Myanmar at a crossroads
Myanmar’s ruling junta is responding to military setbacks in its fight against pro-democracy forces and ethnic militias by stepping up repression, deepening an already grave human rights and humanitarian crisis. It’s also trying to gain international legitimacy. Ignoring civil society’s warnings, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the key regional body, is giving it an easy ride. The international community must act to improve the prospects for democracy in Myanmar, including by supporting activists and journalists at risk, imposing targeted sanctions and an arms and aviation fuel embargo, recognising the legitimate government in exile and referring Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.
Things aren’t going as planned for Myanmar’s army. Since it overthrew the elected government in a February 2021 coup, it’s been at war with the pro-democracy fighters of the People’s Defence Force and ethnic militias resisting military oppression. Recently, it has suffered humiliating setbacks and lost much ground – and reacted by intensifying its violence.
Military setbacks
After gaining control of some key areas earlier this year, including along the borders with China and India, in July opposition forces took over Lashio, the largest town in the northern Shan state and a key military stronghold on the border with Thailand and Myanma’s trade route with China. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, an ethnic opposition group, claimed to have seized the military’s northeastern regional command, detained the regional commander, arrested over 4,000 soldiers and freed more than 200 political prisoners from jail.
It was the first time in more than 50 years that one of Myanmar’s 14 regional military commands had fallen to an armed ethnic group. The loss was significant enough to merit a public statement from the junta leader, who portrayed it as the military ‘withdrawing’ from some positions due to ‘security considerations’.
According to Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), the government in exile formed by a coalition of democratically elected politicians, over 60 per cent of Myanmar’s territory was already controlled by resistance forces before Lashio was captured. The Lashio victory had a multiplier effect, inspiring armed groups in other parts of Myanmar to increase the frequency and strength of their attacks, making it harder for the military to hold onto territory. Opposition groups may now target towns and cities once considered impregnable military strongholds.
Faced with previous setbacks that led to mass defections, which fuelled further defeats, the junta announced compulsory military conscription in February. This prompted many young people to flee to Thailand, at the risk of being sent back by Thai authorities, or otherwise seek refuge in parts of Myanmar not under military control. Since conscription began in April, an estimated 25,000 men aged 18 to 35 have been forcibly taken to training camps, with 5,000 deployed to the frontlines.
Following its Lashio defeat, the junta appointed coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing as acting president, in addition to his roles as military commander-in-chief, prime minister and chair of the ruling State Counsellor’s Office. It then extended the state of emergency, for the sixth time, for another six months – ostensibly to ‘prepare valid and accurate ballots’ for elections it’s already postponed several times.
Relentless repression
Since the coup, the military junta has carried out a brutal crackdown on dissent, effectively closing down civic space.
People have continued to resist, but they face severe punishment for even small acts of dissent. On 19 June, the police arrested scores of people for wearing, carrying, selling and buying flowers as part of a nationwide ‘flower strike’ to mark the birthday of detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi and call for her release. Junta supporters also reported Facebook and Telegram users who posted photos of flowers.
According to data from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a human rights organisation, since the coup the junta has arrested 27,580 activists and protesters on trumped-up incitement, sedition and terrorism charges. Most remain in detention, where torture is systematic. Among the many who’ve died as a result of torture and ill-treatment is a renowned documentary filmmaker, Pe Maung Same, who died of complications from tuberculosis in August 2024. He’d been arrested in May 2022 on charges of contacting local resistance groups and sending video footage to the NUG and local media outlets.
The junta has tried numerous detainees in secret military trials, sentencing at least 160 to death. On 23 September, democracy activists Maung Kaung Htet and Chan Myae Thu, husband and wife, were executed after being convicted in an unfair trial for their alleged involvement in a parcel bomb attack. Several others are at imminent risk of execution.
"The Myanmar junta military will execute over 120 detainees in the coming weeks, who are mostly activists & human rights defenders. 15 of them are women HR defenders."
— Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (@SpecialCouncil) September 24, 2024
States must act to end #Myanmar military impunity NOW. #WhatsHappeningInMyanmarhttps://t.co/4LVsdAAM1v
Arbitrary trials have resulted in thousands being sentenced to prison, sometimes for very long periods. Democracy activist Ko Wai Moe Naing was forcibly arrested during a protest in Sagaing Division in April 2021 and faced 10 charges, including incitement, unlawful assembly and intent to commit murder. He was sentenced to 34 years on eight of the charges, but he was recently also found guilty of high treason and given an additional 20 years.
The junta maintains a relentless crackdown on internet access and media activity, seeking to prevent protests, which rely heavily on social media, and block the flow of information within Myanmar and with the outside world.
In the first six months of 2024, phone and internet services were cut in more than 80 townships, and in May the junta launched a major effort to shut down virtual private networks (VPNs), which people use to access banned websites and services. In some towns, patrolling soldiers began randomly checking mobile phones, threatening those found with VPNs with heavy fines and arrest. In July, people complained that some Google apps, as well as the popular messaging app Signal, were blocked and could only be accessed through VPNs. According to democracy activists, the junta is working with two Chinese companies to develop tools for surveillance, censorship and control of internet access.
Many journalists have fled, and those still in Myanmar are at high risk of being killed, arrested or prosecuted for their reporting.
On 28 June, journalist Htet Aung was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with hard labour in connection with a report he published in August 2023 on demands for justice for past atrocities. He was convicted of abetting terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Law. In August, a military court sentenced two Dawei Watch journalists, Aung San Oo and Myo Myint Oo, to 20 years and life imprisonment. They’d been arrested in December 2023, three days after returning home from hiding. They were beaten during interrogation and denied legal representation. That same month, soldiers shot dead two journalists, Win Htut Oo of Democratic Voice of Burma and Htet Myat Thu, a freelance reporter for the Than Lwin Times, during a house raid in southern Mon state. Their bodies were cremated without being returned to their families.
In total, the AAPP has documented the killing of 5,886 people, including pro-democracy activists and civilians, by the junta and pro-military groups.
Humanitarian crisis
The army continues to commit war crimes against Rohingya people and other Muslim minorities, including extrajudicial killings, arson, forced conscription and the use of people as human shields. Millions have been internally displaced, creating a humanitarian crisis that’s particularly acute in the north, southeast and Rakhine state, the epicentre of the 2017 Rohingya genocide.
Voices from the frontline
Kyaw Win is founder and executive director of the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN). Based in the UK, BHRN is the only civil society organisation that systematically monitors and reports on human rights abuses against Burma’s six Muslim minority groups.
The military’s actions are part of a wider strategy to eliminate Muslim communities. While the Rohingya remain the most visible victims of this genocide, all other Muslim groups –Kaman, Myaydu, Panthay, Pashu and Pathi people –suffer from the junta’s oppressive policies. These communities have long been denied basic rights and full citizenship and experienced systemic discrimination, with the coup exacerbating these abuses.
Military offensives have displaced hundreds of thousands of Muslims, forcing them to flee their homes and leaving many trapped in conflict zones with no access to humanitarian aid. They are in a precarious situation in Burma and as refugees in neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh and Thailand.
In Rakhine State, Rohingya civilians continue to live in conditions of apartheid-like segregation, with limited access to education, employment and healthcare. Clashes between the military and armed groups such as the Arakan Army have worsened the situation. In regions such as Sagaing and Tanintharyi, Muslim-majority villages have been destroyed, mosques desecrated and civilians arbitrarily arrested.
As long as the military leaders responsible for the 2017 genocide against the Rohingya remain in power, the genocidal campaign against Muslim minorities will continue. The junta’s reliance on violence and repression makes the prospect of a peace agreement impossible. Genuine peace cannot be achieved as long as the military remains in control and is unaccountable for its crimes.
The international community must act more decisively. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should reject the legitimacy of the military junta and cease all engagement with it as a governing body. Instead, it should support the NUG.
ASEAN should develop a regional protection framework in line with international human rights standards. This framework must ensure that Muslim minorities and other persecuted groups are not forcibly returned to Burma under the principle of non-refoulement. Countries such as Malaysia, which will chair ASEAN in 2025, have a crucial role to play in leading these efforts and ensuring humanitarian assistance reaches those most in need.
The international community as a whole should expand its targeted sanctions to cut off the junta’s access to military resources and financial support. They must also support ongoing efforts to hold the junta accountable for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court and other international legal mechanisms. The time for action is now. Anything less will only prolong the suffering of Burma’s Muslim minorities and other persecuted communities.
This is an edited extract of our conversation with Kyaw. Read the full interview here.
The junta is also targeting civil society groups and volunteers working to help displaced people, particularly in areas where the conflict has intensified.
Speaking at the opening session of the summit of ASEAN, the key regional body, on 11 October, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres warned states that a third of Myanmar’s population was in dire need of humanitarian assistance and urged them to ‘leverage their influence’ to bring about peace. But Guterres has been criticised for not once setting foot in Myanmar in his eight years at the helm, and for showing little public interest in the situation.
International failure
There’s no shortage of information about what’s happening in Myanmar. Two years before the coup, military atrocities led the UN Human Rights Council to establish the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), which has been gathering evidence and maintaining case files since, in anticipation of a time when those responsible can be prosecuted. The UN has also had a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar since 1992.
In a July 2024 resolution, the Human Rights Council reiterated its deep concern about the human rights and humanitarian crisis and called for its root causes to be addressed, and for a viable, lasting solution. On 9 September, the IIMM informed the Council it had received numerous reports and testimonies of human rights violations against thousands of detainees, including torture and sexual assault, with the situation in Rakhine State being particularly alarming. A week later, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released its latest report on the grim human rights situation.
But no one else seems to care. Other parts of the UN have moved too slowly on Myanmar, or haven’t moved at all. In April 2024, Guterres announced the appointment of his new Special Envoy for Myanmar, a capable and committed official – but almost a year after her predecessor left the post. The Security Council hasn’t referred Myanmar to the International Criminal Court for genocide or taken any steps to impose an aviation fuel and arms embargo on the junta, as civil society has repeatedly demanded. The Human Rights Council passed a resolution to that effect in April, but it hasn’t been implemented.
The junta’s latest supposed election date is November 2025, which is unfeasible given that it only controls a small part of Myanmar’s territory. Civil society has denounced the planned election as a stalling tactic and a sham to give authoritarian rule a veneer of legitimacy – but regional and international powers are backing it, raising the suspicion they’re looking for an excuse to recognise the regime. These include India and Russia, two of the junta’s biggest arms suppliers and China, increasingly supportive of the junta and hostile to the NUG and ethnic militias operating near its borders. It also includes neighbouring Laos and Thailand, both key members of ASEAN, which has consistently chosen not to apply any pressure on the junta.
Voices from the frontline
Cornelius Damar Hanung is Southeast Asia Programme Manager at the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), a regional human rights organisation.
ASEAN’s approach has been guided by the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), agreed upon with the Myanmar military junta in April 2021, two months after the military seized power. The five points were an immediate end to violence, dialogue among all parties, the appointment of a special envoy, allowing humanitarian assistance by ASEAN and allowing an ASEAN special envoy to visit Myanmar to meet with all parties.
This approach is fundamentally flawed because it’s based on engagement with the illegitimate junta, which is committing gross human rights violations, while failing to publicly recognise the NUG.
Despite calls from civil society to go beyond the 5PC and formally recognise the NUG, ASEAN has maintained its stance. When Indonesia chaired ASEAN in 2023, 180 meetings were held with various stakeholders, but not with the NUG. Under Laos, ASEAN has continued talking to the wrong party.
Indonesia’s legacy includes the establishment of a troika mechanism including the current, former and incoming chairs, whose purpose is to discuss how ASEAN can better address the crisis in Myanmar. But if the ASEAN envoy continues to rotate with each new chair, it will do little to improve the situation.
The only positive is that the Myanmar crisis has been on the ASEAN agenda for three years now. But even if some decisions were made, their effectiveness remains uncertain.
This is an edited extract of our conversation with Cornelius. Read the full interview here.
Next steps
Despite repeated calls from human rights groups, ASEAN has done little. At its leaders’ summit in authoritarian Laos in October it decided to stick to the approach it’s adopted since the coup, the 5PC, which it says should lead to dialogue for a peaceful solution. But THE plan has long lost all credibility. ASEAN has allowed the junta to get away with systematically acting against the 5PC, including by criminalising instead of engaging with its opponents, and intensifying rather than stopping the violence. It hasn’t taken the NUG seriously and hasn’t shown any interest in alternative plans developed by civil society.
ASEAN is moving in the wrong direction. After the coup, Myanmar’s participation in high-level ASEAN meetings was limited to a ‘non-political’ or relatively low-level representative. Until recently, the junta chose not to attend – but this has now changed, with the junta sending a ‘non-political’ representative to the latest summit. It should be clear that any participation by the junta is inevitably political, further constraining ASEAN’s ability to act, as decisions require consensus among all members – including military-run Myanmar. The danger is that ASEAN may be moving closer to recognising the junta as Myanmar’s legitimate government.
Instead of bringing the junta back into the fold, ASEAN should engage with the NUG –recognised by the European Union and several democratic states – as the true representative of Myanmar’s people, and listen to civil society.
The international community must support Myanmar’s democratic forces in every way possible. This must include humanitarian aid and human rights advocacy, along with diplomatic recognition and political support. The international community must understand that any lasting solution to Myanmar’s crisis and the achievement of peace and democracy must be led and owned by Myanmar’s people.
OUR CALLS FOR ACTION
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The international community should support Myanmar’s journalists and activists at risk and pressure the military junta to release political prisoners, end arbitrary arrests and refrain from further violence.
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The UN Security Council should impose an arms and aviation fuel embargo on Myanmar and targeted financial sanctions against senior officials, and refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.
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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations should distance itself from the junta and engage with the National Unity Government.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
Cover photo by Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters via Gallo Images