOs), shutting down independent media and deploying digital tools for surveillance and to silence dissent.

In Belarus, six years on from mass protests in 2020, authorities have systematically restricted CSOs and independent media, including by liquidating organisations. In Serbia, the government uses spyware against activists and journalists, arbitrarily closes social media accounts, deploys AI-generated content at scale to manipulate public opinion and harasses those who refuse to fall in line.

These are not isolated cases. Across many parts of the world, civic space is shrinking and those doing the most important work are often the least protected.

What approaches work best in defending democracy?

What really works is long-term, locally owned support. Short-term projects imposed from outside do not. When funding responds to what democracy defenders actually need, rather than to donors’ thematic agendas, it builds real resilience, because ownership stays with the people on the ground.

That’s the approach the EED has tried to take. It means supporting groups that other donors might not or can’t touch, such as unregistered organisations, people with no track record in grants and those working in contexts too informal or risky for standard compliance requirements. It also means moving quickly when situations change and building relationships based on trust rather than bureaucratic accountability.

Moldova is a strong example. Thirteen years of consistent investment helped build a wide network of CSOs, independent media, fact-checkers and think tanks. When Russia spent an estimated €300 million (approx. US$350 million) – roughly two per cent of Moldova’s GDP – to interfere in the 2025 election, Moldovans still chose a democratic, pro-European future. That outcome wasn’t accidental. Organisations such as WatchDog prebunked disinformation and worked closely with the wider media ecosystem. TV8 alone reached 500,000 people on election day.

The urgency became acute in 2025, when the withdrawal of US funding and the dissolution of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) left a significant gap. That year, EED awarded over €52.4 million (approx. US$61 million) in democracy support, 62 per cent more grants than the previous year, despite only a 34 per cent increase in budget.

How important is independent media to this effort?

It’s fundamental, and inseparable from the broader democratic ecosystem. Independent media keep societies under repression connected to reality and are a primary defence against disinformation and foreign manipulation. In Serbia, where most outlets are controlled by pro-government forces, independent media continue to cover ongoing protests despite strategic lawsuits against public participation and sustained harassment.

Local and hyperlocal media are particularly important because they are embedded in their communities and highly trusted. In the Middle East and North Africa, community media have emerged as an important alternative to mainstream outlets.

In many contexts, advertising revenue has collapsed and other income sources are scarce, so core funding to cover salaries, equipment and running costs is what keeps outlets alive. In Belarus, sustained support to exiled outlets has kept information flowing to millions who would otherwise have no access to credible news. The news outlet Zerkalo, for example, has 2.2 million unique visitors per month, 70 per cent of them inside Belarus.

What new approaches are democracy defenders using?

Civic technology is a growing area. For example, EED partner Digital Belarus has built digital democracy infrastructure for the Belarusian opposition, including a legal consultation platform where 99 per cent of users are inside Belarus, with over 1,000 consultations monthly.

Support for people in exile is also expanding. Syrian civil society, for instance, spent years working from abroad before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 created a new democratic opening, one they were determined to seize.

Perhaps most unexpectedly, previously competing groups are learning to coordinate and finding that solidarity offers protection. In Georgia, independent media that once competed are now sharing content and appearing on each other’s podcasts as they navigate an increasingly repressive environment. In Albania, when journalist Sami Curri’s car was set alight outside his home on 26 April, numerous journalists, media organisations and networks rallied in solidarity and called for a transparent investigation.

What role are younger generations playing?

Grassroots youth movements spread across at least 11 countries in 2025. Their demands centre on corruption, inequality and nepotism rather than democracy explicitly, but they are pro-democratic at their core.

In Serbia, students are staging massive protests, and although they don’t bring European Union flags, their demands are clearly pro-democratic and pro-European. In Morocco, an anonymous youth movement known as Gen Z 212 coordinated protests across cities via the online platform Discord, drawing hundreds of thousands of members into public discussion.

Informal and unregistered groups like these are often generating real change yet they rarely meet standard donor criteria. Supporting them requires a different kind of funding relationship, based on trust rather than compliance.

What do democracy defenders most need right now?

Digital security is non-negotiable. Protecting people means more than funding their work. It means ensuring secure communications, VPN access and platform infrastructure, and guaranteeing that the funding relationship itself doesn’t put them at risk.

Capacity must be built consistently, not rushed in at the last moment. Armenia is a cautionary example. Without long-term investment, it entered its pre-election period with critical gaps in cybersecurity and investigative journalism, precisely when those capacities were most needed. In Moldova, by contrast, years of investment meant that when the moment came, civil society, independent media, fact-checkers and think tanks already trusted each other enough to coordinate. That made all the difference.

Sustained support builds resilience that holds even under extreme pressure. When Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, EED shifted to rapid-response funding averaging 15 days per grant, and provided roughly one grant a day in the first 60 days. And when the Ukraine government attempted to dismantle anti-corruption infrastructure in July 2025, civil society moved swiftly to defend it. What was called the ‘cardboard revolution’ showed what that kind of sustained investment makes possible.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.