Venezuela’s opportunity for democracy
The possibility of a democratic transition in Venezuela may be getting closer. Nicolás Maduro’s government, having heavily repressed civic space, is at a low ebb, widely rejected by the public. Meanwhile the opposition, having overcome multiple obstacles and restrictions, goes to the polls on a consensus platform and aligned behind a single candidate. However, much could still go wrong. Strong international pressure is needed, particularly from countries in the region with ideologically close, leftist governments, to call for the Venezuelan government to stick to the electoral timetable, allow a free vote and respect the results.
Venezuela’s 28 July presidential election could offer a genuine chance of democratic transition. Despite an array of challenges, the opposition is coming into the campaign united behind a single candidate. Many Venezuelans seem prepared to embrace the possibility that voting could deliver change.
But the authoritarian government is digging in its heels, meaning things may keep getting worse before they start getting better. The opposition reasonably fears the election could be suspended or the government could suppress the opposition vote. While the government has indicated it seeks at least some semblance of competition, large-scale fraud can’t be ruled out.
All credible opinion polls show that authoritarian president Nicolás Maduro, in power since the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013 and seeking a third term in office, is highly unpopular. But his United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) extensively controls the state apparatus. Electoral authorities aren’t neutral and the election system is riddled with irregularities. A recent decision by the government-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) excluded from voting over five million Venezuelans who’ve emigrated.
If the opposition succeeds in mobilising voters and defeats the PSUV at the polls, the government will only accept the results if the costs of repression outweigh the costs of withdrawal. This means some form of exit guarantees will need to be agreed. And if a new opposition president were to be inaugurated on 10 January 2025, an agreement to coexist would also be needed for a transition period that could last several years, during which PSUV supporters would continue to hold important institutional positions and the party would need to be given the chance to reinvent itself as a participant in democratic processes.
Down the slippery slope of autocracy
When Chávez was first elected in 1998, Venezuela was a democracy, and one of Latin America’s oldest, having avoided the military coups and dictatorships most of the region experienced in the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1990s, however, Venezuelan democracy was under siege, plagued by instability and unsatisfied public demands, and the political class was increasingly discredited.
It should have been a red flag that Chávez, a professional military officer, first tried his luck with a coup. In the early 1990s he founded a clandestine movement, leading a coup attempt that landed him in prison in 1992. But he was soon freed on a presidential pardon and went on to found the Fifth Republic Movement, his springboard to the presidency. He won the 1998 election fair and square, with 56.5 per cent of the vote, promising to call a Constituent Assembly process to draft a new constitution, which he did as soon as he was inaugurated.
Before his first year in power ended, Venezuela had a new constitution, adopted with 71 per cent of the vote in a referendum in which over half of voters abstained. A general election under the new constitution was held in 2000, with external observers noting the CNE’s lack of impartiality, manipulation of the election schedule and difficulties in monitoring the vote count. Chávez was elected again, with almost 60 per cent of the vote. He undoubtedly received a majority vote.
While still a democracy, over the next few years Venezuela would become an increasingly flawed one, as the executive took on excessive powers, undermined judicial independence, took control of the media and tilted the playing field heavily in the PSUV’s favour. The fact that it initially faced serious challenges, including a coup attempt and an indefinite strike in the oil industry, the state’s main source of revenue, encouraged the government to harden its stance.
The government’s social programmes made a big difference to the lives of millions of poor Venezuelans. When the opposition promoted a recall referendum in 2004, almost 60 per cent backed Chávez. There were allegations of fraud, and the fairness of the vote couldn’t be verified. But until his death in March 2013, Chávez remained popular. Civic space became increasingly restricted and electoral competition was far from free and fair, but there wasn’t much need for systematic fraud. Venezuela was what’s often characterised as a hybrid regime, combining democratic and authoritarian features.
All that changed under Chávez’s designated successor, the far less charismatic Nicolás Maduro, whose turn to rule came as the toll of economic mismanagement became impossible to hide. He was confirmed in power in a 2013 election in which the PSUV reportedly won around 51 per cent of the vote. It’s hard to say whether Maduro ever genuinely won an election. He soon became an outright dictator.
In 2014, severe shortages and declining living standards led to a wave of protests across Venezuela. These were violently suppressed, leaving at least 43 dead and thousands injured and detained.
In December 2015, the opposition coalition Democratic Unity Roundtable won National Assembly elections by a landslide, but in January 2016, the Supreme Court declared the legislative body in contempt of court after it swore in three opposition lawmakers who’d been disqualified by the judiciary. In January 2017, the Supreme Court declared all the National Assembly’s actions since the election null and void, and two months later it stripped the Assembly of its powers and deputies of their immunity, leaving them liable to prosecution, including in military courts.
This move, which the opposition denounced as a coup, led to a new wave of protests, in response to which Maduro called for a constitutional rewrite. A vote many saw as fraudulent was held to elect a Constituent Assembly, and in August 2017, this PSUV-controlled body took over the National Assembly’s legislative powers.
The 2018 election that handed Maduro a new term was undoubtedly fraudulent. Following his inauguration in January 2019, the opposition-controlled National Assembly made a bold but ultimately failed move, declaring its president, Juan Guaidó, to be the interim president of Venezuela. A lengthy stand-off followed.
Civil society in resistance mode
Venezuelan civil society has long played a key role in promoting democracy, defending human rights and calling out violations. But it faces many challenges, as many of the human rights violations it has denounced have also been designed to limit its space.
Civic space has increasingly been shut down, with activists and journalists routinely subjected to threats, harassment, intimidation, raids on their homes and offices, arrests, detention and prosecution by courts lacking any independence. Systematically vilified as enemies of the state, dissenters and protesters have faced repression both from law enforcement bodies and groups linked to the ruling party.
Many civil society organisations (CSOs) and media outlets have closed and others have self-censored or changed their focus to avoid reprisals. Numerous journalists, academics and activists have joined the ranks of millions of Venezuelans who’ve fled the country.
The government provided legal cover for many of these abuses by issuing a barrage of laws and regulations that it justified on grounds such as the defence of sovereignty and the fight against terrorism. Many of these, starting with the 2010 National Sovereignty and Self-Determination Law, sought to restrict access to funding to financially suffocate civil society.
The government has also used the 2012 Law against Organised Crime and Terrorist Financing to subject CSOs to unwarranted controls and restrictions. In 2016, when it lost control of the National Assembly, it started issuing emergency decrees that gave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the power to review agreements signed by CSOs or individuals with international bodies for projects in Venezuela. In 2020, it ordered banks to monitor CSOs’ financial operations, ostensibly to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. Further administrative decisions required CSOs to undergo complex registration and licensing processes under threat of being declared illegal.
In 2017, the National Constituent Assembly issued the Constitutional Law Against Hatred, for Tolerance and Peaceful Coexistence, known as the Anti-Hate Law, imposing heavy punishments, including lengthy prison sentences, for inciting hatred or violence through any electronic means, including social media. The law leaves the definition of what constitutes hate speech to the government-aligned courts, meaning any criticism or dissent can be classed as such.
In 2021, the National Assembly, now controlled by the PSUV, passed an International Cooperation Act that included a mandatory register of CSOs and an obligation to provide sensitive information.
As a result of this sustained attack on civic freedoms, in December 2023 the CIVICUS Monitor downgraded Venezuela’s civic space rating from repressed to closed, the worst rating.
The government has doubled down ahead of the election. In January, the National Assembly approved the first reading of a draft Law on the Control, Regularisation, Activities and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organisations. Specifically aimed at restricting civic participation and human rights advocacy, what’s being called the Anti-NGO Law would prohibit CSOs from engaging in vaguely defined ‘political activities’. If passed, CSOs that fail to register or disclose their funding sources could be fined, deregistered and prosecuted. They could be charged with terrorism, money laundering, destabilisation, conspiracy and foreign interference.
The National Assembly is also currently discussing a law against fascism, aimed at banning and criminalising ideas, expressions and activities deemed to be fascist or akin to fascism. It defines the concept vaguely, but it could include the defence of neo-liberalism and moral conservatism. It would give the state the power to dissolve organisations deemed to be based on fascist ideas or ‘similar expressions’, and disqualify people from involvement in politics, a punishment that could be applied retroactively. It would also penalise the organisation of demonstrations that allegedly promote fascism. And it would promote self-censorship by placing a heavy responsibility on the media to avoid spreading fascist messages.
A united opposition
Over the years, the Venezuelan opposition has found it hard to present a unified front and a credible alternative. But this has changed in the run-up to the 2024 election. The most intransigent opposition groups, which for years refused to compromise and take part in elections that didn’t offer enough guarantees, agreed to participate in an opposition primary to select a single opposition presidential candidate, under the banner of the Unitary Platform.
In June 2023, the Venezuelan government disqualified the leading contender, María Corina Machado. Regardless, Machado emerged as a consensus candidate with over 90 per cent of the vote at the October 2023 primary election. More than two million people were said to have taken part, defying threats from the authorities, censorship and physical attacks on candidates at campaign rallies.
In an attempt to regain the initiative, the government sought to stir up nationalist sentiment by activating its dispute over the territory of Essequibo Guiana, a large part of Guyana claimed by Venezuela. In December 2023 it held and predictably won a consultative referendum on the issue.
A week after the opposition primary, the Supreme Court suspended the process and its results. The decision came in response to a request by a ruling party legislator who baselessly alleged that the primary had been ‘a big scam’. In December, Machado filed a writ with the Supreme Court, but instead the court ratified her disqualification. So on 22 March, three days before the deadline for candidate registration, she announced 80-year-old academic Corina Yoris-Villasana as her replacement.
The government couldn’t find any excuse to disqualify Yoris, who’d never held political or public office, so instead it blocked the registration website. Right up to the deadline, the automated system had selective technical issues that affected opposition candidates. Military officers also blocked physical access to the election office building.
Following an international press conference in which Machado denounced the manoeuvre, support came from two unlikely allies, the leftist governments of Brazil and Colombia, which stated that what had happened was incompatible with an agreement that had just been brokered. Many more expressed their concern, and the CNE eventually authorised a 12-hour extension for the Unitary Platform to register its candidates.
Within a few hours, the opposition submitted numerous candidates, some of whom were rejected, while others went through. As a result of further negotiations in mid-April, all registered opposition candidates withdrew apart from one. The compromise candidate was former diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia, a moderate unknown to most people and one few could object to.
International community’s role
The United Nations (UN) has kept a spotlight on Venezuela since at least 2019, when its then human rights chief Michelle Bachelet made an official visit and the Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission. Tasked with investigating human rights violations committed since 2014, its mandate has been extended and it continues to operate.
Over the years, some countries, notably European Union (EU) members and the USA, have supported the Venezuelan opposition and urged the government to respect human rights and hold free and fair elections.
Anything the USA does is open to the accusation of imperialist interference, but the EU has been able to supply a credible set of proposals on how to hold fair elections. The report of its observation mission following 2021 regional and municipal elections recommended strengthening the separation of powers, abolishing disqualifications, holding a public voter education campaign, imposing sanctions for electoral malpractice, allowing balanced media coverage, repealing the Anti-Hate Law and introducing incentives and sanctions to ensure enough properly trained and accredited polling station officials are available on election day.
However, the EU’s role in the upcoming election remains in doubt. After the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning Machado’s disqualification, the National Assembly leader said the EU wouldn’t be allowed to do election observation.
A key step in the right direction was taken in October 2023, just ahead of the opposition primary, when government and opposition representatives met in Barbados and signed an agreement on the right of political organisations to choose their presidential candidates, an electoral timetable and a set of procedural guarantees.
The day after the signing of the Barbados Agreement, the US government eased its sanctions against Venezuela’s oil and gas industry but warned it would reinstate them if the government didn’t honour its commitments – and in April 2024, it brought them back. The Venezuelan government breached the agreement’s first point before the ink dried, as it initiated legal proceedings against the opposition primary.
Upon the signature of the agreement, the US Secretary of State also said that political prisoners were expected to be released by November. Five were immediately freed, but many more remain behind bars. Their release is a key opposition demand in the run-up to the election.
Two months before the big day, everything hangs in the balance. While the official campaign will take place in July, the unofficial one has long started on the streets and social media. Machado and González are touring the country, promising orderly and peaceful change. The government has launched an aggressive smear and disinformation campaign against González. Relentless harassment follows Machado wherever she goes. Local opposition activists are routinely arrested following opposition rallies in their area.
To encourage progress towards free and fair elections, in mid-May the EU temporarily suspended travel restrictions on a group of election officials. But it also extended sanctions against over 50 government officials, which the government reacted to by revoking the invitation for the EU to observe the election, accusing the regional body of engaging in ‘neo-colonialist and interventionist practices’.
There are doubtless many more twists and turns ahead. The Venezuelan government is used to downplaying international criticism, but that’s much harder when calls to respect the democratic process come from leftist Latin American leaders. They have a key role to play in urging Venezuela to let genuine elections happen and respect the results. The logic of democracy is that sooner or later Maduro will have to go. It would be wise for him to start negotiating the how.
OUR CALLS FOR ACTION
-
The Venezuelan government must roll back existing restrictions on freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly and free political prisoners.
-
The Venezuelan government must allow independent election monitoring and ensure the safety of opposition and independent observers during the election.
-
Progressive Latin American governments should urge the Venezuelan authorities to stick by the election schedule and provide procedural guarantees.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
Cover photo by Jimmy Villalta/VW Pics/Universal Images Group via Getty Images