CIVICUS discusses the upcoming BRICS summit with Gustavo de Carvalho, Senior Researcher at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), an independent public policy think tank.

The first summit of the expanded BRICS group will take place in Kazan in authoritarian Russia from 22 to 24 October. With the addition of four new repressive member states – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – the group’s membership accounts for 45 per cent of the world’s population and 28 per cent of the global economy. The bloc positions itself as a counterweight to the G7 and the global governance system but faces criticism for its members’ human rights records.

What’s the BRICS, and what’s its purpose?

BRICS is an informal grouping of emerging economies that has gained influence in global governance since its inception in 2009. Like the G7 and G20, it serves as a platform for member states to promote their views on global economic issues and strengthen cooperation.

In its original composition, the bloc included three major states from the global south – Brazil, India and South Africa – and two eastern powers – China and Russia. Seven other states were invited to join in 2023: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, Argentina and Indonesia declined, and Saudi Arabia has yet to confirm its membership. More states are likely to join in the future, but probably not this year as there have been major disagreements over the pace of expansion and new members are just beginning to settle into their roles. Before expanding further, BRICS is likely to refine its ‘partner country’ category, establishing mechanisms for non-member states to associate with BRICS without becoming fully members.

From the outset, BRICS has advocated for changes in international financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to increase its influence in them to make it more commensurate with its economic weight. In recent years, it has also focused on reducing trade barriers, increasing trade in local currencies and creating institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB). The NDB complements existing financial institutions by offering an alternative source of funding specifically tailored to the needs of emerging economies. Unlike traditional institutions such as the IMF or World Bank, which often lend in major currencies like the US dollar or euro, the NDB started prioritising loans in members’ national currencies. This helps reduce exchange rate volatility and currency risks associated with repayment.

Additionally, while the IMF and World Bank have a more hierarchical governance structure, BRICS countries, at least the original five, have an equal say in the NDB, aligning its governance more closely with its members’ interests and economic realities. Despite not being as large as the World Bank or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the NDB offers to many a more flexible and responsive option for infrastructure and development projects.

What’s on the summit agenda?

This year’s summit is likely to build on the decisions taken last year in Johannesburg, South Africa. Two key topics are expected to dominate the agenda.

Member states will discuss options for trading among themselves in local currencies, based on recommendations from finance ministries and central banks. This is part of a broader effort to offer alternatives for cross-border transactions, not to replace the US dollar, but to increase options and boost intra-BRICS trade. The goal is to create more resilient trade mechanisms by using local currencies to reduce exchange rate volatility and shield members from global financial market fluctuations. Initiatives like the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative aim to facilitate smoother payments among BRICS countries, though these remain voluntary and non-binding. At this stage, we can expect a proposal of options for member states and a roadmap for future implementation, rather than any immediate shifts. These steps will continue to be the subject of intense negotiation, as they have been in the past.

The summit will also likely concentrate on defining the roles of partner states. This is particularly important given divergent views within BRICS on further expansion. Brazil, for instance, was hesitant about the 2023 expansion and may resist another round of new members this year. Emphasis will likely be on consolidating the integration of new members and refining the framework for partner countries, allowing them to contribute without altering the core membership. My impression is that the focus will be on clarifying how non-member states can engage with the group through initiatives like BRICS+ or other associative mechanisms.

As this year’s chair, Russia is using the summit to demonstrate that it’s not as internationally isolated as some might believe. It has planned over 250 meetings for the year, significantly more than the 200 South Africa held in 2023, covering a broad range of issues from politics to culture, education and sports.

Is there room for civil society participation in the BRICS?

Civil society has a voice within BRICS, but its influence remains limited—and not just because Russia is chairing this year’s summit. Historically, civil society engagement has been limited, even when summits were hosted in more democratic countries such as Brazil, India or South Africa. The primary platform for civil society engagement in BRICS is the BRICS Civil Forum, where civil society representatives from member states discuss key issues and present a communiqué for consideration by heads of state during the main political summit. So, the summit in Kazan, like last year’s in Johannesburg, will primarily be a meeting between heads of state, with limited civil society participation.

This limited role for civil society is not unique to BRICS. Similar groups like the G7 and G20 follow a comparable structure, with civil society engaging through the Civil 7 (C7) and Civil 20 (C20) forums and submitting communiqués to governments. Even in more democratic environments, decision-making at these summits remains largely in the hands of states, with civil society playing a consultative rather than decisive role.

A comparison of the communiqués from the BRICS Civil Forum in Russia, the C7 in Italy and the C20 in Brazil shows they all discussed similar issues and made comparable recommendations. The BRICS Civil Forum held in Moscow this year focused on digital inequality, sustainable development, financial reform and inclusive global governance. These discussions echoed calls for more equitable financial systems and closing of digital divides seen in the C7 and C20 forums.

The main distinction, however, lies in their focus, at least in 2024. While the C7 and C20 pushed for broader global reforms—particularly in areas such as climate action, digital equity and financial governance—the BRICS Civil Forum was more focused on changes within the BRICS framework itself, addressing regional needs and promoting cooperation among member states.

How seriously should we take BRICS’ claim to offer an alternative global governance model?

Despite the positions of some of its members, BRICS doesn’t offer a radical alternative model but rather complements existing global governance structures such as the G7 and G20. It provides a platform for states, particularly global south ones that may feel marginalised in other forums, to voice their concerns within a multilateral setting. Discussions within BRICS tend to be slow and incremental, largely because decisions are made by consensus. This approach ensures a search for common ground among diverse members, rather than pushing for rapid or dramatic change.

The consensus-based decision-making process also means that issues on which there’s deep disagreements among BRICS members are either heavily negotiated, toned down or removed from the agenda altogether. This results in decisions that are often more balanced than the individual positions of any one member. The slow pace of decision-making reflects the complexity of reconciling different worldviews, but it also highlights the bloc’s role in advocating for global changes that benefit its members collectively, without necessarily seeking to replace existing structures. BRICS focuses on issues such as financial reforms, development finance and trade in local currencies—topics particularly relevant to emerging economies but less emphasised in the G7 or G20.

The relatively low-key commitments within BRICS make it attractive to states seeking to balance external pressures in a fractured global order. This flexibility allows them to create complementary institutions such as the NDB while advocating for changes that enhance their position within the global economic architecture.

Further coordination between BRICS, the G7 and the G20 is essential. Together, these groups represent the main informal governance frameworks that unite the world’s major economies. Alignment on key issues such as financial governance, climate action and digital inclusion could amplify their collective impact, ensuring global decisions reflect the interests of both developed and emerging economies. In an increasingly divided geopolitical landscape, this coordination is more crucial than ever.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.