CIVICUS discusses challenges following Kosovo’s election with Taulant Hoxha, Executive Director of the Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF), an independent civil society organisation (CSO) that supports local groups to develop a more participatory and democratic society.

In Kosovo’s 9 February election, the ruling Vetëvendosje! (Self-determination), party secured the most seats but didn’t win a majority. Government formation will entail complex coalition negotiations in a highly polarised political landscape. Kosovo faces a delicate balancing act between addressing domestic challenges in areas such as economic development, education, health and justice, and managing tensions over the political participation of Kosovo’s Serb ethnic minority and the country’s relations with Serbia, which doesn’t recognise Kosovo as a state. With local elections approaching and international pressure to resume dialogue with Serbia intensifying, Kosovo’s young democratic institutions face the test of forming a stable government while respecting civic space.

What were the election results and what coalition scenarios are likely?

Vetëvendosje! emerged as the clear winner of this election, securing almost 50 seats in the 120-seat parliament but falling short of an outright majority. A coalition will need to be assembled to form a government, which Vetëvendosje! is in the strongest position to lead. While an alternative coalition of all other parties excluding Vetëvendosje! is theoretically possible, political divisions among these parties make this highly unlikely in practice. Most non-Serb ethnic minority representatives are expected to join the coalition, but additional members of parliament will be needed to secure a majority. The highly polarised political landscape, intensified by aggressive campaign rhetoric, creates uncertainty over whether any political party from the ethnic Albanian majority will join Vetëvendosje! in a governing coalition.

In such a context, any coalition that does not include a broad spectrum of ethnic Albanian parties is likely to be fragile, particularly since failure to secure the required quorum of at least 80 members of parliament for the election of a new president early next year would trigger a new election. Additionally, the Trump administration has yet to clarify its position on Kosovo and the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, and any major shift in US policy could further destabilise a government without broad political backing.

What obstacles do minorities face in political participation?

Kosovo’s population is predominantly Albanian (91.7 per cent), with ethnic minorities comprising Serbs (2.3 per cent), Bosniaks and Gorani (2.2 per cent), Turks (1.2 per cent), and Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians (2.2 per cent). Following international agreements that led to Kosovo’s independence in 2008, Kosovo has established an advanced constitutional and legal framework for ethnic minority rights, including political participation.

Twenty parliamentary seats are reserved for ethnic minorities: 10 for Kosovo Serbs and 10 for other minority groups. Any legislation concerning minority rights requires a ‘double majority’: approval by both the general parliamentary majority and a majority of legislators from ethnic minority political parties. The government must also include at least one minister from Serb political parties and one from other ethnic minority communities.

Kosovo has further strengthened minority representation by establishing several new Serb-majority municipalities and one Turkish-majority municipality. Serb-majority municipalities have been granted extended local authority over cultural and religious heritage, education and health, along with special legal provisions for police and justice system composition. Similar provisions exist to ensure minority rights protection at all levels of governance.

However, the reality of ethnic minority participation varies significantly between communities: while non-Serb ethnic minorities engage fully through their parties, both at national and local levels, Serb political participation is restricted due to Serbia’s active opposition to Kosovo’s independence and its strong control over Kosovo Serbs and their political representatives.

For over a decade, since the beginning of the European Union (EU)-mediated Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, Kosovo Serbs’ political representation has been monopolised by Srpska Lista (Serbian List), a Serbia-controlled party that openly opposes Kosovo’s statehood and frequently undermines its institutions. For instance, it has organised prolonged boycotts of Kosovo’s institutions and frequent road blockades in northern Kosovo, where Kosovo Serbs are in the majority. In September 2023, then-Vice President Milan Radoicic, de facto leader of this political group and now a fugitive in Serbia under an Interpol red notice alert, led a terrorist attack in Bajnska. This party’s dominance restricts political choice for Kosovo Serbs. However, a notable shift occurred this year: for the first time, one Serb member of parliament was elected from outside this party, breaking its monopoly over the 10 seats reserved for Serb representatives.

The situation is more positive at the civil society level, as organisations led by or working with Kosovo Serbs play a visible role in Kosovo’s public life, particularly in advocating for minority rights. However, they face challenges at local and national levels: at the local level because the political monopoly in Serb-majority municipalities limits civic space and pluralism, and at the national level because of active opposition by many Kosovo Serb CSOs to the Kosovo government’s efforts to dismantle Serbia’s parallel structures and extend the rule of law in northern Kosovo, straining their relations with the central government.

How is civil society contributing to Kosovo’s democratic development?

CSOs played an important role in the recent election. Democracy in Action, a CSO coalition, helped ensure electoral integrity and strengthen public trust in the electoral system. CSOs were actively involved in the process to amend the electoral code. They also contributed to voter education efforts, with a notable innovation for these elections of an app allowing voters to compare their positions with political party programmes and identify the best match. CSOs also monitored the entire process, from the campaign through voting and vote counting. The abrupt freeze of US foreign aid just days before the election created a critical challenge, but CSOs reprogrammed activities and secured funding to ensure monitoring went ahead as planned.

Beyond elections, civil society works day in and day out to build democratic institutions and inclusive governance in line with Kosovo’s ambition for EU accession. Much of its work supports EU-driven reforms, which have coincided with the state-building process following Kosovo’s independence in 2008. Major achievements have included the development of a progressive legal framework for civic space, covering fundamental freedoms, public participation, financial sustainability, civil society-government cooperation and CSO service provision. In recent years, focus has shifted toward ensuring effective implementation of this framework, given that governments, irrespective of political affiliation, have tended to support civil society legislative proposals while systematically neglecting proper implementation.

One notable innovation has been the Pooled Funding Mechanism established by the KCSF, which unites multiple bilateral donors under a single programme aimed at enhancing constituency-building and internal good governance within civil society. It has become an effective platform for empowering activists and amplifying people’s voices in policymaking by prioritising local ownership and constituency engagement, essential foundations for a locally rooted civil society.

Thanks to civil society’s successful advocacy for government structures on relations with civil society to be managed by civil servants rather than political appointees, the composition of the new government is unlikely to significantly alter government-civil society relations.

How can international partners support Kosovo’s democracy?

International and foreign donors should continue supporting Kosovo’s democratic development, particularly given its ongoing vulnerabilities as a contested state and the global rise of authoritarianism that may affect disproportionally young democracies. To strengthen rather than undermine local agency, they must prioritise sustainable, systemic approaches over short-term project-based interventions. This means recognising and leveraging existing local capacities, institutions and frameworks, rather than duplicating efforts or imposing external models.

On the political front, the international community must expand its engagement with Kosovo beyond the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, acknowledging that democratic consolidation and human rights advancements are equally critical for the country’s long-term development. Greater political and diplomatic support is needed to break Kosovo’s international isolation and facilitate its full integration into the global democratic community.