CIVICUS discusses Armenia’s June election with Samvel Martirosyan, co-founder of CyberHUB-AM, a civil society organisation that monitors digital threats and electoral interference.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan won re-election on a promise to pivot towards the European Union (EU) and reset the country’s regional relations following the end of its long conflict with Azerbaijan. His opponents campaigned to rebuild ties with Russia, which tried to sway the vote. Pashinyan’s abrasive campaigning style, however, raises concerns over a slide towards personal rule, with police and courts targeting protesters, opposition politicians and religious leaders.

How credible was the election, and what did observers say about it?

The fate of some parties was decided by razor-thin margins. One opposition party, Prosperous Armenia, missed the four-per-cent threshold by just 55 votes, which made a significant difference in the composition of the National Assembly. At a time when Armenia reshapes its political direction, every seat counts.

Observer missions from international bodies accepted the election as democratic overall, but serious concerns clouded that verdict. Authorities arrested dozens of opposition members, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe flagged pressure on the opposition in its report.

Russia deployed multiple interference mechanisms, including open political and economic pressure on opposition forces, troll factories spreading disinformation and cyberattacks against civil society and media outlets that we at CyberHUB attributed to Russian state-backed operations. Russia may also have organised travel to Armenia for thousands of diaspora voters holding Armenian passports. These were not isolated incidents. They were part of a coordinated campaign.

However, some of Russia’s interference may have backfired. Its scale and visibility, combined with economic hardship many Armenians associate with Russian dominance, possibly worked in favour of Civil Contract, Pashinyan’s party. Foreign interference was real and documented, but its impact is hard to measure.

The deeper problem is that observers are also polarised, and each side sees what its geopolitical interests lead it to see. Western governments and pro-Pashinyan groups accepted the result as legitimate. The opposition, Russia and Belarus called it unprecedented forgery. This is not a question of facts versus lies. It’s a question of how one weighs conflicting evidence. The disagreement reflects a deeper dispute about what legitimacy means in an election with heavy interference.

What role has the Church played?

Months before the election, tension between Pashinyan and the Armenian Apostolic Church was intense and public. The Church leader was actively engaged in political messaging, serving as a counterweight to the government. This unprecedented involvement in electoral politics defined the early pre-election period.

Over the final two months before voting, however, the Church fell mostly silent or spoke only in general terms. The conflict simply disappeared from view, suggesting negotiation with the government, pressure on the Church to step back or a strategic calculation to avoid direct confrontation. Whatever the cause, the Church’s retreat was one of the defining features of the final campaign period.

Can Armenia realistically pivot away from Russia?

The path to the EU and away from Russia is far less clear than western politicians suggest. Armenia’s economy is deeply tied to Russia. The country depends on Russian energy, investment and trade relationships that cannot be quickly replaced. Despite political frustrations, Armenians see their economic future as intertwined with Russia. EU integration is slow and complex. Even with Pashinyan’s western-leaning government winning, structural economic and geopolitical constraints make rapid change unrealistic.

Armenia cannot simply pivot. It must navigate between two systems while managing economic survival. The election was framed as a referendum on geopolitical direction, but the options available to Armenia are much more constrained than the vote suggested. Pashinyan’s victory doesn’t automatically translate into an EU path. The economic and political obstacles are structural, not electoral.

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