The law appears to be part of the Taliban’s efforts to consolidate and institutionalise ideological and legal control over Afghan society. Rather than introducing entirely new restrictions, it formalises existing edicts, measures and practices. While presented as a procedural law governing the courts, its provisions extend beyond judicial matters and into people’s daily lives, providing a legal framework for restricting fundamental freedoms. These include freedoms of assembly, expression, movement and religion, and the right to privacy.

The code uses the terms ‘master’ and ‘slave’ to distinguish legal statuses and authorise husbands and masters to carry out some punishments directly. It also categorises society into four groups — religious scholars, elites, the middle class and the lower class — with punishment determined by social rank rather than by the nature of the offence. Both moves reflect an attempt to formalise social hierarchies, entrenching existing inequalities and giving them a legal basis.

The law has far-reaching implications across all spheres of life, affecting fundamental freedoms and rights including rights to equality, family life, privacy and protection from torture and other ill-treatment. Activists, lawyers and researchers have raised serious concerns about its incompatibility with international human rights standards.

The law’s impact on civic space is particularly significant, because it introduces broadly defined offences restricting freedoms of assembly, association, expression and movement and privacy rights. It penalises people for their presence in particular spaces or associations, without requiring any intent or unlawful conduct. Terms such as ‘heresy’ and ‘persistent corruptor’ are vaguely defined and used to criminalise a wide range of conduct and expression, from criticism of public authorities and religious figures to personal behaviour. The law also enables intrusive regulation of private life through vague and punitive provisions that facilitate arbitrary interference with family and community life, compelled reporting and surveillance.

The law further entrenches institutionalised discrimination, particularly against women, reflecting a systematic effort by the de facto authorities to consolidate gender-based repression and subjugation. Provisions regulating marriage and family relations undermine women’s autonomy and equality, including by limiting their ability to seek legal protections from domestic violence and conditioning those protections on visible physical harm. The law also permits punitive measures against women for exercising basic freedoms, such as visiting relatives without permission. These measures, combined with existing restrictions on movement and access to justice, create a framework that tolerates violence, imposes a disproportionate evidentiary burden and denies women access to effective remedies. This violates international human rights standards including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

The law also raises serious concerns regarding children’s rights by permitting corporal punishment under narrowly defined thresholds. It allows disciplinary violence unless it results in visible injury, implicitly tolerating other forms of physical and psychological harm. Some provisions authorise punishment of children for vague reasons such as negligence in religious practice. These measures are inconsistent with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires protection from all forms of violence and mandates that discipline respect the dignity and best interests of a child. The broad language of these provisions risks normalising violence against children and enabling abusive practices.

Religious minorities are further marginalised through provisions that privilege a singular interpretation of Islam while labelling non-Muslim communities and other sects, such as Shia Muslims, in discriminatory terms. The law restricts freedom of religion, including by penalising changes in sectarian affiliation for adherents of the Hanafi school, one of the four major schools of Islamic law in Sunni Islam, and the dominant one in Afghanistan. This may enable coercive and discriminatory enforcement against other sects, including followers of the Ismaili or Jafari schools. These measures disregard Afghanistan’s religious diversity and are incompatible with international protections of freedom of conscience, religion and thought under the ICCPR.

The law imposes severe and discriminatory penalties on LGBTQI+ and gender-diverse people, including the death penalty for some acts, without distinguishing between consensual and non-consensual conduct. This violates fundamental rights, including the rights to life and privacy and freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and risks criminalising victims of sexual violence and discouraging reporting.

The international community provides some support to Afghan activists, both inside the country and in exile, but not enough to meet the scale and urgency of their needs. Although the de facto authorities have not been formally recognised by most states, the international response to the Taliban’s policies has been fragmented. This lack of coordination has arguably emboldened the Taliban to further suppress civic space and intensify their targeting of activists.

Activists inside Afghanistan face extreme risks, including reprisals, surveillance and threats. They need sustained financial, moral and political support, including discreet funding mechanisms, protection measures and stronger international advocacy on their behalf.

Afghan activists in exile, while operating in comparatively safer environments, also face significant challenges. Many maintain contact with people inside Afghanistan and continue documenting human rights violations and need greater financial support and training in digital security and evidence collection to work safely and effectively.

The international community should adopt a coordinated pushback strategy. States and the UN should publicly and consistently call for the law’s repeal, condemn it as incompatible with international human rights law and ensure it remains high on the agenda of relevant UN bodies.

The international community should strengthen accountability by reinforcing monitoring and reporting, supporting evidence preservation and pursuing targeted measures against those responsible for drafting, implementing and enforcing the law. International civil society organisations should complement this by documenting the law’s impact, amplifying Afghan voices and supporting strategic advocacy internationally.

Practical support should also be expanded for Afghan activists and women human rights defenders. The international community’s response must deny the law legitimacy, raise the political cost of its enforcement and strengthen those resisting it, particularly inside Afghanistan.